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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE NORTH, EIGHT COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES OF COMMUNITY STRUCTURE AND POLICY MAKING.

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A PRELIMINARY, SYSTEMATIC PICTURE (CENSUS) WAS DEVELOPED OF THE STATUS OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN EIGHT NORTHERN CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE 1954 "BROWN" DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. THE PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT WAS TO CORRECT THE DISTORTED VIEWS OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION STATUS, RESULTING PRIMARILY FROM NEWS MEDIA REPORTS OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. PRINCIPAL STUDY DATA WERE GATHERED THROUGH INTERVIEW RESPONSES AND THE PERSONAL FILES OF APPROXIMATELY 200 PERSONS, INCLUDING SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS, SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, NEWSPAPERMEN, AND HEADS OF CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS. THESE DATA WERE USED TO DEVELOP A CASE STUDY FOR EACH CITY CONSIDERED, DESCRIBING HOW THE DESEGREGATION ISSUE WAS RAISED, HOW IT WAS DEBATED, AND HOW IT WAS (OR WILL BE) RESOLVED. CITIES COVERED IN THIS INVESTIGATION WERE ST. LOUIS, LAWDALE, BAY CITY, NEWARK, BUFFALO, BALTIMORE, SAN FRANCISCO, AND PITTSBURGH. AN OVERALL REVIEW OF THE EIGHT CASE STUDIES WAS ALSO MADE IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A GENERAL PICTURE OF THE TYPICAL INTEGRATION DECISION, COVERING THE DEMANDS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, THE RESPONSES OF SCHOOL BOARDS AND SUPERINTENDENTS, AND THE REACTIONS OF THE MASS OF WHITE CITIZENS. IN THREE OF THE CITIES STUDIED, SCHOOL INTEGRATION HAD BEEN RESOLVED, AND DEMONSTRATIONS, IF THEY EVER OCCURRED, WERE A THING OF THE PAST. PLANS WERE BEING IMPLEMENTED IN TWO OTHERS WHICH SHOWED PROMISE OF RESOLVING THE ISSUE. IN THOSE REMAINING, WORK STILL NEEDED TO BE DONE. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE IN THIS STUDY TO RECOMMEND SOLUTIONS FOR THIS LATTER GROUP, AS THE PROJECT PURPOSE WAS ONLY TO REPORT FACTS AND POSSIBLE SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THESE FACTS. (JH)

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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE NORTH:
EIGHT COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES OF
COMMUNITY STRUCTURE AND POLICY MAKING

by

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A study such as this owes a huge debt to the two hundred persons who permitted us to interview them and who graciously made their files available to us. We are especially conscious of the sacrifices these men made since they were all very busy men and women--school board members, school administrators, public officials, newspapermen, heads of civil rights groups. A number of them gave us confidential documents, permitted us to borrow their personal files, and helped us locate other documents which we needed. They spent as long as eight hours in interviews with us. We remember several of these persons as especially helpful, considerate, or insightful; but we have decided not to attempt to thank any of these persons by name here. To thank one or two would be an insult to twenty others who also went out of their way for us; and to thank twenty would be an improper recognition of our debt to a hundred more.

We will no doubt disappoint many of these respondents, who were hopeful that we would present a series of recommendations which they could make use of; but as responsible social scientists we are convinced that our duty is to report facts and possible sociological explanations of these facts, and let those who are qualified by experience or training develop specific proposals from this.

Many of our informants disagree with us about our interpretation of these data, of course; but in many respects those who disagreed were more helpful than the others, since they forced us to rethink our analysis.

We are indebted to Miss June Shagaloff of the national office of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who gave us valuable advice and information about the national picture. Anyone who attempts a study such as this has a great advantage if his cities are described in the City Politics Report published by the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies, under the direction of Edward C. Banfield.

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The members of the research staff were Morton Inger, Thomas M. Landye, Gerald A. McWorter, Paul Peterson, Robert T. Stout, and James J. Vanecko. They were responsible for the interviewing, for preliminary drafts of almost all the chapters as indicated below:

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Interviewers</u>	<u>First draft by</u>
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IV (Bay City)	Inger, Stout	Inger
V (Newark)	McWorter, Vanecko	McWorter
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The first draft of Chapter XIII was prepared by Vanecko; the first draft of Chapter XIV by McWorter.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This preliminary report is an analysis of the way in which fifteen American city school systems made decisions concerning school integration. Eight of these cities are northern ones which were faced with demands for increased integration. They are discussed in this, the first volume, of the preliminary report. The second volume will study seven southern cities that were in the process of desegregating their schools in compliance with the Brown decision of the Supreme Court.

Politics, however it is defined, is mainly concerned with the process by which groups of people make decisions which are binding on the members of the group. Studies like this one, which focus on a single decision as it is made in different cities, are one way to approach the study of urban politics. Of course, no theory of urban politics can be derived from studying a single issue, and therefore this sort of study will need to be repeated for other types of decisions. But this disadvantage to the present research is more than compensated for by the fact that concentrating on a single decision permits us to simultaneously examine a number of cities and determine not merely how the decision is made in a particular city, but what factors cause cities to differ in the ways in which they make decisions.

This is one justification for the present study. School integration is an interesting issue for our purposes, particularly in the North, because it is a new issue; rigid decision-making techniques have not been developed, and the range of possible outcomes is large. Furthermore, the decision is made in a highly ambiguous situation where there are no simple formulas to rely upon. Thus the decision will vary

from one place to another, and we can expect this variation to have its roots, not in trivial differences in administrative structure, but in some aspect of the basic political style of the city. Our analysis suggests that this is indeed the case, and that cities which resemble each other in their handling of school integration have fundamental similarities which cause them to also handle other issues in the same way. For example, we will present an analysis which suggests that the most important factor in determining the behavior of school boards on the integration issue is the amount of influence in the hands of the "civic elite"--the businessmen and others who participate in city decision making from outside the government and the political parties. The analysis of school integration has suggested to us a partial explanation of why these "civic elites" play different roles in different cities.

But in addition to this, the study serves a second and quite different function. It provides us with a description of one aspect of one of the most important social movements in recent American history. Admittedly, school integration is only one part of the "Negro revolution," but it is an important part. Some writers have seen the 1954 Supreme Court decision as the most important single cause of the Negro revolution, and in the northern cities studied, school integration has frequently been the leading edge of the civil rights movement. A good look at this issue, and the way it has been handled, may help us to understand and anticipate the future course of social conflict in America.

Almost all our information about the school integration issue has come from newspapers and news magazines, and they have presented a highly distorted picture.

A careful reading of the national press would lead us to this image of the school system and the civil rights movement as two uncompromising opponents battling on year after year. The newspapers have reported in detail the conflicts--the picketing, the boycotts, the resignations of superintendents, and the role of race in school board election campaigns. Conflict is news and peace is not. What the

newspapers have not done is to bring their readers a systematic picture-- a census of where the news is good as well as where it is bad.

This is a goal of this study. By selecting eight cities more or less randomly, this study was able to develop at least a preliminary picture of the state of the school integration issue in the big cities across the whole of the North. The reader may be pleased to find that the picture is not quite as bad as he had thought; in three of the eight cities, the school integration issue has been resolved in one way or another, and demonstrations, if they ever occurred, are a thing of the past. In two cities, plans are now being implemented which show promise of resolving the issue. In another, the issue has not been resolved, but at this writing is simmering quietly; two other cities are facing demonstrations as this is written. There is a great deal of conflict in these cities but it is also clear that conflict is not unavoidable. And if Negro education has not changed radically, it is also true that each of our eight cities has taken some steps to improve the education of its Negro students. A social revolution of considerable importance is being handled gracefully in at least some cities.

But in this study we are trying to be more than systematic journalists. We also want to spell out more precisely the nature of the school desegregation issue. It is not simply a story of Negroes screaming "freedom now" and school administrators saying "go away." The prevailing myths--that civil rights leaders want total integration immediately, and that they would rather demonstrate than negotiate; that school superintendents are narrow-minded autocrats; that school boards are representatives of a segregationist power structure; that the white voters will rise up in arms at the first sign of a school bus--are, we think, simply not true. So one of our main concerns here is to make some first estimates of what precisely civil rights leaders expect from the schools and what they are willing to accept and how school boards, school administrators, and the voters feel about the issue. Perhaps we only reflect the social scientist's faith that things look simpler when we

understand them, but we do not think that the school integration issue is as complicated or as irrational as it has been made to look.

Our third goal is, then, to explain the differences between the cities we have studied. Why was there so much controversy in Bay City and so little in Baltimore? The school desegregation decision is simply a decision, made by a group of men who make up the school board while they in turn are being influenced by another group of people who make up the civil rights movement. It therefore follows that differences in the kinds of decisions made will depend upon differences in the composition of these groups, and upon the kinds of influences they operate under. From this common-sense perspective, school integration is merely one of the many issues handled by local government. This means two things; that this study will add to our general knowledge of the community, and conversely, the recent renaissance in the study of local governments and community structure provides us with some conceptual tools to look at civil rights and the schools. This completes the circle and returns us to the first goal of the study--to use the way in which the eight cities handled a common issue to develop some general ideas about how American public schools and American cities are governed.

The Research Design

Unfortunately, there has been little systematic research on the way in which the school integration issue has been handled. There is of course a great deal of journalistic writing, but this had tended to dwell on the actual list of charges and countercharges, on the personalities of the contestants, on the conditions in the schools and the specific plans for integration. From our perspective, these are not the most relevant factors. What is important from our point of view is the process of negotiation and communication, the perceptions of other's intentions, the conditions under which certain types of people--political leaders, businessmen, academics--play roles in the decision. Very little of this appears in the day-by-day reporting of school

integration in the North. We are only marginally concerned with the objective result of any particular plan for school integration, and we are completely unequipped to evaluate the quality of education which Negro children receive in different school systems.

R. M. Williams and Ryan (1955) provided a valuable analysis of desegregation in northern cities before the Brown decision; but the changes in the national climate since that time have been so great the school integration is in many ways not the same issue that it was then.

Research in schools of education has generally not been as useful as we had hoped it would be. There are two reasons for this: first, the school system is seen from the administrator's perspective and in the frame of reference of the educational profession; second, much of the work consists of disparate pieces of research which have not been put into a useful conceptual scheme. One valuable exception to this rule is Kimbrough (1964).

Since we did not feel that the existing literature provided us with a set of hypotheses which we could test, we were forced to fall back on a case study technique. The great advantage of the case study is that it makes minimal restrictions on the research. The observer in the city can feel free to pursue a particular hypothesis as far as his imagination and the cooperation of his respondents will permit. Although our approach is of course limited by our inability to conceive of all the factors which are involved, we did try to stress six questions which we thought were fundamental to the issue and which were stated in sufficiently general terms to permit us to uncover unanticipated factors:

1. What is the issue? Who wants integration, and what do they mean? Who is opposed? Why? (Can we distinguish between the demands publicly made by the civil rights leaders and the philosophy which lay behind the demands? Similarly, can we find fundamental attitudes behind the position held by the other actors?)

2. Who are the actors? How many persons participate in developing a demand for integration? Who are the actors who decide how to reply to the demand? (Was the decision made by the school board, the superintendent, the "power elite," the mayor?)

3. What are the channels of communication and influence which connect the actors to each other and to the holders of various kinds of power? (Is poor communication an important factor in the creation of controversy? Does the school board tend to go to influential persons for help?)

4. What resources did the various actors have at their disposal (votes, prestige, money, etc.)?

5. What are the factors which placed the particular men in decision-making positions? (Does an appointed school board differ from an elected one? Under what conditions do "militants" take over leadership of a civil rights organization?)

6. Could we see a relationship between the behavior of the actors in the school integration issue and the general structure of politics in the city?

The other advantage to the case study approach is that it permitted what we might call a "total analysis" of the particular issue. We were, after all, restricting ourselves to the study of only a particular aspect of the issue. We therefore set as the final goal of the project the complete explanation of the differences between cities on this issue. In this way we would be able (within the limits of our skill, of course) to determine which factors were most important, and which factors were irrelevant. For example, we have concluded that not only are the personal attitudes of school board members toward the civil rights movement important in determining the extent to which the school system will move to integrate schools, these attitudes seem to be by far the most important factor. Similarly, we concluded that the willingness and

ability of the civil rights movement to engage in demonstration has relatively little effect on what the school board does. This is part of what we mean by "total" analysis. In addition, we set for ourselves the goal of tracing the causes of variation in the school integration decisions back to fundamental characteristics of the city: its population composition, its economy, and its political structure. This rather utopian goal would be completely unattainable if we restricted ourselves to highly specific types of data. Rather, we tried to collect a great deal of miscellaneous information about each city so that if we discovered that we needed to know about any particular characteristic of the city, we would have at least some information which could be used in the analysis.

The great disadvantage of the case study, of course, is that it is time consuming, and in the past this has meant that one social scientist studied only one city. Unfortunately, the single case study has some serious drawbacks, since it is impossible to know whether the conditions being reported are unique to that city or whether they are in fact representative of most cities. For this reason the single case study has outlived its usefulness. The three most valuable recent monographs on community decision making all are based on comparisons between cities. Banfield and Wilson (1963) based their work on data collected by their students in a series of large cities, each city being described in a lengthy mimeographed monograph. O. P. Williams and Adrian (1963) studied four middle-sized Michigan cities (in an effort to match certain aspects of the cities so as to minimize unimportant differences); and Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson (1964) also based their study on research in four communities.

Empirical research on the community is fundamentally no different from empirical research in any other area; it is simply the establishing of the relationships which exist between variables. To note that both competitive politics and large public expenditures for "projects" such as urban renewal are present in New Haven is not very helpful. We need to know whether these two variables are systematically linked in most cities. Even if we do not wish to establish correlations, but only to

describe the American city, we have no choice but to make a comparative study. It is obvious that we cannot answer the question "How militant is the northern civil rights movement?" while looking only at New York City.

Even four cities were not sufficient for this purpose. There would be a very great risk of selecting a biased sample. Thus we were caught between several conflicting demands. Our research budget would have permitted a very complete case study in one or two cities; or we could have undertaken to survey one hundred cities, if only we could select two or three variables for study and limit ourselves to them. But of course we could not take chances on our ability to guess which were the crucial variables. Our solution to the dilemma was a rather novel research design. We selected fifteen cities, eight in the North, seven in the South, by a modified random sampling scheme, which is described in Appendix I. In each city we made a case study, basing our data largely on approximately twenty interviews which were collected in the course of one week. We then selected what we thought were the key variables and assigned our cities scores on each variable so that we could undertake a survey-style statistical analysis. We thought that this design would be the best compromise, since it would give us the advantage of the case study, in which we could search for the most important factors in each case, and then permit at least a tentative demonstration that these factors were important in all our cities. We stayed within a research budget by taking the smallest number of cities which would permit comparative analysis, then economizing on data collection techniques.

The data were collected by a team of two or three interviewers who usually spent one week in each city. During that time they interviewed most of the members of the school board, the leaders of the civil rights movement, local informants such as newspapermen or social scientists who were familiar with the local situation, and where possible key elite figures such as the mayor or the most influential businessmen. We

collected on the average twenty-two interviews, ranging from thirty minutes to eight hours in length. The interviews focused upon determining what was demanded by the civil rights movement, what the school system did in response, and what actions (demonstrations, suits, counter-suits, etc.) took place or were threatened. In the process of doing this, we found out who the most important actors were. Then we interviewed these men to determine the pattern of communication and the channels of influence that connected them. In our interviewing of the actors we also focused upon their personal characteristics--in particular their social origins and their political ideology. We then began tracing the reasons why these particular men should be in the decision-making positions by trying to find out how persons are recruited to these roles and obtaining information about the community's general political and civic structure. Finally, in each city the interviewers gathered several pounds of printed documents: school board minutes, reports, complete sets of newspaper clippings, and even copies of private correspondence.

If there is any part of our research we are pleased with, it is the method of data collection. Our fears that a week of interviewing in each city would not be enough time proved to be unfounded. We had no difficulty in learning the detailed story of the decision; there may be some well-kept secrets which we did not uncover, but we think that in almost every city we have a story complete enough for analysis. In addition, we found, as other researchers have noted, that a clear impression of the particular "tone" or "style" of a city is immediately apparent, although sometimes we were not successful in identifying all the factors which go into making up a city's "style" of action.

It would be pleasant to pretend that we had, in fact, conducted a total analysis, one which considered every possible factor and then developed the relationship of each variable to the outcome of the integration controversy. Of course, one cannot design research which will do this. However, by the use of open-ended interviewing, a flexible data

collection schedule, and a willingness to rewrite the questionnaires repeatedly we were able to keep in mind many possible hypotheses. In addition, we often found that when a hypothesis developed from our study of one city, we could search the files and our memories for the necessary data to make at least a rough test of the hypothesis in the cities we had been in earlier.

The case studies of the eight cities are presented very briefly in the next eight chapters. Each chapter is simply a description of how the desegregation issue was raised, how it was debated, and how it was finally resolved. In writing the description, we have not attempted a thorough account of every action; instead we have stressed the key actions, and those which to us seem particularly significant in setting that story apart from the others. In general, there is little in the stories which an informed resident of the city might not already know. We have also pointed out the factors which we think might have caused the city to take the particular course that it did. We have added brief descriptions in some cases of some of the actors, where we think this is helpful to the reader. Of course, we are not interested in singling out persons for praise or blame; but one of the reasons why cities differ in their actions is that they place different types of men in leadership positions.

We are not concerned with the technicalities of actions taken by the schools to meet the demands of the civil rights movement. We do not intend to describe in detail, or evaluate, particular plans for school integration or various techniques for upgrading education of the "culturally deprived." Rather, our focus is upon the school integration issue as a political matter. Our concern is with the problems of communication, perception, influence, power, and ideology which are part of this story just as they are part of any political decision. Thus our focus will be upon two main questions: Was the issue resolved to the satisfaction of the civil rights movement? How much public controversy surrounded the issue?

After each chapter was written, copies were given to our respondents. They made many important criticisms. In two cases a school board or a school superintendent objected strongly to our report, and in these cases the city has been given a pseudonym at their request. (In a third case, one school board member objected, and that person is not mentioned in that report.)

In Chapter X we review the eight case studies and attempt to develop a general picture of the typical integration decision--what the basic demands of the civil rights movement are, how the school board and the superintendent respond, and how the mass of white citizens react. In effect, this chapter is an overview of the issue. The following four chapters then analyze the differences between the eight cities. In Chapter XI we attempt to show that much of the difference between cities can be explained by the composition of the school board; in Chapter XII we pursue the two major variables, the liberalism of the school board members and the cohesion of the board, and conclude that the differences between boards lie in the differences in the way members are recruited to serve. In Chapter XIII we attempt to trace these differences in recruitment patterns to differences in the basic makeup of the city; its political structure, its population composition, and its economic base.

In Chapter XIV we then make some rather preliminary attempts to analyze the civil rights movement in the same way, by attempting to determine how a factor such as the socio-economic status of the Negro community affected the style of action of the movement.

We are somewhat surprised by our findings. For example, a great deal has been written about school superintendents and their role in the school integration decision; our case studies suggest that the superintendent plays a minor role in comparison with the school board in the overall shaping of the decision. Much has also been written about the aggressiveness of the civil rights movement; our interviews suggest that the aggressive movements appear in relatively few cities in the North.

We were more impressed by the weakness of the typical civil rights group. In addition, we did not find the typical civil rights movement to be engaged in "irresponsible" direct action; it seemed to us that if a political strategist were called in to advise the civil rights groups in our cities, he would generally advise more picketing, not less. Finally, we were somewhat surprised to find evidence that despite the pressures working on school board members, they did not seem to be learning to play new roles as full-time political actors; instead their decisions about school integration seemed to be affected most by the personal prejudices for or against Negroes which they brought with them when they first joined the the board.

We think the report will be valuable to the persons involved in the school desegregation issue. Certainly, we have no formula for either racial peace or racial progress, but the report may provide the reader with a useful account of the situation in other cities and, more important, a perspective on the whole matter which may help him understand his own community. In addition, we hope that the analysis of this issue provides useful data for the social scientists who are concerned with the government of the public schools. We especially hope that we can stimulate more research on school boards. In the years of work on the study of education, few writers have focused upon school boards as political bodies, and the results of this study seem to indicate that more attention should be given to them. Finally, we hope that these new data will be of value to the students of American local government and the American community. While we do not develop any general theories of community structure or community decision making, we hope that this study brings us closer to the day when such theories can be subjected to thorough empirical tests.

CHAPTER II

ST. LOUIS

In many ways St. Louis might be selected as a representative example of a big city with problems. For example, while the metropolitan area as a whole increased 74 per cent between 1920 and 1955, the city itself grew only 12 per cent. During that time, the gap between the white middle-income suburbs and the biracial low-income city became much greater. Seventy-three per cent of the Negroes in the metropolitan area live in the city. In 1960, the city of St. Louis was 29 per cent Negro while the suburbs had a Negro population of 6 per cent--the bulk of whom lived in Illinois in the East St. Louis area.

St. Louis' last annexation was in 1876. In the late 1950's a serious effort was made to create a metropolitan government; however, the plan fared worse here than in most places. When submitted to a referendum the suburbs vetoed the proposal by an overwhelming vote. Worse yet, the city itself split on the issue and wound up rejecting it by a narrower margin.

With this much of the story told, the resemblance to other "cities with problems" ends. Banfield (1965) introduces his description of St. Louis by observing that St. Louis does not have the middle-income population necessary to support "good government," but has it just the same. In fact, the St. Louis school segregation controversy is a good example of "good government" in action.

The St. Louis Political System

The main political division in St. Louis can be referred to as South Side versus North Side. South St. Louis is German and was once Republican; North St. Louis is solidly Democratic and contains the remnants of a political machine based on Irish, East European, and Negro votes. (Of course, politics does not follow exact geographic lines, but we will use these terms for descriptive purposes.)

During the school segregation crisis of 1963, Southsider Raymond Tucker was in the midst of his last term as mayor of St. Louis. Previously he had been opposed in each Democratic primary by the North Side regular Democrats. He defeated them with the help of business support, an appeal to good government, and the votes of the South Side German wards. While in office, Tucker ran a "clean" administration, pushed an attack on air pollution (Tucker had been an engineering school professor), and stressed civil promotion of the "Gateway to the West" and "projects" such as urban renewal and the Saarinen arch. The urban renewal project which contributed so much to building Tucker's image--Mill Creek--played an important role in the integration issue, as we shall see.

The School Board and Its Schools

The North Side Democrats never had much patronage in Republican St. Louis; in fact, only one Democratic mayor was elected before 1949. The exceedingly clean city charter made them dependent upon noncity jobs for their organizations. Some of these jobs came from the Democratic state capital, but many came from the school system. When the Northsiders controlled the board, the school system was divided into four sections with an administrator reporting directly to the board from each section. Instruction, under Superintendent Philip Hickey, was clean of patronage, but contracts and nonprofessional staff appointments required political clearance. An effort at reform began with the school board elections of 1951, but with relatively little success until in 1958 one of the reform board members, a young executive named Daniel Schlafly, succeeded in breaking a scandal. One school administrator had been removed from office and the board president was involved in the scandal when Schlafly stood for re-election in 1959. (In St. Louis the twelve board members serve staggered six-year terms, so that four members [or more, if there are any vacancies] are elected every two years.)

There had never been a Negro elected to city-wide office in St. Louis, although several men had tried. In the 1959 election the Negro candidate

for the school board was Reverend John Hicks. The Negro wards represented a sizable bloc of the North Side anti-reform votes, and Hicks and Schlafly reached an agreement for mutual support. Hicks took many votes away from the organization and threw some of these to Schlafly (many simply "bulleted" by voting only for Hicks). The result is that both of them, and a third "reform" candidate, were elected. During the next two years, two North-siders resigned, and Mayor Tucker made two blue-ribbon appointments: a corporation lawyer (and a Republican), James McClellan, and Mrs. Gilbert Harris. Two years later, in 1961, five more of the board's seats came up for reelection, and Schlafly and others organized a citizens committee which found candidates and financed them. The citizens committee was primarily a group of businessmen. McClellan and Harris were endorsed by the committee. The committee also slated another Negro, James Hurt, the son of a prominent physician and owner of a small loan company. The entire slate won rather handily. Now with a majority of the board, the reformers were able to reorganize the contracts and maintenance programs, and Superintendent of Instruction Hickey was given de facto control over the entire school system.

With the elimination of patronage, the usefulness of the schools to the organization Democrats was over, and since that time the citizens committee's candidates have been virtually unopposed. In 1963 the last seats of the board were swept by the slate, and two women active in PTA and neighborhood work, one of them a Negro, were selected. Superintendent Philip Hickey retired because of health in 1963, and his deputy, William Kottmeyer, succeeded him as superintendent. Although both were committed to running a "clean" school system, the political involvement of the schools had given them a broad background in the political arts. Thus the school system had men with political "savvy" both on the board and in its top administrative offices.

Although the reorganization of the schools solved some of its problems, the schools were and are still in a series of binds. One of these is money. With the city's limited tax base as its main support, the school

system has not been able to afford many new programs (property assessment had not been changed in a decade). The other bind on the schools is the combination of the Missouri state school law and a rural-dominated state legislature. The law sets the maximum tax rate at a very low level and requires that any school system operating above that level receive approval from the voters in referenda held at least every two years.

From 1955 to 1963, the civil rights issue lay dormant. The school system and Superintendent Hickey had received much praise throughout the United States for the speed and success of its desegregation program immediately after the Supreme Court decision of 1954. One of the legacies of the previously segregated system was the presence of a large number of Negro teachers and administrators. In our interviewing ten years later, the effect of this on Negro-white relations was still visible. But throughout this era of good feeling, there was an undercurrent of racial protest. There was still some discrimination in the school's building trades employment. The schools were de facto segregated with over 90 per cent of the Negroes attending segregated schools.¹

The Negro community was, during this time, split into an uneasy alliance between the professional politicians (who were affiliates of the North Side organization) and the Negro business elite. The ward political bosses were "welfare oriented," primarily concerned with obtaining their share of the jobs and favors to be distributed; the business elite represented an old St. Louis elite that was somewhat more militant on racial matters. By 1963, the left wing of the Negro community had become mobilized around a growing CORE chapter and the voice of a "young turk" politician, William Clay.

During this period, the basic racial ecology of the city was being drastically altered by the Mill Creek urban renewal project. In 1950 the

¹Throughout this report, we will use "segregated" to mean a school enrolling over 90 per cent of one race. Our conventional measure of segregation will be the percentage of Negroes attending such schools (see Appendix II for a discussion of this particular measure, and a table comparing the school systems studied).

Negro population was concentrated in the old center-city wards. As has happened in many cities, these wards were bulldozed. The Negro population was displaced into the West End. In addition, the total Negro population had been growing at an annual rate of 4 per cent. In 1950 the West End area had a population of 83,000 people, and it was 99 per cent white. Ten years later, it was 30 per cent white. Previously, the population had been older, Catholic families, and the parochial schools had sufficed for their educational needs. Now an influx of young, Protestant families filled the public schools far beyond capacity. School bond proposals were defeated repeatedly, so that by the time a bond issue was finally passed to build new elementary schools in the West End, the schools were already badly overcrowded. State law effectively prevents putting the schools on double shift. In addition, both the superintendent and school board members expressed strong disapproval of double shift. Instead, in 1955 the school system began transporting the excess children to empty classrooms in all corners of the city. However, the predominantly Negro students arrived in the all-white receiving schools in "contained units"--they arrived a few minutes later than other students, and attended classes only with their bus-mates. In part, the "contained units" were a solution to a complex logistics problem involving bus schedules; also, in some schools the transportees heavily outnumbered the resident students so that the integrated schools would be racially imbalanced. And in the mid-1950's, when the entire bussing program was running great risk of segregationist opposition, "contained units" were probably the only realistic approach. By 1963, however, the civil rights leadership saw the segregation of transported students as a slap in the face.

This was but one of the factors which made the West End situation explosive. In addition, there was considerable complaint from parents who resented the overcrowded schools, and many parents objected to having their children bussed, whether in "contained units" or not. Most important, the white families who had stayed in the West End and organized to stabilize the area racially were losing the battle and unhappy about it.

In the election in the spring of 1963, the final third of the school board seats were filled by the reform slate. The school system also held its regular referendum to receive approval to levy taxes above the state maximum. They received the approval by fewer than three hundred votes this time. In the spring the de facto segregation issue spread through much of the country, and caught fire in St. Louis' West End.

The West End Community Conference Report

The West End Community Conference was an organization of middle-class whites and Negroes dedicated to maintaining stable integration. The group was led by Mrs. Ann Voss, a white housewife who succeeded her husband as president and who devoted tremendous energy to the organization.

On March, 17, 1963, the Conference issued a report, charging that the schools in the West End were more segregated than could be accounted for by housing segregation. They specifically accused the board of permitting white students to transfer out of schools in the area while refusing Negroes the same privilege. They charged that the school board's plan to move Harris Teachers College (the teachers college operated by the public schools) out of the West End would discourage whites from staying in the area, and they raised the issue of segregation of the transported pupils. They asked for the appointment of a committee to study the question. The school board met a few days later to discuss the report and consider appointing a commission. Three days after that, the NAACP issued a report, repeating many of the conference charges and also calling for a commission. The same day, a "young turk" Negro politician, William Clay (whose ward was in the West End), charged that the school administration had "intentionally established and authorized policies and programs which have been major factors in the resegregation of schools." CORE and other civil rights groups began to make statements.

The school board held a public hearing, at which these groups presented testimony. The meeting was long and the testimony disorganized.

In response, the school administration prepared a document, replying, as its title said, to 136 charges made at the hearings. By merely presenting a long catalogue of charges made, this report had the effect of belittling the central issues, such as the teachers college and the transportation program, by surrounding them with more trivial charges. It lumped together statements made by everyone, including some by board vice-president Hicks. Finally, it produced a flat "no" as an answer to everything. Needless to say, the quality of the arguments used to demolish the charges varied considerably. Although the report served a useful function in rebutting some of the false charges, the tone of the document was such as to add fuel to the flames.²

At the same time, the board itself was in the process of naming the commission requested by the West End Community Conference and the NAACP. In retrospect, one of the most important actions taken by the school board was the appointment of this commission. It was appointed at the very beginning of the controversy and instructed to report quickly; in addition, the commission was made up of persons acceptable to the civil rights movement. The Negro school board members had been consulted for names--not only Hicks, but the more militant James Hurt. The Catholic diocese, under the leadership of Cardinal Ritter and St. Louis University, has a liberal slant, and from this community the board selected as its chairman a man with impeccable credentials as an integrationist--Trafford Maher, S.J. The man primarily responsible for the selection of the committee was Schlafly, who was then board president.

April was a calm month. What would happen next was hard to guess. The board was showing signs of splintering on the racial issue. All three Negroes could be counted on to vote for increased integration. Two of the white board members were also likely to take an extremely liberal stand.

²It is difficult to judge the impact of the document. Of course it is difficult to say what alternatives the school system had which would have avoided irritating the civil rights leaders. But it is our judgment that the document did have this negative effect.

One of these was Reverend Allan Zacher, the young minister of a major Episcopal church in the central business district. The other was Dr. Robert Rainey, a militant liberal who was just beginning his campaign to run for coroner. During our interviewing, he was occasionally accused of being influenced by the Negro vote. At the opposite extreme, a couple of the less active members of the board were conservative on racial matters. This left Schlafly and McClellan as central figures in two senses of the word. They were the men who would determine whether the board would go conservative or liberal.

The Maher committee had been asked to make an interim report on the Harris Teachers College question. Their report endorsed the move of the teachers college. Hicks sharply criticized the report, and he, the other two Negroes, and Zacher voted against the motion to transfer the school. The weight of logic was on the side of the transfer. A study of the census data had pointed out that the school-age population of the West End was overwhelmingly Negro, and there was little if anything which the board could do to prevent the West End schools from becoming all Negro. It also seems unlikely that keeping the teachers college in its present location (a few doors from the Voss residence) would encourage any of its faculty or students to remain living in the area.

But it was unfortunate that this demand of the West End group had to be singled out and rejected at this time, since it led the civil rights leaders to expect more unfavorable rulings when the Maher commission completed its report. The rest of May was uneventful, but during the first week of June, Mrs. Voss met with Charles Oldham, a long-time labor lawyer and an ex-national chairman of CORE, Dr. Jerome Williams, and William Clay. These men were probably the most important leaders in the militant wing of the St. Louis civil rights movement. They decided to again raise the issue of the segregation of the bussing program and testified before the school board on June 5. When the board failed to respond to their testimony, they decided to blockade the buses which would pick up West End pupils. On June

7, the buses were blockaded by a small group of civil rights leaders. Two days later the schools recessed for the summer. The rest of the month of June was a series of threats. The protestors threatened to sit-in, to call a school boycott, and to file a suit. During this time, Dr. Amos Ryce emerged as spokesman for the Parents of Transported Pupils, the organization which had boycotted the buses. Ryce was later to become the first Negro president of the city-wide federation of Protestant churches.

At this point Schlafly called for the board to obtain a court ruling on the legality of the bussing program. McClellan made the motion, but Dr. Rainey proposed an amendment that the ruling should be sought only if the Maher commission, whose report was due that month, recommended retaining bussing in contained units. Apparently Rainey's amendment was accepted by McClellan, although this vote is not a matter of record; the final motion read that the ruling would be requested after the Maher commission had reported. (The wording is important. If the board had asked for an immediate ruling, it would have appeared to commit the board to retaining "contained units" regardless of the Maher recommendations.)

By mid-June, the original demands had been broadened to include a general plea for a program of integration of both pupils and staff. At this point, the protestors announced that they would put on a demonstration on Locust Street outside the school board offices on the evening of June 20. Mayor Tucker publicly asked them to cancel the demonstration. Dr. Williams announced the morning of June 17 that they were going ahead with the demonstration and demanded a meeting with the school board in order to avert the demonstration. They also requested Tucker's presence at this meeting. They had three principal demands: (1) the transported pupils be fully integrated at receiving schools; (2) faculties be integrated; and (3) school district boundaries be redrawn to insure maximum integration. Schlafly offered to have three members of the board, Hicks, Hurt, and McClellan, join him in meeting with them and Tucker. Dr. Williams requested that the entire board meet with them, but the board

members would not accede.³ On June 20, 1963, the protestors demonstrated, and the next evening the Board of Education met, the Maher commission reported, and the board voted to do two things--to submit the report to Superintendent Hickey for a reply and to start holding public hearings on the report.

The Maher report, while avoiding any direct criticism of the school system, made a series of recommendations, including the integration of faculties, the integration of the transported students, and the adoption of an open enrollment program. The Post-Dispatch reported that unidentified members of the school administration viewed the recommendations as unrealistic.

After the citizens committee report, the Patrons Alliance, a city-wide organization, functioning somewhat in competition with the PTA and quite conservative in outlook, opposed the report. The president of the Alliance had been on the Maher commission but afterwards attacked the report. The Patrons Alliance packed the board's public hearing and held a meeting of its own on the report.

Superintendent Hickey's health was already failing at this point, and Deputy Superintendent Kottmeyer, who had been instrumental in drawing up the "136 replies," was put in charge of preparing the administration's reaction to the Maher report. There was considerable change in tone between the two documents. Whereas the earlier one had made it clear that there was little at fault in the system, this one stated that the school system was going to do something. It was not completely clear what that something was. The report promised to terminate the "contained unit" bussing device, but then proceeded to list statistics showing that the logistics of moving pupils across the city required that pupils arrive late,

³ It is hard to know exactly what was behind this move of Williams. The relationship between the board and the civil rights leadership was quite strained at this point, and the demonstration may have been an attempt to undercut the Maher report should it be too conservative for the movement.

leave early, etc., so that this new policy could not be put in effect in the coming fall. The report also noted the problem of maintaining racial balance in receiving schools. Several new elementary schools would be opened during the next year; if this did not eliminate bussing entirely, it would simplify the logistics and racial balance problems. The report went on to list a series of other changes which would be made: more teaching staffs would be integrated, action would be taken on the vocational education program, and tactics would be adopted to prevent white transfers from high schools in the West Side. When this rather ambiguous document was presented to the board, there was very little discussion, and the board voted (this time eight to three on racial lines) to accept the staff's recommendations. It was probably not clear to anyone when the school system actually intended to integrate all its receiving schools in the transportation program. It was possible that when the new schools were opened, the bussing would be stopped completely. (In fact, it was going to integrate several, but not all, that fall. The following year the new schools were opened in the West End, and the bussing program was cut back to 700 students. With this reduction, it was possible to integrate all receiving schools. In 1965 it was increased again to 2,600 students, and all receiving schools were still integrated.)⁴

Meanwhile, the board was faced with a racial issue which was not a matter of administrative prerogative. The board presidency was about to be vacated as Schlafly completed his turn in the revolving office in October. Traditionally, the board would elect its vice-president as the new president. But the vice-president was Hicks. Was St. Louis ready to see a Negro as its school board president? Was the middle of the integration squabble the right time? The board decided to find out and elected Hicks its new president.

⁴The school administration's position is that it is possible to integrate the bussed students only if the total number of transportees is small enough to permit short traveling distances and to maintain racial balance. They consider 2,600 to be very near the maximum possible number which can be integrated.

The next step in the civil rights battle was the NAACP's decision to file suit against what they called the Hickey-Kottmeyer plan. The board filed a suit to determine the legality of bussing by contained units. It also went to court to obtain an injunction to prevent a school boycott threatened by the NAACP. But in fact, although the civil rights leadership did not know it, the battle was over. More important, and this they also did not know, they had won. The segregated bussing program would be phased out, steps to increase faculty integration would be taken, and the board had committed itself to integration. One plausible interpretation of what happened here is that the school system decided to walk the tightrope between the civil rights groups and the segregationists by integrating the schools, but on a slow time table, and without publicly advertising it more than necessary. In any case, the Negro board members, Hicks and Hurt, were now ready to oppose any attempt to boycott the schools.

The uneasy coalition between the conservative NAACP and the direct action groups had already fallen to pieces by this time. During July, while the board was deciding what to do with the Maher report, Dr. Williams called for another conference meeting of all the interested community groups and involved individuals. This meeting was "stacked with NAACP people and the conservatives of the community." It was decided that the education issue should be left up to the Education Committee of the NAACP. This committee was then expanded to include representation from other community groups. The counterstrategy of the militant wing was simple. They formed a new organization called ACT, included some other organizations to legitimate their claim to city-wide representation, and decided that the Education Committee of the NAACP would be required to report to them. The NAACP (and several Negro political leaders) took a stand against this power play and the NAACP made it clear that they would take no action unless approved by their board and that they would not report to ACT.

From this point on, the NAACP activity was directed almost entirely toward preparing a suit against the schools. The militants showed an ever decreasing activity curve at this time and began to get more involved in other issues.

With the Negro school board members now supporting the Hickey proposals, the militants were completely isolated. The militants picketed Hicks' home, but as they prepared to send pickets to Hickey's house, he suffered a severe stroke. These moves were only half-hearted in any case. Most of the militants were becoming involved in the picketing of the Jefferson Bank in support of a demand to hire Negroes. Meanwhile the NAACP continued to threaten a boycott; they scheduled a huge rally for the Sunday before the opening of school. Roy Wilkins was invited to speak, but sent one of his staff instead. But on the day of the rally, a demonstration at the Jefferson Bank resulted in the arrest of Oldham and other leaders. At the time of the rally, Mrs. Oldham and Clay were leading a huge march the other way, to picket the city jail. Needless to say, the school rally was a flop. Thus ended the school integration issue, six months after it had begun, and three months after the first demonstration.

The militants in the civil rights movement, including at least one of the Negro school board members, were unhappy with the outcome. During the following year, various efforts were made to reopen the issue. Some picketing took place around the newly opened West End schools, but this received little community support. Board member Hurt waged a successful campaign to employ Negroes in maintenance positions. (In this, he had the support of the board. With the elimination of political sponsorship, there was a considerable increase in Negro nonprofessional employees.) The following year, all transported pupils were successfully integrated into receiving schools. (The Patrons Alliance protests during the fall of 1963 had been successfully squelched.)

There is little question that the school board survived the storm. In 1964 board president Hicks resigned to take a church in New York. Mayor Tucker appointed as his replacement Ryce, who had led the Parents of Transported Pupils. McClellan became board president. (He was succeeded in 1965 by Mrs. Harris.) In 1965, when Hicks's seat came up for election, the citizens committee which had reformed the board attached Ryce to their slate. Only one opposition candidate (supported by the

teachers union) ran against the four slate endorsees, and the slate was elected handily. Schlafly, running for reelection, ran very well in the Negro wards. Also in 1965, the board held its tax referendum. This time it was defeated. However, the electorate was not serious in its vote to push the school system over the brink; in a second election held a few weeks later, the tax rate was endorsed overwhelmingly. When the response of the wards to the tax in 1965 is compared to 1963, a general increase in support throughout the city is apparent. However, the most impressive increases were in the Negro wards, where the percentage voting "yes" increased from 74 per cent in 1963 to 89 per cent in 1965. Both Schlafly and the schools had received votes of confidence from the Negro voters. Meanwhile, the white voters had forgiven or forgotten the picketing done by Ryce. Whereas in 1961 only 69 per cent of the white voters who voted for the slate had voted for the Negro member, Ryce received 76 per cent of their votes.

Interpretation

The first question is, who influenced the outcome of the desegregation decision? It seems clear to us that the general decision--to look for ways to meet some of the demands of the civil rights movement--was made by the board. The Parents of Transported Children made an unsuccessful effort to involve Mayor Tucker, but he apparently played no significant role. None of the city's other elected officials were involved. While Superintendent Kottmeyer drew the actual plans, it also seems clear that the board both explicitly and implicitly let him know that he should "do something to let the steam out."

In the original reform the board members were dependent on a group of influential businessmen for the financing of their election campaigns.⁵ But there is no evidence that these "angels," who had also helped support

⁵Some of our respondents argued that the "angels" played a minor role, with Schlafly almost single-handedly running the campaigns.

bond campaigns, influenced the board overtly. At most, various board members may have wondered a bit about their reaction to the situation, but it seems most likely that the elites felt they had "delegated" responsibility for making school decisions to their "representatives" on the board. (We must also remember that Schlafly had originally recruited their support, so that he, at least, was in no sense a delegate of theirs.)

One of the most intriguing aspects of the St. Louis story is the apparent turn-around in goals of the Negro community. In the middle 1950's the West End was concerned about the overcrowded schools, and there was objection to the bussing program. Of course, the West End voted heavily in favor of bonds to build new schools. However, before the schools were completed, the complaint was changed; bussing was now seen as a way of integrating schools, and the opposition was to the segregation of the transported pupils. After 1963 the most militant of the civil rights leaders were opposing the opening of what they were now calling ghetto schools. Actually, this seemingly complete reversal is not as peculiar as it appears in retrospect, and similar changes of course occurred in other cities as well.

One possible thesis is that the fundamental split in the civil rights movement was not mendable, and that regardless of the outcome of the issue, the movement would have collapsed from the weight of its internal struggles. There is some truth to this. When the militants lost control of the school integration movement, it would be logical for them to start hunting for another issue.⁶ However, had the school board played the role of the villain, then all the members of the movement, including the Negro board members, would have been forced to follow public opinion and continue battling with the school. In a sense, the militants' feeling may have been one of futility--futility in that the school system was not

⁶Actually, there is a relationship between the Jefferson Bank and the schools. One reason why the bank was singled out is that the school system kept its funds there. More important, the Jefferson Bank has ties to St. Louis politics.

making the concessions they wanted, but at the same time was making enough concessions to prevent the militants from gaining much community support. The rather progressive race relations in other aspects of the community also kept the Negro leadership from becoming more militant. The City Council was passing civil rights legislation, Negroes were being appointed to governmental positions, and the Catholic diocese was strongly committed to integration. In addition, Daniel Schlafly commented to us that the police department helped the situation by its judicious handling of the demonstrations.

The militants' position would have been much more sharply undercut if the board had chosen to give the symbols of victory to the civil rights movement. If they had clearly stated that they were going to capitulate, that the segregation of the transportation program was wrong and would stop, then the movement would have felt free to celebrate. In fact, many of the civil rights leaders did not know what they had won. There was no guarantee that the bussing program would ever be integrated, and there was the distinct possibility that rather than do that, the bussing program would be stopped entirely. (The board, after all, could have used portable classrooms to alleviate the overcrowding.) The wording of the Maher report, and the board's adoption of a policy statement committing it to integration, were important symbolic victories, but the rest was rather vague.

If we look at the reality, instead of the symbols, we see that the board actually should have angered the segregationists more than the civil rights movement. The board could have defended bussing by contained units (and in starting to seek a court ruling on its legality, almost did this). It could have denied that the facilities were segregated. It could have rejected the Maher report. But the school system gave enough, so that if it did not satisfy the militants, it at least won the grudging approval of the Negro business elite, the Negro board members, and some of the grass roots. The board did meet many of the integrationist demands, but they also managed to prevent a segregationist explosion. They succeeded in getting offstage before the tightrope could break.

In none of the other cities we shall examine will we find an administrative action which has had as much effect on the number of students in integrated schools as in St. Louis. In the absence of the bussing program, the schools would be quite segregated, with only 10 per cent of the Negro students and 14 per cent of the white students in integrated schools. However, during 1965-66 the bussing of 2,600 Negro students into predominantly white schools increased the percentage of Negroes and whites in integrated schools to 14 and 36 per cent, respectively. The bussing program has tripled the number of whites in integrated schools.⁷

Why did the board acquiesce as much as they did? One reason, quite simply, is that the major actors were basically liberal in their orientation toward racial issues. For example, McClellan, in comment on Hicks's election to the presidency, said that it was important to show the white community that the board members "weren't prejudiced." In saying this, McClellan reveals that his reference group is the liberal white community and the community elite. (He, like most of the board members, is a resident of the fashionable and reform-oriented Forest Park area.)

Similarly, although some of Schlafly's public remarks could be interpreted as hostile to the civil rights movement, Schlafly had been instrumental in appointing the liberal Maher committee (and the early appointment of this liberal committee virtually determined the outcome). Or to go back farther in time, Schlafly had attempted to recruit a Negro to the board, and he did not try to select an "Uncle Tom" in the place of Hicks or Hurt. One board member commented of William Kottmeyer that "he was the sort of man who could kick the door shut and say, 'You're right--that is discrimination and I know it. Here's what I want to do about it. . . .'" This sort of candidness would have also been valuable.

A second reason why the board was able to respond to the demands made on it was that its lines of communication to the Negro community were

⁷The St. Louis statistical data do not permit this precise calculation, but these figures should be reasonably accurate.

very good. Here, much of the credit must go to Hicks. During his time on the board, Hicks had managed to earn the wholehearted respect of the white board members, while at the same time retaining his position as an integrationist. In addition, the necessity of producing a Negro-reform coalition had forced the white board members to build relationships with important Negro community leaders--particularly the influential editor of the Argus, Howard Woods. The schools' public relations firm was also in close touch with Woods. In passing, we should observe that one uniting force in the Negro community is the highly developed Negro business elite. Neither militant nor conservative, they were an important counterweight to the more conservative Negro politicians. Standing in the middle of the Negro community, they were in touch with Hicks, Hurt, Mrs. Oldham (who is the daughter of a prominent St. Louis Negro family), and the NAACP.

The final major point we wish to make is that the decision-making authority was highly centralized, partly at least because of the interlocking web of "exchange" relations between the actors. Kottmeyer, for example, had several reasons to respect his board, for they had reformed the schools and recruited the business support for the tax referenda.

The board members also owed debts to each other, and particularly to Schlafly, for organizing the slate and running the reform campaign. In turn, Schlafly could be grateful to Hicks and Hurt for their support of the reform movement.

The result was to build a highly unified decision-making structure which could hold the respect of diverse elements of the community. But ultimately, the centralizing force was money and prestige, contributed by the businessmen who had financed the reform. One question we will return to in the analysis of eight cities is the effect of having an elected, rather than appointed, school board. The St. Louis board member generally like serving on an elected board. And the board certainly handled the integration issue with more skill than some of the appointed boards we will examine. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the slate is inherently

an unstable force, because of the drain of the biennial election campaigns upon it. It is easier to recruit candidates and funds when the glamour of reform is in the air. In 1965, without this appeal, and with the race issue hovering in the background, the slate was able to function. (It recruited a lawyer with impressive credentials to fill a vacancy on the board, and it accepted Ryce as a slate member.) But it has not been in operation very long, and the future is always unpredictable.

If St. Louis handled the integration issue with more skill than some of the other appointed boards, our other two northern elected boards did not do as well. We shall look at those two boards next, and later try to make some generalizations about the effect of election and appointment on school behavior.

CHAPTER III

LAWNDALE¹

Lawndale is a city of less than one-half million population in the western United States. Compared with other western cities, it has a large Negro population.

The Negro population of Lawndale dates only from the beginning of World War II. In 1940, the city was 3 per cent Negro; in 1950, 12 per cent; and in 1960, 23 per cent. The total population of Lawndale grew by 27 per cent during the war decade, but since 1950, the Negro growth has been accompanied by a faster decline in the white population so that the total population dropped. The suburbanization of the white population has meant that the white-collar population has declined in the city.

This change in population has also begun to threaten the end of Republican rule in this nonpartisan city. In any nonpartisan city it is difficult to talk about political groups, which are usually very fluid. However, we will oversimplify somewhat and consider Lawndale as having three major political factions. Most important is a group we will call main-line Republicans; this is a group of conservative businessmen and professional politicians who have customarily been victorious in local elections. The liberal Republicans are less influential; they are centered around another group of businessmen, including some executives in heavy industry. The Democrats in our analysis are a heterogeneous collection; labor leaders, intellectuals, civil rights leaders, and professional politicians. It must be understood that when

¹The superintendent and several members of the school board objected to our analysis in this city. Consequently, we have substituted pseudonyms for the name of the city and the persons involved and have made other changes to maintain the anonymity of the informants.

we say that the school board is made up of main-line Republicans, this does not mean that they were nominated by the Republican party as such, but that they are loosely identified with them.

The Lawndale political situation is now apparently in a process of change. In state and national elections, Lawndale votes Democratic. In 1961 a liberal Republican, Thomas Kelly, defeated a main-line Republican in the election for mayor. Kelly, the son of an Irish policeman, has run a "clean" and "progressive" city government in the eyes of the voters and was reelected easily. However, the school board has remained in the hands of main-line Republicans.

Lawndale's seven-member school board is in theory elected but until recently it has been virtually self-perpetuating. Traditionally, whenever a member retired from office, he did so in the middle of his term, so that his successor could be appointed by a majority of the board. The successor, running as an incumbent, was then elected. Between 1931 and 1958, this formula was used to appoint nineteen new members to the board; in only one case was a new member elected to the board directly. Its present president is a defeated state assemblyman, but another member is a past president of the National Association of School Boards. We might think of the board as having had a traditional division between school-oriented members and aspiring or retired politicians; but it is also important to remember that they represented a homogeneous group of white Protestant main-line Republicans. In the last decade one seat has been held by a Catholic Democratic labor representative.

1956: A School for the Middle Class

In 1956 the peculiar geography of Lawndale was well suited to high school racial and socio-economic integration. The low-income and Negro residents were spread along one side of the city. The city had five high schools, arranged in a more or less straight line the length of the city. The northernmost school served a small blue-collar area,

and this school, Norton, was a predominantly Negro school by 1945. The remaining four schools were comprehensive schools, and all were districted so that students from the low-income area and those from the middle-income neighborhoods went to each school. Every school (except Norton) had always served both rich and poor. The Negroes then moved into the low-income areas with the result that most of Lawndale's Negroes were distributed neatly in predominantly white high schools; every school except Norton was integrated. However, new middle-income housing was being built in Woods, on the opposite side of the city from the Negroes. And of course, a growing population meant that more school space was needed. The result was growing community demand for a new school to serve Woods. The Lawndale school board was responsive to this. (Most of its board lived in Woods, but in any case the city was conscious of its need to stop the flow of whites into the suburbs.) But a school for the wealthy would disrupt the city's pattern of "comprehensive" high schools. Two bond issues were defeated partly because of the conflict over the new school. Apparently, the final resolution of the conflict had been to build the new school, but also to appease the Norton community by upgrading their school with some of the bond money.

When the bond issue was finally approved, a site for Woodside High School was selected at the very edge of the city boundary. Obviously, this new school would have considerable impact on the racial balance of the other schools, but until it was finished and boundaries set, no one would know how profound this impact would be.

While the school was being built, the board made an additional concession to the Negro community. In 1958 a vacancy appeared on the board, and the board leadership and the Republican party offered the seat to a Negro Republican lawyer who had been one of the spokesmen for Norton High, James Clendon. However, presumably because Clendon was Negro, he was not appointed to fill the vacancy. Instead, the vacancy was allowed to remain until the election, and Clendon, with the support of the other board members, was elected to fill the empty seat.

In recent years the board has had one Catholic Democrat. However, the present appointee is not an active Democrat, does not come from a major union (he was a used car salesman), and was more noted as a "Dad's Club" member who had long been interested in high school athletics.

1961: The Second Woodside Dispute

In January, 1961, the school board began to discuss setting boundaries for the new school. At the first meeting, it became clear that the board had in mind that Woodside would serve the entire woods area. This meant that the school would serve an all-white area roughly ten miles long and only one mile wide. Such a school boundary could not be rationalized convincingly. There is no road which runs directly the length of Woods. Thus students at either end of the district would have to travel through another school district in order to reach the new school. Woodside was a neighborhood school only in the sense that the community it served was of a single racial and economic group. The impact on the other schools in Lawndale would have been considerable since three high schools which had had relatively small Negro enrollments would now have larger Negro percentages.

At this time, the local NAACP had a new president, John Wadsworth, a prominent Negro lawyer, who was active in the Democratic party and held a state appointive job. Wadsworth launched a protest to the board and recommended that the new school be opened to students from other parts of the city.² This began the debate over open enrollment.

The superintendent rejected Wadsworth's demand, insisting that it would not be possible to extend Woodside's boundaries into the other part of the city and that geographic assignment, rather than open enrollment, was "commonly accepted."

²Note that Wadsworth's protest follows immediately after the New Rochelle case.

At the same time a prominent civic organization, the Conference on Public Education (COPE), privately advocated a change in Woodside's enrollment.

COPE can be thought of as representing that sector of the civic elite who took a more liberal view than the main-line Republicans. But COPE was also rebuffed.

In March the board approved a ten-mile-long district for Woodside. Only Clendon, the Negro, voted against the motion. The school was opened in September. The NAACP apparently took no action in response to this. As we shall see, throughout the Woodside dispute the civil rights movement was very reluctant to take any action, either in the courts or in the streets.

1962: The Woodside Dispute, Phase Three

In May, 1961, two months after the vote on the Woodside boundaries, Dr. William Gordon was elected to the board, defeating a Republican. Gordon is a physician and an active liberal Democrat. He immediately began an attack on several board policies. For example, at one point he announced that one of the board members was going to resign to permit his replacement to be appointed and accused the board of perpetuating itself. He also made some general criticism of the operations of the schools and the quality of Lawndale education. By taking a strong stand on integration he encouraged Clendon to further break with the rest of the board, and they sometimes voted together on nonracial matters.

During the next year the board was engrossed in the problem of replacing retiring Superintendent John Walsh. The issue was whether to bring in another "outsider" like Walsh, or not. (Walsh and the previous superintendent hold national reputations.) It seems clear that one of the board's most influential members, Gregory Foote (who had been appointed only two years earlier), favored a "local" appointment. Finally,

on April 27, 1962, the board voted to promote Assistant Superintendent Stephen Jones (Gordon and Clendon voted against the appointment).³

Immediately after Jones's election early in 1962, Gordon reopened the Woodside issue. He proposed that the Woodside district be redrawn to eliminate some of the Woods area, include some of the older neighborhoods, and reduce the total enrollment so that students from outside the district would be able to transfer voluntarily. His statement was picked up by the chairman of CORE, William Turner, who called for the appointment of a study committee.

At the next board meeting, Turner, NAACP president Wadsworth, and a crowd of five hundred of their supporters appeared. The board listened to their statements, and the outgoing superintendent, Walsh, made a statement which rejected all their demands. In some respects, Walsh's statement was unconvincing. For example, he explained that changing school boundaries might cost as much as four million dollars, but did not explain this statement. He went on to comment that the Lawn-dale school board was not required by law to eliminate de facto segregation. Finally, Walsh stated that the board did not keep racial statistics, and therefore it was impossible to know whether Gordon's proposals would result in increased education.

Board member Foote picked up the "color blind" theme, stating that it was wrong to consider race in the drawing of school boundaries. Immediately after these statements, the board voted to reaffirm the original boundaries, with only Gordon dissenting. (Clendon was not present at this meeting.)

Thus the board position could be described as follows:

³The issue of appointing an "outsider" versus an "insider" was hotly debated, with at one point a majority voting to offer the job to a prominent eastern superintendent. One informant explained that Foote had intentionally insulted the candidate in order to persuade him to refuse the offer.

1. The board was color blind; it would neither intentionally segregate pupils nor intentionally try to prevent segregation.
2. The Woodside issue would not be reconsidered.
3. Segregation was irrelevant to educational policy; the only restraint on the board was the Brown decision.

The other proposal advanced by Turner, that the board appoint a citizens committee, was supported by a variety of civic groups. Finally, in August, 1962, the board voted to establish a citizens committee to study the school's finances, building needs, and racial problems. The civil rights groups continue sporadically to protest the Woodside boundaries, and June Shagaloff of the NAACP national office appeared in Lawn-dale to state that the NAACP was prepared to file suit, sit-in, or boycott the schools. She added that the schools were also guilty of discrimination against teachers. The NAACP filed the promised suit a few weeks later.

Meanwhile, the citizens committee was nearly stillborn. In October the board voted to invite the seven organizations which had asked for the citizens committee to each nominate three members to serve on it. These included the NAACP, CORE, four religious groups, and a "white liberal" organization. But they then rejected a proposed statement by Clendon which should have put the board on record as wanting to correct de facto segregation, and closed the meeting by tabling an open enrollment plan proposed by the new superintendent, Jones.

The NAACP then replied to its invitation to designate three members of the citizens committee with a flat refusal to cooperate. At the same time, the board continued to strain its relationship with the civil rights groups by appointing as the chairman of the citizens committee Clarence T. Wilkerson, who had previously served as chairman of the bond issue campaigns and was generally considered to be a conservative on racial matters. However, the board did reverse itself and adopt Clendon's policy statement.

Several efforts were made in the next few months to satisfy the NAACP. During November, another board member, Milton Clark, presented a resolution which stated that since "concentrations of minority groups" was unfortunate, the board should counteract this by expanding a program of compensatory education. While compensatory education may have been a useful bargaining tool in 1956, it was no help now.

Jones brought up his open enrollment plan again in December. Basically, the plan permitted voluntary transfers from any school to any other if space was available. However, Woodside had no empty space--in fact, the new boundaries resulted in the school using portable classrooms--so that no one would be able to enter the disputed school as a result of the plan. While additional portable classrooms could be added to make space for transferees, the superintendent said he was opposed to this. At the second meeting devoted to the open enrollment plan, Foote argued in favor of placing more portables at Woodside to permit open enrollment. However, he did not put up a strong fight for his amendment and it was defeated. It seems likely that had this motion been adopted, the civil rights movement might have been partly satisfied. A vigorous effort on the part of the school board to get as few as one hundred Negroes into Woodside might have been sufficient to satisfy the movement at this point.

Clendon made one last effort to entice the NAACP back into supporting the citizens committee. He proposed that the board charge the citizens committee to make a judgment whether de facto segregation was harmful. Gordon fought to amend the motion, the meeting dragged on, and finally the board voted to adopt the Gordon-Clendon Joint Resolution, which instructed the committee to make "reasonable" recommendations to reduce minority group concentrations. After eight months, the board had agreed that the citizens committee could prepare an integration plan. Lest the board retreat from its position, Gordon dashed to the TV cameras to make the announcement. With this, the NAACP agreed to cooperate with the committee, and the committee began deliberations.

With establishment of the committee, the third phase of the Woodside dispute came to an end. With the NAACP and CORE both participating in the citizens committee, the civil rights movement was more or less content to wait for the report to be completed. Three members of the board came up for reelection during the spring of 1963. Sam Murphy, the Catholic Democrat, was opposed by five candidates, but won handily; Clendon ran against a member of the John Birch Society and was reelected; and the liberals put up a candidate against the board's elder statesman, Arnold Horst, and Horst was also reelected. Then the board waited, from the spring of 1963 to the summer of 1964, for the citizens committee report.

1964: Woodside Phase Four, The Committee Report

It was generally assumed that the presence of Wilkerson as chairman of the citizens committee would prevent the committee from proposing any major changes. However, the liberals on the committee, the civil rights leaders, and the liberal Republicans managed to wrest control of the committee away from the chairman and drove through a report which, while moderate on other points, proposed a redrawing of Woodside's boundaries. In their recommendation, Woodside would be redistricted to exclude the farthest extremities of its district. While the plan would not have districted any Negroes into Woodside, it would have returned some whites to other high schools and prevented these schools from becoming as heavily Negro. In effect, the proposed redistricting would have made Woodside into a neighborhood school serving the immediate geographic area. The committee also proposed a redistricting to increase the number of whites in Norton. Finally, the report advocated that the open enrollment program be keyed to the integration issue by setting as its goals the relief of schools with heavy concentrations of minority groups and the improvement of racial balance wherever possible. The open enrollment program adopted by the board was essentially color blind, although it did give preference to students in overcrowded schools.

When the committee report was released, the school system scheduled a series of public hearings on the report. Although it is difficult to be sure what happened here, it would appear that some members of the board approached neighborhood groups in the Woodside area and encouraged them to give testimony on the report. The board scheduled a series of public hearings, during which time the opposition to the report grew steadily. Much of the testimony from the Woods area was thinly disguised racism. After some five months of community discussion, the board met, and the president (at this time Clark) led a discussion in which the five members of the majority arrived at a consensus that the Woodside boundary change was unimportant from the point of view of integration, and that any serious attempt to stabilize the racial composition of the other schools would require constant redistricting. But they also recognized that it would be good if some sort of concession could be made. Foote consulted Gordon, and they drafted a resolution asking the superintendent to produce a plan to extend open enrollment and to develop a master plan for integration which would include the possibility of phasing out the all-Negro Norton school. Foote was quoted as saying that "I think the support of the whole community would be behind us on that."

This ended the fourth round of the Woodside battle--some eight years after it began. But whereas the St. Louis controversy had merely consolidated the hold of the school board, the aftermath of the Woodside fight was one of the most heated school election campaigns in the city's history. In 1965 Gordon and the most liberal member of the majority bloc, Margaret Willis, resigned from the board. Incumbents Foote and Clark, two of the most influential of the majority bloc, were up for reelection.

The majority bloc of the board had to find two candidates for the vacant seats. It cleared the nominations of Lois Coxe and Harold Smith for Mrs. Willis's and Gordon's seats, respectively. Mrs. Coxe, a defeated candidate for Congress, was identified with the radical right; Smith was a typical Republican candidate for the board. A liberal slate of candidates was informally supported by the Central Labor Council, the

Democratic Party, the civil rights groups, and a group of Gordon's advisers. The slate included John Swartz (a Jewish attorney), running for Gordon's seat, a Negro junior college teacher, Rosemary Snow, for Mrs. Willis's seat, and a Negro minister running against Foote. Two other candidates were entered with the support of a rival Democratic organization, one against Clark, the other contesting for Gordon's seat. A candidate supported by the ultraconservatives filed for Gordon's seat. Finally, a Woodside community group which had been formed to oppose the redistricting of the school supplied a candidate for Mrs. Willis's seat. The two rival Democratic candidates lost in the preliminary election. The ultraconservative had trouble avoiding the help of the John Birch Society and was also eliminated in the preliminary. The Woodside candidate was also beaten and Foote defeated his liberal opponent handily. The chief candidates for the two vacant seats did not receive majorities, and a run-off election was held for these two seats. The liberal Swartz defeated Smith, with 51 per cent of the vote, but his Negro running mate, Mrs. Snow, received only 47 per cent of the vote and was defeated by Mrs. Coxe. The board actually became somewhat more conservative, with the replacement of Mrs. Willis by Mrs. Coxe, but the majority had little cause to rejoice. The liberals were able to consolidate their position by successfully replacing Gordon and came very close to adding a second Negro to the board. Lawndale can expect the 1967 election to be interesting.

Interpretation

Who were the actors in this decision? We think that the decisions were, in fact, made by the board without outside consultation, although this is not obvious. Since the board majority were associated through the Republican party, it is at least possible that the key decisions were made by party leaders. However, it is not likely that any important discussion of school integration could have taken place in the Republican Central Committee without our hearing of it. A very prominent Republican

owns the city newspaper, but it also strikes us as unlikely that he played a direct or consistent role in the issue; certainly no one suggested to us that he did. In fact, we do know that throughout most of the controversy the paper covered the schools with a reporter openly sympathetic to the liberals.

Mayor Kelly has publicly disassociated himself from the school board. It seems likely that his relations with the board are strained. Finally, the liberal sector of the civic elite has attempted to influence the board, but has only been able to do so through the citizens committee. COPE's earlier attempts to influence the boundaries of Woodside were ignored, even though its chairman was the most prominent industrialist in the city.

Although the Woodside controversy was long and complicated, it is really a simple story. The majority members of the board clung to their original plan, to provide a middle-class school, throughout the debate. Faced with opposition, they attempted to meet it in four ways: First, by adopting under Foote's leadership a highly legalistic, color-blind approach, which suggested that the school board's behavior was legitimate if it merely conformed to the Supreme Court decision. By claiming a color-blind position, they were able to delay taking a racial census and were able to avoid making open enrollment a policy with direct relationship to integration. Second, they attempted to meet the demands for integration with plans for compensatory education. The action the board took with respect to compensatory education is not discussed in this study simply because it is of little or no political relevance. The civil rights movement did not accept the premise that there was an equation connecting these two goals. Third, the school board seemed to have conscious strategy of delay, so that each action was put off as long as possible. Fourth, when these two approaches did not solve their problems, the board allowed the Woodside community to mobilize to oppose integration.

What alternatives did the board have? First of all, the school system could have avoided drawing the original ten-mile boundary for Woodside. There was enough opposition at that point to warn the board that it was likely to have difficulty. An all-white district which was geographically more plausible would have undercut some of the opposition of persons concerned with the racial stability of the other schools and would have avoided showing as much favoritism toward high-income whites. It should be noted that the proposed redistricting of the citizens committee was a radical step, but one which did not bring any Negroes into the all-white school. The board came very close to escaping the dilemma when Foote proposed permitting a limited number of transfers into Woodside.⁴

In response to the board's action, the civil rights movement took virtually no direct action except in the election campaigns. The closest thing to a demonstration was the five hundred spectators in the May, 1962, meeting. Where the civil rights movement has taken action, the board has been responsive; for example, the open enrollment plan was at least partly the result of the NAACP's suit and its refusal to serve on the citizens committee. It seems likely that had the civil rights movement organized a demonstration, particularly in the fall of 1962, the board might have been more acquiescent. The NAACP did make a halfhearted boycott threat in 1964. The suit against the board has not moved into court at this time.

There may be two reasons for this inactivity. First, the Negro community of Lawndale is less than twenty years old; there is no developed Negro community from which to draw leadership. In the absence of a self-sufficient ghetto, the leadership group tends to be biracial, and the white members, like those in most cities, less anxious to get involved in direct action. Second, a part of Lawndale's potential leadership is

⁴Eventually open enrollment led to the presence of over one hundred Negroes in Woodside, but this took place too late to have an impact on the conflict. There was no objection to the arrival of the Negroes.

drawn off by the presence of nearby cities with more "intellectual" climates.

Why, then, do we find in Lawndale a protracted controversy with no resolution? We can cite the following possible reasons:

1. The board and its critics became hampered by their own ideology. In reading over its struggles with policy statements, one gets the impression that the board has been more willing to support integration in practice than in principle. Similarly, the citizens committee report represents a position with a heavy ideological tone, in which much attention is paid to a "fair" districting of Woodside which does nothing to eliminate segregation. The civil rights movement also concentrated on the Woodside issue. Attempts to focus attention on segregated elementary schools never got off the ground.

2. The insertion of partisan politics into the issue has the effect of polarizing the community, so that the gulf between Gordon and Foote becomes unbreachable. For the same reason, the Republican Clendon has little influence on the Democratic Negro community or on the Democratic leadership of the civil rights movement. In addition, the desire to strengthen the Democratic party becomes a goal which occasionally conflicts with the goal of winning the integration battle, and may explain in part the unwillingness of the civil rights groups to indulge in direct action.

3. When we have reviewed the other northern cities, we will see much of the difference between Lawndale and St. Louis can be explained by differences in the board. The Lawndale school board has only one member who might be considered a representative of the business elite of the community; Clark is president of a large retail establishment. But the board's political ties are reflected in the fact that of its seven members in 1965, four are lawyers and another is a defeated candidate for public office.

CHAPTER IV

BAY CITY¹

Bay City is a major city in New England and the first large city in the United States to outlaw school segregation (1855). Today it has one of the most highly integrated school systems of any city its size. Unlike St. Louis and Lawndale, the Negro population is relatively small (10 per cent of the population). Students attend school outside of this small ghetto under an open-transfer policy. Less than one-half of Bay City's Negro students attend segregated schools. In addition, the remnants of abolitionist sentiment are still visible in New England politics.

Bay City, with its integrated schools and its liberal traditions, is now involved in what is probably the most bitter school integration battle in the North. The battle, which has involved boycotts, sit-ins, new state legislation, a cutoff of federal funds, a court suit, and two election campaigns, is now entering its third year. And yet, during the first two years, the controversy revolved around a single point: the school board's refusal to adopt a policy statement acknowledging the existence of de facto segregated schools. In contrast to St. Louis and Lawndale, the civil rights movement has not accused the board of intentionally segregating schools.

Stated in this fashion, the controversy seems a bit ridiculous. However, when the public debate is put into context, it is not so implausible. It is not, as we thought for some time, simply a question of semantics.

¹As in the Lawndale chapter, all names of persons and places are pseudonyms.

The School Board

The Bay City school board is an elected body with the unusual provision, adopted by the city's voters in 1949, that all five members must run for election at the same time every two years. All five are elected at large, a fact which, in a predominantly Irish-Catholic city where ethnic loyalties are unusually strong, naturally excludes Negroes, Jews, Protestants, and even non-Irish Catholics. The elections are strictly nonpartisan and the candidates run on their own, so that an occasional "outsider" may get elected on the basis of a purely personal following. For example, the only Protestant on the present board is the son of a well-known political figure.

There have been at least two attempts by reform, good-government groups to slate candidates to the school board. The first, known as the "New Bay Committee" (NBC), had a quick spectacular success, then collapsed and faded from sight. In 1951, in the first election after the adoption of the new city charter, with the city apparently still in a reform mood, the electorate voted in a new mayor (the incumbent had been in office for decades) and swept into office five of the NBC's candidates for the city council and four of its five candidates for the school board. Despite another successful election in 1953, the NBC was through by 1955. The principal energy of leadership was provided by a young New Yorker, fresh out of law school, but whose drive for personal power and gain scared off many of the principal backers of NBC.

If the New Bay Committee failed, reform did not. The present mayor was elected on a reform platform. Thus it is not surprising that a second effort has been made to reform the Bay City school board. Between 1953 and 1959, the board membership reverted to type, and in 1961 four of its five members were young, ambitious Irish politicians. In 1960 a new group was formed--the Citizens for the Bay City Public Schools. Unlike NBC, the Citizens are exclusively concerned with schools. They serve a "watchdog" function as well as recruiting candidates. In

addition, they have been able to avoid the mistake of the NBC and retain a strict reform character. In 1961 a financial crisis broke before the election, and three of the four incumbents running were defeated. The four vacancies were filled by two Citizens candidates, William Thrall and Thomas Kennedy, and two non-Citizens, Mary O'Connor Smith and John Silverstein. These four, plus the surviving incumbent, Francis P. White, made up the school board during the integration controversy.

The Bay City school board is viewed by some as a political stepping-stone, and one man became governor of the state and then a United States cabinet officer after starting out on the school board. Though his success is atypical, his aspirations are not, for the school committee regularly attracts politically ambitious men and women. Each committee member is given an office in which to conduct school business and money to hire a full-time assistant. Traditionally, these educational advisers have spent much of their energy working on their employer's election campaign.

The issue of de facto segregation in the Bay City public schools was first raised publicly in June, 1963. Preceding that confrontation was a five-year history of what the NAACP calls "concern." In 1958 the NAACP education chairman began to investigate differentials between white and Negro educators. From June to October of 1961, the NAACP tried to effect changes in the school system by working through a state agency, the State Commission against Discrimination, but this effort was generally unsuccessful. When the State Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights called for a racial census of the Bay City schools, Superintendent McDonough refused on the grounds that the state's fair educational practice laws prohibited it.

In 1962 the NAACP published a report on the Bay City schools showing the age and state of disrepair of many of the city's predominantly Negro schools and the relatively low expenditures per pupil in these schools. In this report and in behind-the-scenes talks with school

administrators and school board members, the NAACP attempted to persuade the schools that de facto segregation was harmful; again, they were unsuccessful.

Finally, in June, 1963, the NAACP requested a school board hearing on the question of school segregation. On June 12, at the first public confrontation in Bay City on this issue, Superintendent McDonough flatly denied the charges.² The argument made by the school officials at that first public meeting was that since the school boundaries are not based on ethnic factors, there is nothing the schools need do. In short, there is no problem for the school to deal with.

Dissatisfied with this response, Negro leaders called for a boycott on June 18 unless the school board agreed to thirteen demands which they presented. To head off this boycott, the five school board members and the superintendent met for seven hours with four Negro leaders on June 15. The four Negroes at the meeting included three members of the NAACP education committee and Canon James Winston, curate of St. Paul's Protestant Episcopal Cathedral and a leader of the direct-action New England Freedom Movement.

The NAACP presented the thirteen demands, and twelve were accepted by the school board. The thirteenth was that the board issue a statement recognizing that the schools were de facto segregated. The school board refused to use the phrase "de facto segregation," and on this seemingly minor point the seven-hour meeting broke up.

The question is, why was the board reluctant to use the phrase, and why were the civil rights leaders so insistent on this point? Let us pause to review the five members of the school board, and the motivation behind each of their positions.

² Civil rights leaders commented to our interviewers that McDonough was extremely defensive about their complaints and tended to interpret any criticism of the schools as a personal attack.

1. Mrs. Mary O'Connor Smith is the daughter of a prominent local politician. Mrs. Smith did not obtain a law degree until she was in her middle thirties and ran for the school board soon after. For her, the school board was a political steppingstone, and it was generally believed that her position would be entirely based upon political calculus. Her home neighborhood, and political base, was the "south end," a low-income Irish neighborhood.

2. Francis P. White, the only Protestant and the only holdover from the 1959 school board, held an ambiguous position on race. The income from his family's firm enables White to spend five days each week in his board office, answering queries from parents. Now in his sixties, he has served on the board intermittently since the thirties. His political strength lies in the low-income Irish and Italian wards. The civil rights leaders expected him to be conservative on the race issue, but hoped that he might follow the lead of John Silverstein.

3. John Silverstein, a Catholic, ran for the school board in 1959, while still in law school. He ran ahead of all other nonincumbents, and in the reform of 1961 he led the ticket. He was then twenty-four years old. He campaigned well, and gained votes in both low and high income wards, and received "reform" votes from Jewish and Yankee wards. He had made no secret of his political ambitions and sought the Democratic nomination for lieutenant governor in 1964. Silverstein was placed in a bind--while he wanted to present a compromise which would bail the school board out of the situation, he wanted to avoid being tagged as an integrationist.

4. Thomas Kennedy, then one of the Citizens' candidates, is a college instructor. Although a staunch supporter of reform, he was an equally staunch conservative on the school integration issue. Although his support was primarily in the reform wards, he did well enough in some Irish wards to run second to Silverstein in 1961.

5. William Thrall, the other Citizens' candidate, is a broker. His electoral support came largely from the Jewish-Negro-Yankee reform wards. Since coming on the board, he had moved rapidly into a strong integrationist position. He was also an aggressive champion of modernizing the Bay City schools.

Throughout most of the civil rights controversies, the board voted four to one against Thrall. Although Thrall was successful in introducing some nonracial legislation, his relationship with the three nonreform candidates was becoming more and more strained.

The most plausible explanation of the vote on the de facto segregation statement is that Mrs. Smith took a position at this point to hold a firm line against any concessions to the NAACP on the integration issue. Kennedy was later to say that he was opposed to discussion of de facto segregation because the discussion would be a foot in the door which might eventually lead to massive bussing of students. Francis P. White's position may be in part due to his belief that most of the language associated with race relations, including even the words white and Negro, was misleading. The implication of this is to force him into positions which sometimes appear even eccentric. Apparently the civil rights movement was not completely displeased with the outcome of the negotiations. Some of its leaders felt that in the long run, the boycott would be of more value than a quick settlement. Prior to the school board meeting, a prominent Negro politician called a meeting where several NAACP leaders urged that the boycott be delayed. It seems clear that the political leader who chaired the meeting was opposed to the boycott. However, the two leaders of the New England Freedom Movement (NEFM), Paul Jones, executive director of St. James Social Center, and Canon James Winston clung to their position that the boycott would be called unless the board agreed to all thirteen demands. It was also agreed in the course of this and future meetings that the NAACP would handle the actual negotiations with the board, while the NEFM would take charge of the boycott.

In a last-hour effort to avert the boycott, the governor tried desperately to act as mediator and arranged for secret negotiating sessions between the school committee and Negro leaders. This was the only time the Bay City school system came close to a workable compromise on the school segregation issue. It seems clear that the governor wanted the school board to adopt a de facto segregation statement, and that he had been in close touch with Negro leaders regarding the statement. Hence, John Silverstein who undertook the responsibility of drafting the statement, could be confident that it would be acceptable to the NAACP. Knowing the intensity of the struggle, the reader may well be surprised at the blandness of the statement:

While the heading under which these matters have been brought to our attention is that of "de facto segregation," any thoughtful person will agree that the fact some of our schools are overwhelmingly Negro is not the result of policies of the city's present nor previous school committee. It is, rather, part of a seamless web of many forms of discrimination in housing, and areas.

Smith and Kennedy could be expected to vote against the statement, but White accepted it; then Thrall upset the apple cart and rejected it and the boycott was on. Thrall told the interviewer that Silverstein's statement was designed to avoid a boycott: "I was more concerned with the causes of boycotts." In all our cities, it is one of the few cases when a board member took a more militant position than the civil rights leaders; it is the only case of a vote which was a coalition of both extremes against the middle. There are a number of possible reasons for Thrall's vote against the proposal. Probably he simply thought that since the board was going to reject any specific demands for action later, this was as good a spot to provoke the fight as any. In any case, the final result of his vote was only to speed up the board on its collision course. It seems likely that negotiations with the NAACP would have broken down soon even if this hurdle had been passed. The school boycott went off on schedule, only six days after the first meeting with the board.

Three-fifths of the Negro pupils in the upper grades were absent on the day of the boycott.

Partly in response to newspaper criticism of its refusal to acknowledge the existence of segregation, the school board established an advisory commission of fourteen citizens to serve as a medium of communication between the schools and the Negro community. The NAACP angrily refused the three seats it was offered ("we, not the school board, will decide who is to speak for the Negro community") and secretly pressured the other Negroes not to serve on this commission. The NAACP won this skirmish when the other Negroes announced their refusal to serve, but the argument degenerated even further when the school board announced on July 23 it would no longer discuss racial issues with the NAACP, stating it would work only with the biracial commission it had set up. In response to this slap in the face, Negroes and whites picketed the school offices. The school board election came in the midst of this, with all five members up for reelection.

The NAACP campaign supplied Mrs. Smith with more publicity than she could possibly have obtained on her own. Three days before the election, one newspaper carried banner headlines describing a demonstration led by the NAACP, photographed anti-Smith signs, and quoted NAACP leaders urging Negroes to vote.

At the same time, Mrs. Smith was waging her reelection campaign. A number of our informants, both liberals and conservatives, stated that Mrs. Smith had used the race issue to stir up white wards. Finally, to add to the complications of the election, the board voted shortly before the election to replace the retiring Superintendent McDonough by promoting one of his assistants, Gerald S. Braun, to the post. Both Thrall and Kennedy urged the school board to search for a superintendent from outside the system. In any case, Mrs. Smith received over 60 per cent of the vote to lead the ticket. Lagging behind were the other two nonreform candidates, Silverstein and White. Kennedy ran fourth, and Thrall fell

farther behind to fifth place. The Citizens for the Bay City Public Schools had entered two other candidates in addition to Kennedy and Thrall, including a Negro. Although neither won a seat, they ran far ahead of the other three nonincumbents in the race. If Mrs. Smith's good showing and Thrall's poor vote can be attributed to the race issue; Kennedy's fourth place vote is a bit mysterious. Silverstein interpreted it as a repudiation of the reformers' attempt to bring in an outsider as superintendent. This seems on its face to be unlikely, but it is as good an explanation as any.

From November on, the controversy continued to boil. The NEFM set the date for its second boycott for February 27, 1964. In another effort to head off a boycott, the board met in a televised public session to decide, not to what to do about integration, but whether they were willing to meet with the Negro leaders. Silverstein and Thrall supported the motion to meet with them; Kennedy argued that bussing was the only solution to imbalance, and therefore there was no point in discussing it. (The NAACP had not made any statement requesting bussing.) Mrs. Smith argued they should not acknowledge that any problem existed. White voted for the hearings on the grounds that they heard other petitioners, but added that transferring children out of segregated schools would prevent them from receiving compensatory education. The hearing was approved three to two.

At the hearing, the NAACP requested that the school committee appoint a panel of school board members and NAACP appointees to consult with experts and determine whether segregated schools are harmful to children.

The board eventually decided not to establish the panel, voting down Thrall's motion four to one. Mrs. Smith took the most extreme position at this meeting, with a debating style appropriate to a Senate investigating committee. For example, a professor of education spoke on the correlation between integration and educational achievement, only to have his testimony interrupted by Mrs. Smith:

Smith: Have you ever visited the Bay City schools?
Professor: No, I. . . .
Smith: Thank you.

At the end of the board's discussion, Mrs. Smith offered a motion to bring legal action against the two leaders of the NEFM but the motion was defeated four to one.³

On February 27, 1964, over one-fifth of the city's students stayed out of school. And this boycott had its effects. Twenty-four hours later, the State Board of Education ordered an immediate racial census of the public schools and began to organize a study of the effects of racial imbalance on education. With two "task forces" of educators doing the actual study and with a cast of big names lending prestige to the findings, the State Board conducted a year-long study. Known as the Advisory Committee on Racial Imbalance and Education, the group included a university president, a major industrialist, the Catholic Cardinal, and a banker from Bay City's oldest family. Their report, filed in April, 1965, concluded that racial imbalance (1) does exist in the schools and (2) is harmful to both white and Negro pupils. The major recommendations included (1) the immediate closing of many old, predominantly Negro, school buildings; (2) the transfer of those students to other schools; (3) the expansion of school districts and the construction of larger schools in order to draw from both Negro and white neighborhoods; and (4) an immediate mutual transfer of 5,000 Negro and white students in grades three to six in forty-five schools. "The schools involved in the mutual transfers are relatively close together. . . . No extensive cross-city transportation is involved."

³The boycotters were also threatened with court action by the Negro political leader referred to earlier. (In reply the boycotters obtained the support of white suburbanites who publicly volunteered to pay the fines!) Indeed, throughout the campaign the civil rights movement had considerable white support. One story is that during one of the boycotts, so many white students turned up at one of the "freedom schools" that some of the Negroes had to be bussed to other locations.

The Advisory Commission noted explicitly that it found no evidence that the school committee was to blame for the racial imbalance. On the other hand, the fourth recommendation went well beyond any integration plan in use in any large city. Of course, the recommendations had no legal force.

Only Thrall supported the report. "I'm pleased," he said, "and satisfied because the principles on which the report is based are in full accord with my position. There is racial imbalance in the schools. It is harmful to Negro and white children. And it should be redressed." But Smith and Kennedy were outraged. It is interesting to note that virgually all their objections were on the subject of bussing. Mrs. Smith was "appalled" at the suggestion of bussing, and referred to the report as "the pompous proclamations of the uninformed " The proposal, she said, "is undemocratic, un-American, absurdly expensive, unworkable, and diametrically opposed to the wishes of the parents of this city." But this time Kennedy's comment was more provocative than Mrs. Smith's. Kennedy said, "After forty years in education, twenty-five of which were in the Negro area, I am very certain that moving them around is not going to make them learn any better." White said he was convinced that "white children do not want to be transported into schools with a large proportion of backward pupils from unprospering Negro families who will slow down their education." (The NAACP's president publicly referred to these statements as being as dangerous to the well-being of Bay City as Hitler was to Germany and the world.)

When it comes to dogma, Mrs. Smith can hold her own with the liberals. For example, the report said that one of the harmful results of racial imbalance was that it failed to prepare children for a multi-racial community, nation, and world. If multiracial living was the goal of education, Mrs. Smith asked, what about the private schools which separate pupils by economic status and by religion and have an overwhelming proponderance of whites? "With keen interest, many citizens will now

observe the parochial school system of the archdiocese. . . . Will this school system now embark on a program of integration with the public schools so that children of different races, colors, and religions will have the benefit of 'integrated learning experiences' which the blue ribbon advisory group tells us is vital to a quality education?"⁴ Superintendent Braun expressed "deep disappointment" that a panel of such eminent citizens should have come up with such faulty findings and recommendations.

Prior to the filing of the report of the Advisory Commission, the local chapter of CORE, which had hitherto played only a supportive role in the school controversy, brought the federal government into the picture for the first time by filing a complaint with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Pending the outcome of its inquiry into CORE's complaint of segregation, HEW withheld federal funds for manpower retraining. These funds were later released.

At the end of April a new tack was taken by the NAACP. It filed suit in Federal District Court against the school board and the superintendent on behalf of eighty-one Negro pupils, alleging, inter alia, that the school committee and the superintendent set up segregation in the classrooms by creating arbitrary school districts "in such a manner as to establish and perpetuate" a racially segregated school system. This reflects the general tendency in integration controversies to expand the list of charges made against the school system, for in fact, until then the civil rights movement had paid little attention to the possibility that one or more of the school districts might be gerrymandered.⁵

⁴Mrs. Smith's political star had already risen considerably as a result of her victory in the 1963 school committee race. In 1964 she filed in the Democratic Primary for state treasurer. Although she gained a majority in Bay City, she ran last in a field of four in the rest of the state, losing badly in most of the suburbs. Thus her political future seems to be limited to the city proper. During the 1965 school board election, there was some newspaper discussion of her possible candidacy for mayor.

⁵Although there are many integrated schools surrounding the Bay

As this report goes to press, the battle goes on. When school opened in the fall of 1965, several Negro elementary schools were overcrowded. The superintendent requested funds to buss these children to less crowded white schools; this was rejected by the board. Up to that time, the school board had been routinely bussing students to relieve overcrowding; it now voted not to make any further increases in the number of students to be transported. The civil rights movement responded by organizing their own transportation program, "Operation Exodus," and moved approximately three hundred students into white schools. There was a furor over whether the students had a right to transfer, and Bay City again found itself making national headlines. The integration issue reached its zenith just in time to have the maximum effect on the 1965 school board elections. This time the Citizens for the Bay City Public Schools decided not to support Kennedy, obviously because of his votes on the race issue. They also attempted to turn public attention away from integration and toward other reform issues, but the damage had been done. All five Citizens candidates survived the preliminary election but lost in the general election, including incumbent William Thrall.

Interpretation

In the racial integration issue, the school board has exercised a great deal of autonomy. The governor and the attorney general were unsuccessful in their efforts to intervene, and during the 1965 bussing battle, the mayor had publicly supported the bussing program. The state and federal governments may eventually force the school board to back down, but only by threatening to cut off funds. Nor will demonstrations have much effect. Although the board initially was willing to make some compromises to avoid the first boycott, it seems unlikely that under any condition they would have gone far, and in any case the time for compromise

City ghetto, there are two points where segregated white schools are quite close to Negro residences. The case might be based on one of them.

is now past. Nor has the change in superintendents had any effect on the board's action, despite the fact that Braun is noticeably more "liberal" than his predecessors.

The difference between this school board and those in ⁷endale and St. Louis is obvious. The school board's five members include two professional politicians whose career demands frequently conflict with the demands placed on them by the school's needs. If Mrs. Smith feels that cutting off federal funds is necessary for her to be elected mayor, she will have little choice. If the other three members can be considered loyal to the schools, they express their loyalty in drastically different ways. White is a nineteenth century individualist who tends to depend little upon other board members; Kennedy is a conservative on race, and Thrall a fighting reformer who has little opportunity or willingness to associate himself with White or the board's politicians. (One of the other board members described Thrall with the ambiguous phrase "abominably intelligent.")

Even if there were little public controversy, the board would still be hampered by its natural internal conflict. With the board members competing with each other for votes every two years, and with each struggling to maintain his constituency, they are naturally in conflict.⁶ At board meetings, discussion tends to ramble on for hours. As we have noted, the pattern of voting is erratic, and there are no two members who have not disagreed on one of the major issues facing the board. On the five-member board, it is difficult to predict who will be the "swing" member of any particular vote. In contrast to this, the school board has been faced with a civil rights movement which is

⁶Even routine administrative matters are affected by the school board's style of decision making. For example, at one meeting it was announced that the post of assistant school custodian was open. The chairman ruled that appointments to this post should be made by the board and without asking the superintendent for a recommendation, two of the board members nominated persons for the position. After some discussion the matter was referred to the superintendent.

united, militant, and has considerable organizational skill. The civil rights movement wasted little time going into the streets, and when they did, they developed considerable support among white suburbanites. Their contacts with state officials are much closer than are the school board's.

A list of the most important civil rights leaders in the Bay City school controversy would include probably eight persons. The following brief biographies of six of these leaders serve to demonstrate one unique aspect of the Bay City civil rights movement.

Canon James Winston, who was curate of St. Paul's Protestant Episcopal Cathedral, is now on the executive staff of the Commission on Religion and Race of the National Council of Churches. He is a graduate of Union Theological Seminary and Dartmouth, where he majored in comparative literature and philosophy.

Paul Jones is director of a social center in the ghetto. A graduate of Dartmouth, where he majored in psychology, Jones ran for Congress in the 1964 election on a peace-civil rights platform.

Sam Ackerman, who is white and Jewish, was one of the founders of the local CORE chapter. Ackerman, a graduate of Antioch and Harvard, where he majored in history and Soviet studies, has been teaching history in a well-to-do suburb and has recently joined the staff of the national office of CORE.

Thomas Wilson, a vice-president of the NAACP and one of their attorneys, is a graduate of Harvard University and Harvard Law School. At the time of the school boycotts, Wilson was the governor's adviser on racial issues.

Larry Stone, education chairman for NAACP, is an engineer with white architects working for him. For many years, Stone has been appointed by the governor and the mayor to important posts. For example, he is the chairman of the Governor's Committee on Education and is a member of the Mayor's Advisory Committee on Urban Renewal. In addition,

he is the first vice-president of the Citizens for the Bay City Public Schools. Stone is a graduate of Purdue and did advanced work at MIT.

Philip McNeill, possibly the only executive secretary of an NAACP chapter who is a sociologist, is a graduate of Indiana University, where he won a Phi Beta Kappa key. While doing graduate work, he wrote a paper criticizing the NAACP for not being sufficiently aggressive, and he was promptly hired to be the executive secretary. Only one of the five (excluding Jones) is a native of Bay City. Three are alumni of Harvard, and their median age is thirty.

The unity of the civil rights movement conceals a serious disagreement over goals. On the one hand, the movement believed that recognition of the evils of de facto segregation was a major goal. However, it also felt that a campaign of demonstrations was necessary to overcome the apathy of the Negro community and mobilize public sentiment on a wide scale. Thus the civil rights movement felt that it could benefit from the board's acceptance of a policy statement at the very beginning, but it also knew that its goals would be served if the board chose to take a hard line. Other civil rights movements would have been less interested in demonstrations for their own sake. In addition, the civil rights movement had a third goal, as is indicated by Larry Stone's membership in Citizens for the Bay City Public Schools, and by the Citizens' Negro candidate for school board being active in the NAACP; this was general reform of the school board. In the 1959 election, before the Citizens was organized, its founder, Mrs. Biddle, ran for the school board; even then she ran well in the Negro wards, so that a reform-civil rights coalition was "natural." This has posed a serious dilemma. The pre-election civil rights demonstrations of 1963 and 1965 seem to have hurt the chances of the reform candidates. (The Negro candidate pulled relatively more votes from white wards in 1961, before the school integration issue came up, then he did in 1963.)

The impressive victories of Mrs. Smith in the school board elections of 1963 and 1965 have been interpreted as evidence of white

opposition to school integration. However, the results are not this simple. The marriage of reform and civil rights has done little to help either; but the reformers, whose base never extended beyond the one-fourth of the city which was non-Catholic, were never a potent political force. They probably would not have done well even if the race issue had not come up. More important, the battle in Bay City has not been concerned so much with school integration as it has with deciding a more fundamental issue. The civil rights movement has not made demands for extensive integration. As one civil rights leader commented about one of the negotiating sessions, "If the school committee had done nothing more than say they intended to do something, that would have been enough." But what the civil rights movement has demanded has been something much more valuable. For recognition of the right of Negroes to integrated schools implies a recognition of Negroes as occupying a new social and political position. It is this which we think has been put to the test in the school elections. Or to use the language of the board's lonely integrationist, William Thrall, it would help to satisfy the Negroes if "official Bay City could recognize their humanity."

CHAPTER V

NEWARK

The remaining five cities in our study have appointed school boards. Of the five, Newark is possibly the most interesting.

There are apparently only a handful of political machines remaining in the big cities today. By "machine" we mean the political organization which maintains itself almost exclusively with patronage and other material rewards. Newark provides us with a textbook example of the machine in operation. Even Newark has flirted with reform, however, in 1954, Newark adopted a mayor-council form of government dropping its obsolete commission structure. At that time, one of the commissioners, Leo Carlin, supported the reform and was elected mayor. In 1962 the present mayor, Hugh Addonizio, was elected with the support of at least part of the Republican organization, some elements of the Democratic party supporting his opponent. (Newark local elections are nonpartisan.) Thus both of the last two mayors have incorporated limited "reform" elements in their program.

Newark, like Lawndale, could be described either as a suburb, since it is fifteen minutes from Manhattan, or as an industrial central city, in its own right. But in Newark the passing tourist would have no difficulty deciding which label better described the city. Newark is primarily a city of heavy industry and working-class housing, though it houses home offices of several major insurance firms, including Prudential. Much of its industry is absentee owned, and its management lives in "The Oranges"--New Jersey's middle- and upper-income suburbs. Like most older cities, Newark lost much industry after World War II, although new commercial and financial firms have partly offset the loss.

Traditionally, the dominant ethnic group in Newark politics is the Irish-Americans, although the election of Mayor Addonizio has brought the Italian-American group to a dominant position. Actually, the city

was 34 per cent Negro in 1960 and the Negro population is growing rapidly, so that there are more Negroes than Italians in the city. However, the younger Negro population may have to wait for many years before they constitute enough persons of voting age to play the major role in local politics.

Newark, then, has all the conditions necessary for the ideal-typical machine: a heavy concentration of Negroes and ethnic groups, a small and disinterested business elite, a population which is apathetic and which turns its attention toward New York. And the machine has an ideal-typical image; to many of our informants, it is seen as efficient at vote getting and at co-opting its critics, but inept at everything else. We were told a number of stories suggesting that the government was corrupt and tied to organized crime.¹ The school system was the one part of the city administration which has not been affected by any reform.

The school board's nine members are appointed by the mayor without approval of any other governmental body. The bulk of the board consists of political appointments representing Newark's various ethnic groups. One informant stated that only six of the nine are political appointments who are active in elections. This figure may be correct, but at the time of our study we thought it too low. As one board member said, "I don't know what X is doing on the board; I didn't see him in the last campaign!" The board has served as a political stepping-stone. In fact, Mayor Carlin served eight years on the school board before moving to the city council and the mayor's office. Of the present nine members of the board, four are Catholic (two Italians, one Irish, and one Polish) four are Protestants (of whom two are Negro), and one is Jewish. Three of the nine are attorneys, another is the wife of an attorney.

¹We should make it doubly clear that we are talking about the image; we have no reason ourselves to know whether these charges are justified or not. However, the 1965 grand jury raised the issue of organized gambling again.

The schools have been the target of much criticism. (As always, some of the criticism must be dismissed as unfounded.) Much of the criticism has focused on allegations of severe overcrowding, particularly in Negro schools. A report by the director of the Newark Human Rights Commission charges that teacher turnover is high and that an abnormally large number of teachers are substitutes. The combined impact of the socio-economic status of the Newark population and the conditions in the schools result in a system where, at the sixth grade, the median scores on the Stanford Reading Test are below the national norms in a heavy majority of the city's forty-six elementary schools.

The first Negro was appointed to the Newark school board in 1942. The present board president, Harold Ashby, is Negro, and Mayor Addonizio appointed a second Negro to the board. Thus Newark was one of the first cities in the United States to have a Negro board member, and one of the first to have two Negroes on the board. Both are lawyers.

1961: The First School Desegregation Issue

Prior to 1961, the civil rights movement was concerned with discriminatory practices within the school system, and with the overall quality of education, rather than school segregation. The first issue raised was the demand that the school system appoint a Negro to an administrative post. Later, an interracial community organization, the Clinton Hills Community Conference, began an attack on Superintendent Kennelly, asking that he be dismissed as incompetent. He was also accused of being prejudiced, but the main charge was that he failed to anticipate building needs. The Clinton Hills group was joined by white and Negro religious groups. However, the school board unanimously rejected the demand that charges be brought against the superintendent. (In New Jersey superintendents have tenure in their positions.)

A series of factors cooperated to bring the school integration issue to the surface at the same time that the board was defending Kennelly.

First, the school system converted a junior high school to high school use in the Vailsburg area. Vailsburg is a peninsula jutting out to the west of the city and is an all-white community of middle- and low-income housing. The boundaries set on the new school would make it all white, and its students would be transferred out of an integrated high school to attend it. Thus the Vailsburg issue is similar to Lawndale's Woodside High School (but without as much circumstantial evidence or gerrymandering). Like the Woodside district, Vailsburg has symbolic significance. It is the home of five of Newark's nine councilmen and Mayor Carlin.

In the late 1950's the NAACP and Attorney Paul Zuber were active in de facto segregation suits in both New Jersey and New York state, and the New Rochelle verdict had been handed down only a few weeks before Vailsburg opened.

The integrated community adjoining Vailsburg is Clinton Hills, so it is hardly surprising that the NAACP's education director (Stanley Winters, an officer of the Clinton Hills group) picked up the Vailsburg issue and brought in Zuber to file a suit charging that the Newark schools were segregated. As usual, Zuber's presence indicated a split between the national NAACP and the local branch. As seems to be typical of these suits, there was little money. Zuber was simultaneously involved in several other important cases, and the NAACP began looking for an out-of-court settlement. Actually, as in most northern segregation cases, it is difficult to guess how good a case the NAACP had. Winters was clearly the one person most committed to the suit. He produced a report documenting the charges to be leveled in the suit. He is also the only important civil rights leader who was not Negro, and the only member of the branch executive board to oppose an out-of-court settlement. Mayor Carlin, who was then running for reelection against Addonizio, was also interested in settling the case and helped establish contacts between the school board and some of the NAACP officials.

In January, 1962, Zuber and the NAACP branch president met with

school board President Morris Fuchs, Superintendent Kennelly, and other school officials. They produced an out-of-court settlement which centered around the adoption of a limited open enrollment policy called Optional Pupil Transfer, and the appointment of a Citizens' Advisory Board to advise the board on integration matters. With this minimal victory for the integrationists, the case was withdrawn and Zuber left Newark.

The school board adopted the Optional Pupil Transfer plan in March. At that meeting, the board also voted to meet with the NAACP to establish the structure of the Citizens' Board. It was agreed that the NAACP would be permitted to nominate five of the thirteen members. It is indicative of the interrelationship between the actors that the NAACP suggested Ashby, who that same day was appointed to the school board by the incoming Mayor Addonizio. The other four NAACP nominees included a representative of a Negro businessmen's group, the associate director of the state chapter of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and two NAACP members. By June the Citizens' Advisory Board was officially established.

Under the regulations governing Optional Pupil Transfer, 347 students were permitted to transfer, and apparently less than 200 of these were Negro students going into predominantly white schools. All eight of the plaintiffs in the original Zuber case did not receive transfers, but the new Negro board member, Ashby, asked the board to pass a motion permitting them to transfer also, and this was done.

The Citizens' Board limited itself to watching over the details of the transfer plan and never played a role of importance in the situation. Over a year after it was formed its president, Ralph M. Caprio, manager of the Newark office of Metropolitan Life Insurance, commented that he "would be the first to admit we've done practically nothing."

While many members of the NAACP executive board seemed to be satisfied with the outcome of the suit, Winters, who had not been consulted during the bargaining, was not. From this time on, he and the Clinton Hills Council engaged in a guerrilla war with the school board; their

persistent testimony about inferior education became a consistent theme of Newark school board meetings. However, he was never able to mobilize a sufficient protest movement to force any action.

The segregation issue reappeared in another community a year later. In the spring of 1963 the school board rearranged the boundaries between Peshine and Hawthorne elementary schools, just south of the Clinton Hills area. In an effort to balance overcrowding in these two schools, the school board transferred 161 students, some of whom were white, from Hawthorne (74 per cent Negro) to Peshine (96 per cent Negro). Hawthorne was a middle-income area in racial transition, while Peshine was a working-class Negro area. The parents protested the transfer, partly because both white and Negro parents objected to attending nearly all-Negro schools, and partly because they felt the quality of education to be lower at Peshine. While the parents received some advice from the Clinton Hills Council and from one of the Negro board members, and had the support of civil rights groups, this was primarily a neighborhood protest, which used the tactics of the civil rights movement without really attempting to identify the issue as a civil rights issue. At first the school board paid little attention to the protest.

On the first day of school (September 9), 111 of the transferees boycotted. Five days later the board rejected the request of the parents that they be allowed to transfer to other schools. The parents had submitted a list of white schools which were less crowded than Peshine. When the board rejected their request, they organized a picket and sit-in at one of the schools which they had wanted to transfer to. In addition, the parents organized a "freedom school," using volunteer teachers in a private home. Immediately after the sit-in, Mayor Addonizio met with the parents. After the meeting, the mayor announced that the board would consider their cases on an individual basis. Ashby, who also participated in the negotiations, added that the board would reconsider the entire matter. On September 24 the board met and entertained a motion to give the 161 Peshine transferees top priority over the other students in the Optional

Pupil Transfer waiting list. Although some board members protested that this was discrimination in favor of the protesters, and against the other applicants, the board adopted the motion by a six to three vote. This meeting was held on September 24, exactly two weeks and one day after school opened.

Interpretation

The characteristics of the political machine, as an "ideal type," are: (1) The members are disciplined by material rewards, such as patronage, graft, or appointments to public positions. In addition, potential critics are co-opted by the party by these appointments. Consequently, there is no internal dissension, and external criticism is muted. (2) Ideology is secondary to organizational maintenance. The machine takes whatever policy is considered necessary to get the votes. (3) The machine deals with voters particularistically rather than adopting general legalistic universals; it "makes deals" on an individual basis. When the machine actually operates in this manner (many do not), the resulting government has some advantages. It tends in general to be a good "broker" of the conflicting demands upon it, and it can move quickly and decisively to avert conflict. This is basically what happened in Newark.

In Bay City, a school board member used the racial issue for personal political gain. This did not, and could not, happen in Newark.

In Lawndale, the controversy became pitched on an ideological level, and became a virtual holy war. In fact, the board members in Newark are more conservative than those in Lawndale,² but they took the necessary minimum action to avert controversy without any complaint. A school superintendent in Kennelly's position could have easily become involved in an ideological war with the liberals, especially since they had already attacked him. But Kennelly's public behavior showed commendable restraint. Again this is consistent with the Newark political "style."

²See Chapter XI for the questionnaire data on this point.

In St. Louis the school board agreed to a program to increase integration. Newark did not do as much because the political machine has few persons in it as liberal as those on the St. Louis board, and because it was not necessary for the maintenance of political power. Newark does have a policy of bussing students from overcrowded schools, and this has resulted in integration of several white schools. This bussing program has never been the subject of controversy; white parents have not protested, and civil rights leaders (to our knowledge) have not asked for expansion. The highly pragmatic behavior of Mayor Addonizio suggests that had the civil rights movement pressed harder on the schools, they might have gotten much more from the system.

Of course, it is impossible to know what would have happened had the movement pressed harder. Presumably, Mayor Addonizio would eventually have chosen to refuse demands in order to avoid alienating white voters, and we do not know at what point this would have occurred. However, it seems characteristic of machine cities that they have weak civil rights movements. Any NAACP branch is in danger of falling into the hands of those Negro lawyers and others who have political ambitions; this is especially true in a machine city which can use patronage to win their support, and can extend other favors to nonlawyers.

The Newark NAACP has always had a group of "young turks" and white liberals like Winters. They have remained in a minority on most issues, and in 1965 their candidate for branch president was defeated. They did play a major role in the Zuber suit, as reflected by the presence as legal advisor of Clyde Ferguson (then on the Rutgers faculty and later chief counsel of the Civil Rights Commission).

The militant civil rights group is CORE, and it has generally avoided taking a major role in the schools issue and has worked on employment problems. Employment discrimination is handled by a nongovernmental biracial group, the Business and Industry Coordinating Council. It has been fairly effective, and it is perhaps an accurate reflection on Newark that it has

operated completely independent from the government. Indeed, Newark's use of private enterprise for public purposes is impressive. In another case when a major industry attempted to cooperate with the public schools in establishing a training program, it took over many of the public schools' functions, apparently on the assumption that it would be simpler to do the work itself.

In Newark it seems clear that the school board has little autonomy. The two mayors participated in the crucial negotiations in both the Vailsburg and Peshine issues, and in both cases the school board wound up reversing its position.³

It is understandably difficult to assess what the school board might have done had it acted on its own. Apparently it was not planning to make concessions to the Peshine transfer students, although it might have later. The board members vary considerably in their attitudes toward race issues. Ashby, despite his school board position, is respected by Negroes and apparently exerted a liberalizing influence behind the scenes. But this is characteristic of the ideal machine, that it does not require conformity on ideological grounds, as long as the boat is not rocked unnecessarily. So in Newark the mayor goes against the trend of keeping politics out of the schools by publicly handling controversial issues. The result is that if it does not resolve the school desegregation issue to the satisfaction of the committed civil rights leadership, it at least handles potential controversy with impressive speed and efficiency.

³One critic of the school system has argued that the serious financial problems of the Newark schools could be partly alleviated if the schools had a politically independent board with its own taxing powers.

CHAPTER VI

BUFFALO

Like Newark, Buffalo is an undeveloped democracy; but unlike Newark, and more like Bay City, this is reflected in a political system which borders on chaos. The effect of this is to produce a city government which has been incapable of supplying much more than the minimum of amenities to the city.

Buffalo, like most northern industrial cities, delivers a consistent Democratic majority in presidential elections, and its local elections are partisan. Under these conditions, we might expect a stable political machine to exist. In fact, mayors usually serve only one term, and two of the last four mayors have been Republican. In the last two mayoralty elections, there were competitive primaries in both parties, and a major third-party candidate in the general election. Since a plurality and not a majority is required for election, the result is highly unpredictable. In 1957 the Democratic candidate, Frank Sedita, was elected by sixty votes over the Republican, with a candidate running on the Independent Citizens ticket running a close third. Four years later Sedita was defeated in a primary fight and ran as an independent in the general election. He ran ahead of the Democratic candidate, but the split in the Democratic ranks helped to elect the Republican, Chester Kowal.

During the early 1960's Buffalo was split into four factions--two in each party. The Republicans were split into the supporters of Eric County Chairman Robert W. Grimm and state Senator Walter J. Mahoney. The Democrats are permanently split, not by personality, but by ethnicity. The major bloc of votes is Polish: the city is said to be 63 per cent Catholic and 35 per cent Polish-American (Dawidowicz and Goldstein, 1963). The other major groups are the Italian and Irish ward organizations. The absence of party discipline is reflected not only in the third-party candidates for mayor, but in the fact that the Democratic party seriously

considered slating a Republican councilman as their candidate for U.S. congressman in 1964. The existence of both a liberal and conservative party complicate the picture further. Just as it is not clear which party will win the mayoralty, it is also not clear what ethnic group will be victorious. Of the last four mayors, three had Polish names, but Sedita is Italian.

The Negro voters do not have a home in any of these factions, and in the 1957 and 1961 mayor's races divided their votes three ways. There is only one Negro elected official, an alderman (councilman in Buffalo) elected from the Negro ward, and he has been quiet on the schools issue.

During the past decade, politics has tended to be scandal ridden and the city government has had few accomplishments to its credit. For example, Buffalo's urban renewal program led to the clearance of 160 acres of slum land in 1952; thirteen years later, the land still stands vacant. In 1964, all federal and state aid for new housing programs was cut off because the city did not have a housing code. A code was adopted about one year later. The present mayor, Kowal, and his corporation counsel are under indictment for taking unlawful fees, having an interest in the disposal of city property, and perjury.¹

In this political climate the school system has had a checkered career. In the 1940's a fierce battle raged over the schools because the superintendent, Robert J. Bapst, was a devout Catholic who was accused of making the public schools into a stepchild of the parochial school system. He did lend some of the public school teachers to the Catholic schools, and he urged his administrators to hold down spending because of the burden which operating two school systems placed on the citizens of Buffalo. He was supported by a school board consisting of four Catholics and one Jew. When the Protestants launched an attack on Bapst, two of the Catholics on the board were replaced by Protestants. Bapst resigned after this and

¹As we went to press, Mayor Kowal, who did not stand for re-election, was replaced by Sedita, who had served as mayor from 1957 to 1961.

was ordained as a priest a short time later. In the 1950's Mayor Solita departed from the practice of appointing two Protestants. He appointed what are called "public school Catholics," but pressure from Protestants, Negroes, and organized labor eventually forced the enlargement of the board from five to seven members to give broader representation.

The Catholic-Protestant issue is still visible. In his 1965-66 budget message, Mayor Kowal said:

I am well aware that the allocation of \$37,700,000 for the Board of Education falls short of their request [\$43,089,905] but the fact remains that to provide additional funds would require a substantial increase in the tax rate and thereby add to the burden of many thousands of our property owners who are presently supporting two school systems.

The city council's budget cutting, plus the limited tax base in Buffalo, make the school system the most poorly financed one in the state. The average expenditure per pupil is \$200 per year less than the average in the five other large cities in the state; on some measures of expenditure, Buffalo ranks last among the 107 school districts in western New York.

In 1964 the seven members of the board included two Italians, two Poles, one Greek, one Jew, and one Negro; the two Italians and the two Poles are Catholic, and the other three are Jewish, Protestant, and Greek Orthodox. The composition of the board is unstable in both its ethnic and religious make-up; for example, there are no Irish members, although there were a few years earlier, and in 1965 one of the Italians was replaced by a "Yankee." There was, briefly, a tradition of bipartisanship in appointments, but Mayor Kowal broke this by appointing only Republicans. (Our informants generally told us that Kowal knew he would not be reelected, and therefore felt free to make the most of his one term.) Five of the seven present members were either friends or supporters of the mayors who appointed them. It is important to understand the type of people who make up the Buffalo board. Nine different persons served on the board between 1963 and 1965; we shall describe six of them.

Paschal Rubino, a funeral director in an Italian neighborhood, retired from the board in 1965 after a record fifteen years of service. He is now only forty-six. In general, he has taken the position that the board should rule the schools and the school superintendent. One result of this is that he has sometimes been very rude to the superintendent, but other board members have shown the same trait. Rubino is a dynamic and outspoken man and shows some of the qualities of the effective politician. For example, in explaining his vote on the crucial issue of this study, the setting of boundaries for Woodlawn Junior High School, he made a 1,600-word speech in which he publicly praised twenty-three persons by name--including former city councilmen and school board members.

Peter Gust Economou first joined the board in 1956. A Republican, he was appointed and reappointed by Democratic mayors Pankow and Sedita. He owns and manages the huge Park Lane Hotel and Restaurant, which serves as a meeting house for both Jewish and Protestant society. Economou is a respected member of the Republican party. He was vice-chairman of the Sewer Authority for eleven years, chairman for four years of the governmental employees division of the United Fund, and has held a number of other positions. He is a close friend of the state senate majority leader Walter Mahoney. He has worked hard to improve the schools in his special area of competence--the efficient handling of food and the teaching of food preparation in the vocational schools. He is also a member of the State Education Department's Advisory Committee on School Lunch Programs.

The board's Jewish member, Sam Markel, was appointed in 1961 by his close friend Mayor Sedita (he had also served for eight years in the 1940's). Although an active Democrat, he is not politically ambitious. Although he was forced to go to work at fourteen, he is now a successful businessman. He is very conscious of the prestige which being a school board member holds, and has been one of the superintendent's staunchest supporters. In 1965 Mayor Kowal replaced Markel with a Republican dentist, Dr. Bernard Rosenblatt. (Kowal did not reappoint any of the incumbents whose terms expired while he was mayor.)

When the board was expanded to seven members in 1962, Kowal appointed Dr. Lydia Wright, a pediatrician and the first Negro to serve on the board. Kowal originally intended to appoint another Negro to the position, but she waged a highly effective campaign to attract support. She is generally considered a militant fighter for civil rights, but has also supported efforts to obtain more money for schools. Although she is respected by most of the other board members, her outspoken mannerisms have at times limited her effectiveness.

Carmelo Parlato was appointed in 1963, also after working for Mayor Kowal in the primary. He is a young attorney, a militant anti-Communist, and politically ambitious. He considers the superintendent of schools to be an integrationist who must be carefully checked by the board, to prevent "racial ideas from predominating over educational values."

Another recent appointment to the board is Anthony Nitkowski, who holds the union seat. Kowal had originally nominated another union leader who was unable to accept the appointment. Nitkowski then proposed his own name to the mayor. Nitkowski is a supporter of the superintendent and has a strong commitment to the schools. He is a liberal on racial issues.

Buffalo, like St. Louis, Lawndale, and Bay City, has a superintendent who has risen through the ranks within the school systems. The superintendent of schools, Joseph Manch, has over the years demonstrated a personal commitment to integration which is unusual among school superintendents. Manch has been vice-president of the Urban League, active in the NAACP and the Anti-Defamation League, and has received awards from the National Conference of Christians and Jews and many other groups. Manch's background is also unusual for a school superintendent. He is one of the very few Jews who are superintendents, and was very active in the teacher's union during his years in the Buffalo system.

The general situation in Buffalo is made worse by the fact that the city has had a strong radical right organization, which has, for example, made the unlisted telephone popular among liberals and even unknown University of Buffalo faculty members. The far right's preoccupation with Communism has blocked needed innovations. One story will give an example of this and also indicate a little about the school board policy-making style. Buffalo has been financially unable to embark on a strong compensatory education program

for slum schools, and a predominantly white group, the Citizens Council on Human Relations (CCHR), organized an after-school remedial education program staffed by volunteers, most of whom were city school teachers. However, when CCHR became involved in the school integration issue, two board members virtually accused them of having Communists in their membership. Although a majority of the board voted to uphold CCHR, the minority conducted a public campaign which caused CCHR to cancel the program for fear of jeopardizing the careers of their volunteer teachers.

The School Integration Controversy, 1963-65

During the two-year period from 1963 to 1965, the school board changed considerably in its decision-making style. During 1963, the board suffered from considerable internal dissension and alienated the civil rights movement by its decision to open the new Woodlawn Junior High School as all Negro over the initial objection of Manch. However, in the following year, the internal structure of the board changed so that in 1965 a liberal majority dominated the board and voted as a cohesive bloc in adopting an integration plan proposed by the superintendent. We will look first at the Woodlawn decision, then at the adoption of the integration plan in 1965, and in our interpretation try to understand the factors which caused this change.

The Woodlawn Junior High School Decision

In the late 1950's Manch proposed, and the board adopted, boundary changes which led to the integration of three high schools; later, the system integrated several elementary schools. In addition, the board repeatedly went on record as favoring integration and endorsing it as a major goal.

In the 1950's the school system began to shift from the eight-four to the six-three-three grade organization. At that time the NAACP urged the school system to take advantage of the reorganization to increase integration. In particular, it objected to the location of the new Woodlawn Junior High School, which was planned for a site within the ghetto. The argument centered on the cost of various sites and several other issues as well as integration. The NAACP lost this round of the battle. The site was selected in 1958, but the school was not ready for occupancy until 1964. In the spring of 1964, the board was forced to face the issue

and establish boundaries for the new school. At this point the board was under considerable pressure to make Woodlawn an integrated school. Not only was the local civil rights movement pressing the point, but the State Department of Education had adopted a series of statements on the importance of integration.

The racial ecology of Buffalo would seem to give the school board some opportunity for integration. The Negro community is laid out in a peninsula running north from the center of town. Its long boundary would seem to provide space for a large number of integrated schools. There are a number of integrated schools, but there are also cases where rigid district lines separate white and Negro schools. The Civil Rights Report of Buffalo (Alexander, 1963) also points out that at three points on the boundary of the ghetto, optional areas are maintained, where students are given a choice between schools. In each case white students apparently use the opportunity to attend predominantly white schools.¹ Thus, despite the superintendent's efforts, in 1964 only 28 per cent of Buffalo's Negro elementary school students were attending integrated schools.

The Negro peninsula is bounded on one side by a Polish area and on the other side by an Italian community. Both communities are working class and at one time or another have expressed considerable anti-Negro sentiment. If Woodlawn Junior High School were to be integrated, it would require feeding some the all-white schools from the west, or Italian, area into it. In the Civil Rights Report written a few months before the final decision, Manch is quoted as saying that Woodlawn would be integrated: "The Zone would cross Main Street if I have anything to say about it."

When the board brought up the Woodlawn boundaries question, only six board members were in the city. They proposed four competing plans. Only Parlato proposed that Woodlawn be made entirely Negro. Economou and another board member drafted a plan which would include two all-white

¹The school system is now in the process of eliminating these optional areas.

elementary schools and which would make Woodlawn 76 per cent Negro,² and Parlato said he would be willing to compromise and vote for this plan. Nitkowski and Rubino supported a plan which differed from Economou's only in excluding part of one Negro school, lowering the proportion Negro to 69 per cent. Manch endorsed their version. Finally, Dr. Wright proposed that students from three other white schools be sent to Woodlawn, resulting in a school which was 38 per cent Negro. At this point, Manch's prediction that Woodlawn would be integrated seemed to be coming true; upon Markel's return, it seemed likely that the superintendent and five members of the board would find themselves supporting some variant of the Economou or Rubino-Nitkowski plan. Unlike the Wright or Parlato plans, their plan would place Woodlawn almost in the exact center of its district. In the following month, pressure from integrationists and segregationists was stepped up. The white neighborhoods threatened by the plan circulated a petition and obtained 12,811 signatures, and protested long and loudly at a public meeting held by the board. We were told that one of the members on the board was threatened by a local politician that he would be bankrupted if he did not support Parlato's plan.

At the same time the NAACP and other civil rights groups were endorsing the integrationist proposals and threatening a school boycott. However, the Buffalo Urban League only confused the issue. The League had been for thirty years under the direction of a highly conservative executive director. He had in fact opposed Dr. Wright's appointment on the grounds that she was too militant. Upon his retirement, he was replaced by a militant leader, but one who committed probably the most serious political blunder of any civil rights group in our study. His letter, addressed to Manch and each member of the school board and made public, called for the board to establish Woodlawn as a 50 per cent Negro school, even if to do so would be "educationally unsound or administratively or financially infeasible." Needless to say, the letter was

²These and the other percentages are those given by the Buffalo Evening News.

denounced by liberals and conservatives alike. At the next board meeting, Parlato moved that the board ask the corporation counsel whether it may consider race in establishing boundaries. When Manch pointed out that the State Education Department's legal counsel had said that "the question is no longer whether to integrate but how," Rubino attacked Manch for "his unfortunate and supine concern with these unclear statements emanating from the state." The corporation counsel--the same one who was later indicted--supported Parlato's view that race could not be considered a factor, but based this opinion on a decision by the state's lowest appellate court, an opinion that shortly afterwards was appealed and reversed.

At the next board meeting, the board capitulated to the segregationist opposition. Parlato's plan was adopted by a six to one vote, with only Dr. Wright voting against it. Manch made it clear that he was surrendering to the white opposition, first stating that Parlato's plan was "as good a plan for a district which will be organized on the basis of the immediate neighborhood as any other"--leaving open the question whether the plan was as good as one which was organized on the basis of some other definition of the neighborhood. He then went on to say that "it is not feasible . . . to draw the district lines for Woodlawn as to achieve a racial balance that would be meaningful or stable" (italics added). Thus he made it clear that he felt it would be impossible to maintain Woodlawn as integrated given the extent of white opposition. He bemoaned the fact that Woodlawn had become the "test of the board's and the superintendent's intention in this total matter of racial balance" and cited the previous cases when they had redrawn lines to integrate schools. Markel and Nitkowski cast reluctant votes in favor. Nitkowski made it clear he was influenced by Manch's change of opinion. Only Wright voted against the Parlato plan.

This total retreat of the board and the superintendent from their previous position spurred the civil rights movement to mobilize for the first time. On the day of the board's decision, the NAACP staged a poorly

attended march in the rain to Niagara Square. Within two months, however, the threatened boycott was held and was rather successful. Absenteeism was over 60 per cent in several all-Negro schools. The following fall (1964), when Woodlawn was opened, the civil rights movement was torn by the national NAACP policy that no demonstrations be held until after the Johnson-Goldwater election. One group, called the Mothers' Alliance, attempted an opening day boycott of Woodlawn which was an almost total failure. Several informants stated that the school system had effectively publicized the new school, which contained such luxuries as closed-circuit television. It is indicative of the weakness of the boycotters that they were very critical of Dr. Wright for refusing to ride the streets in a sound truck.

It was after this debacle that the NAACP began preparing a petition for State Commissioner of Education James E. Allen. It is interesting that the Buffalo NAACP did not use Negro lawyers, but went to the University of Buffalo faculty for legal advice. (Of course, the Citizens Council on Human Relations had many contacts among the Buffalo faculty, so it was easy for the movement to obtain help from this source.)

At this point Manch and the two liberals on the board began a campaign which eventually resulted in the adoption of an integration plan. They were aided by several factors. Most important was Allen's reply to the NAACP petition, in which he rebuked the board and ordered them to prepare an integration plan.

Manch had been attempting for over a year to persuade the board to adopt an open enrollment plan expressly designed to further racial balance. Under this plan, only students from schools which were designated as imbalanced would be qualified for transfer to predominantly white or integrated schools. The board had earlier adopted the conventional "color-blind" version of the plan, but had declined to tie it expressly to integration. In May the board voted down the amendment four to two, with Dr. Wright and Nitkowski in the minority and Dr.

Rosenblatt abstaining. However, in September, 1964, the board adopted a stronger policy statement, committing the board to achieving integration in nearly any way short of a wholesale transportation program. Only Parlato and one other conservative on the board voted against the proposal. In December the board again rejected the amendment of the open-enrollment plan, this time by a four to three vote. But in December the board received an indirect rebuke from an unexpected quarter. The Chief Judge of the State Court of Appeals, Charles S. Desmond, spoke harshly of the "impotence" of school boards in dealing with the segregation issue. Such a statement from this prominent judge was unexpected, and the Buffalo press took the opportunity to chastise the board.

Allen acted on the NAACP petition in February, 1965, and requested the Buffalo school board to submit an integration plan by May 1, 1965. Manch immediately asked the board to take action and the board responded, first by accepting the color-conscious restrictions on the open-enrollment plan (which it had rejected again a few days earlier), and then by requesting the superintendent to prepare an integration plan. The superintendent responded by presenting an eleven-point plan, which involved the closing of one segregated school and the redrawing of boundaries in other areas. The plan was approved April 28. The two conservatives voted against the plan. One of the liberal members, Nitkowski, expressed slight misgivings that the plan did not go farther, but voted in favor of it. Dr. Wright also voted for it but publicly expressed her disapproval. This five to two vote was to become the pattern for the board. Three factors--Manch's continued pressure on the board--Allen's request for a plan, and Judge Desmond's speech, had enabled the board to develop a liberal consensus. In May board President Rubino retired from the board, and Mayor Kowal named as his successor George F. Goodyear. Goodyear's appointment is important for two reasons: not only was his appointment nonpolitical, he was an Anglo-Saxon Protestant member of the Buffalo civic elite. In addition, he was known to be a liberal on racial issues, since he had been very active in Urban League activity. When Goodyear

joined the board, the board elected Nitkowski as board president. Nitkowski, who had been only a year earlier a member of a liberal minority, was now the leader of a five-member liberal majority which would support Manch's recommendations.

In the fall of 1965 the first steps in the implementation of the new integration program were taken; Negro students were transferred in several white schools, and plans were drawn to close another antiquated school building. By this time, the anti-integration opposition had organized formally, with the open support of the two conservative board members. A suit was filed contesting the legality of the new integration plan. (The suit lost in the local courts and may be appealed.)

In the fall of 1965 the board and the staff had another opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to integration. One of the Negro elementary schools in the Woodlawn Junior High School district was partially disabled by a Sunday-night fire. The staff immediately prepared a plan to reassign some of the students into two adjoining all-Negro schools and a nearby intergrated school. The parents from the burned school protested the transfer to all-Negro schools and Manch met with a large group Monday night. At the meeting he agreed to try to develop a new plan. The plan was prepared the next day and involved dispersing the students into eight integrated or all-white schools. The plan was approved by the "normal" five to two vote and the students were back in class on Friday.

Interpretation

The outstanding characteristic of the Woodlawn decision was the inability of the board to operate as a cohesive group to produce a single plan. Although five of the six board members (one was out of town) favored integrating Woodlawn, they wound up producing four different plans. Then, in the face of the petition campaign, they retreated. Throughout 1963, the school board's decision-making process was nearly

as chaotic as Bay City's. This is somewhat surprising, given the fact that this board was appointive. However, it may be that the disorder of the appointment process, which boiled down to rewarding the faithful, with little regard to maintaining any particular ethnic, religious, or political composition, explains the situation. Of our cities, Buffalo is the only appointed board where members could not expect to be automatically reappointed. Thus there was considerable pressure on board members to play roles which would gain them political followings. In addition, two members waged campaigns to be appointed initially. In this way, the board had pressures on it which make it resemble an elected board. In Newark, the machine, with its devotion to political discipline, serves to keep board members "in line," but the multi-factional politics of Buffalo reward dissidence, especially under a lame duck mayor. Finally, we should note that in a city like Bay City or Buffalo where ethnic rivalries find their way into the political arena, racism is a more legitimate position.

The presence of many new appointments on the board, coupled with criticisms from several board members of Manch, created an air of tension around the board's decision-making process. The board refused to be led by the superintendent, but on the other hand, there was no board member whom they recognized as a leader. The result was that no one was quite sure what the board should be doing, or who should be doing it. It was extremely difficult to single out any members of the board as being key members, and the pattern of votes was somewhat unpredictable. What is most interesting is the heavy emotional investment made by the board members. Insults were thrown, not only at Manch, but at other board members; board meetings include hours of speech making, and several board members have wept publicly at one time or another. A board meeting is likely to be punctuated by a demand that the superintendent explain "why was a coat stolen in P.S. 136?"

This query, by one of the board's conservatives, indicates the flavor of many board meetings. The presence of a single person who

chooses to harass the superintendent and the other board members by taking campaigns to the public can almost immobilize the board. The collapse of the volunteer compensatory education program indicates that such tactics can succeed even over the opposition of a majority of the board.

The unusual board structure in 1963 might be put this way: The board's most outspoken members were the president (Rubino), the two conservatives, and to a lesser extent, Dr. Wright. But none of these four people (except on a few occasions, Rubino) represented a central position of the board. In contrast, the three members who made up the center of the board--Nitkowski, Markel, and Economou--were less aggressive. This situation changed immediately when Nitkowski became board president.

In the case of Lawndale, we noted that the civil rights movement's weakness might explain why the school board did not take any action to increase integration. In Buffalo, where the movement is somewhat more militant, but organizationally very weak, it is interesting to speculate whether a stronger movement would have had more success in the Woodlawn case. The civil rights movement is very weak in Buffalo. CORE is essentially a one-man organization, and the NAACP, which carried the brunt of the schools issue, is not much better. The NAACP is unusual in that it does not seem to represent the Negro elite as one might expect. Its education chairman during most of the Woodlawn controversy, Raphael Dubard, is not the usual lawyer, but is a toll collector for the New York Department of Highways. Its present president is a steelworker. The organization does not even have a paid receptionist. The "white liberal" group, the Citizens Council for Human Relations, sees itself as viewed with outright hostility by the white citizenry. But how much difference would it have made if demonstrations like those in St. Louis could have been staged? With a couple of board members ready to ride on a "white backlash," the demonstrations might have simply stiffened the board's resistance to integration of Woodlawn.

In Lawndale the demonstrations by white neighborhood groups came only after the board had committed itself to rejecting the integrationist

demands. Thus the Woodlawn Junior High School incident is the only case that we have yet seen in which the demonstration of opposition to integration had a direct effect on the board. Why was the demonstration so effective? One reason is that the board made it clear to the community that it was open to influence. Rather than simply uniting about a plan drawn by the administration, the board presented four different plans of its own. Thus the community did not see the situation as a fait accompli; rather than trying to defeat the board's plan, it was trying to persuade the board to adopt Parlato's recommendation. The board and the superintendent had made it clear that there were no overriding considerations which required that the boundaries be at any certain place. The board could not fall back on any computer mythology and say, "We know best." In addition, it seems to be generally true that effective demonstrations can be mobilized more easily by the parents from a sending school as opposed to a receiving school. The whites were defending the status quo; they were being required to send their children into a Negro neighborhood (admittedly only a short distance into it), which is psychologically akin to "reverse bussing." In contrast, Manch had been successful every time he had proposed sending Negro students into white areas to school.

Finally, the school board did not feel a strong moral compulsion to integrate Woodlawn. The civil rights movement did not argue that the segregation of Woodlawn would be an illegal gerrymander. If they had, the board might have reacted differently. Rather, the movement took the position that the board had a moral obligation to integrate schools whenever possible. But this is a vague position. It is not a universally accepted principle. It does not have the support of law, and what exactly does "whenever possible" mean? The board had integrated other schools; couldn't they dodge the issue this one time? Economou reflected this legal and moral confusion when, as he voted to support the segregation of Woodlawn, he read a short statement pleading for a decision from the Supreme Court to establish the guidelines for decisions like this one. To some extent, providing this moral guideline was the important function of Allen's intervention.

In the other cities we have studied, we have found that the crucial decisions on integration were made by the board, not the superintendent. This is also true in Buffalo, where the board has at various times exercised a firm hand in overriding the superintendent. However, it is also clear from the Buffalo story that a liberal superintendent can have an impact on his board, especially over a period of time. Manch's strong endorsement of integration, and his support of Allen, eventually led to the acceptance of this point of view by a majority of the board.

Between 1963 and 1965 the board developed a cohesive majority faction. In part, this may have simply been the result of maturation, as the number of new appointees gained experience. (The board had been increased in size from five to seven members in 1962; two of the board members were appointed in 1963; hence at the time of the Woodlawn decision a majority of the board had served less than two years.) But other factors played an important role. The selection of Nitkowski, whose appointment was not political, as board president, and the addition of Goodyear, a prominent "Yankee" businessman, to the board, tended to deemphasize the political and ethnic factors which had formerly prevented consensus.³ (Earlier, the Buffalo Evening News had virtually accused the board of voting on party lines on one issue, and at another point one board member had accused the others of being more willing to force integration in Polish neighborhoods than in Italian neighborhoods.)

In 1965 the stable five to two split on the board (one newspaper story referred to a unanimous vote as "a rare moment of unanimity" and called the five to two vote "normal") still meant that conflict was quite high, and board meetings were still likely to turn into shouting matches lasting long into the night. But the level of cohesion among the majority meant that public controversy could be controlled, and that attempts to

³In a political situation as unstable as Buffalo's, it is difficult to guess whether this is the first step toward "reform." One of our informants calls to our attention the formation of "Citizens for Better Education." Our informant adds that it is "doing a fairly good job of rousing public support for increased school budgets and better methods of choosing the Board."

make decisions would not be bogged down in misunderstanding; individual board members were now able to act with more security due to the presence of a consensual group. In many ways, this seems to be as important a factor as Allen's intervention.

CHAPTER VII

BALTIMORE

In every city we have examined so far, the school desegregation issue has been accompanied by demonstrations, court suits, and considerable controversy. Baltimore, during the summer of 1963, was faced with a series of complaints; by the end of the summer major action had been taken to meet the demands made, and yet there had been no demonstrations of importance and hardly any public statements which suggested any conflict. For this reason, Baltimore may provide us with an important case history.

The city of Baltimore still has an "image" as a sleepy port city, but this is inaccurate. The recent revitalization of Baltimore is involved with a number of seemingly unrelated facts. The decline of the iron ore supply in the Mesabi Range in the Great Lakes area has had an effect on Baltimore's economy, for iron ore now is brought to the United States from Europe. As a consequence of this, Baltimore now has the largest steel plant in the United States. The counties surrounding Baltimore are among the five fastest growing in the country. This is partly accounted for by the growth of diversified small industry, partly by the growth of the financial position of Baltimore, and partly by the influence of the Washington/New York axis of transportation and communication.

The Initial Complaints

The Baltimore school system desegregated immediately after the Brown decision in 1954. Like many eastern cities, Baltimore was permissive in its transfer policy for its students. Desegregation was accomplished by simply opening most schools to both Negro and white students. However, schools which were overcrowded or in danger of becoming overcrowded were "districted," meaning that students from outside the school's "district" were not allowed to enter. (This policy was originated in the 1930's.) Prior to 1963, Baltimore experienced a rapid growth in its Negro

population, and many of Baltimore's schools became overcrowded and went on double shift. As this happened, more schools were "districted." In addition, the schools began bussing as many as 2,000 students annually to relieve overcrowding. From 1954 to 1963, civil rights groups had made sporadic criticisms of this policy, charging that it was administered in a discriminatory fashion.

In 1961 the wife of a Johns Hopkins faculty member, Mrs. Shirley Bramhall, led her community group downtown to complain about the local school. Although the neighborhood was an integrated one, the public school was entirely Negro. The school system was transporting Negro students from more overcrowded schools in one door, while resident whites had organized transportation to take their own children out the other. Mrs. Bramhall's group specifically complained that the transfer program was likely to drive whites out of the area.

The following year another white mother, Mrs. Dorothy Sykes, was notified that her child would be put on part-time attendance because of overcrowding. Mrs. Sykes carried her complaint about this to her principal, to assistant superintendents, and finally to the superintendent of schools, George Brain. While she was doing this, she also contacted the Civil Rights Commission in Washington and the staff of the Office of Education. (Her husband was an employee of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, so she was familiar with the Washington agencies.) Mrs. Sykes's daughter was not put on double shift, but this did not deter her from her campaign. In her search for a lawyer, she contacted Baltimore Neighborhoods, Incorporated, an organization financed by Baltimore industrialists (see p. 99) which has as its mission promoting racial stability in the central city. Its director, Edward Holmgren, put her in touch with Mrs. Bramhall and an informal committee of parents was organized. Over the next year, the Sykes-Bramhall group began to see their own community problems as part of a general city-wide issue and decided to attack the general question of segregation and overcrowding in the whole school system.

We can get an idea of the way parents were able to work with school staff from the tone of one of the interviews between Mrs. Sykes and Superintendent Brain.¹ Although the tone of the interview was friendly, a clear disagreement between the parties appears in Brain's insistence that Mrs. Sykes was asking the schools to become an "instrument of social policy, to force integration through racial balancing." The parents' group prepared a report on their findings. They also contacted Melvin Sykes (unrelated to Dorothy), who agreed to serve as legal counsel to the group. Some members wanted to make the report public; after some debate, Melvin Sykes and Mrs. Sykes persuaded the committee to make a private presentation of the report to Brain and the Board of School Commissioners. (Apparently, they felt that making the report public would place the board in an uncomfortable position and possibly engender controversy.) They also obtained a resolution of support from Baltimore Neighborhoods.

Holmgren and Melvin Sykes presented the report to Brain and to the board president, Eli Frank, in February, 1963. At this meeting it was agreed that the school administration would be given an opportunity to reply to the report, and Frank asked for additional copies for all board members. This is apparently the first time that the Sykes-Bramhall group had made any contact with Frank. The protestors were promised action by April, and in late February Frank appointed an ad hoc board committee to prepare a statement on the report.

The report, which was simply called Seven Years of Desegregation in the Baltimore Public Schools: A Report, was strong and accusing in tone. It charged the school system with intentionally segregating schools and overcrowding Negro schools by (a) not building enough schools in the inner city; (b) "districting" white schools to keep Negroes out; and (c) refusing to issue transfers to Negroes to permit them to attend predominantly white schools.

¹Mrs. Sykes prepared a written summary of the interview, and submitted it to Brain, who approved the document. It was later incorporated into reports of both the school system and the parents' group. Thus we have an "official" insider's view of this interview.

Throughout April and May, there were meetings of the board's new ad hoc committee with both the administration and the protest group. The school staff prepared a response to the Seven Years report. It broke statements of the report into what it called 120 different concerns and rebutted many of them by asking that the terms used be defined. (What is a "predominantly Negro" school?). In another case, an error was corrected, the response noting that there was an omission in a listing of schools which "fit the definition of 'predominantly Negro.'" The theme running through the reply is that the report was not clear enough to be commented on, that it showed no valid evidence of discrimination, and that its recommendations that the school system adopt a policy of "forcing" integration would be of questionable legality.

This response was dismissed as meaningless by the protest group and criticized by at least one board member, and a second reply, with the same title, was prepared by the school administration.

By the beginning of May the protest group had become impatient, and Melvin Sykes wrote Frank that unless they could reach an agreement with the ad hoc committee within the month they would make a public presentation of their grievances at the June 6 board meeting. Sykes was granted a hearing at the June 6 meeting, but on May 22 the administration submitted to the board and the Sykes-Bramhall group the new reply to the Seven Years report. Although not nearly as condescending in tone as the earlier reply, the new statement was a categorical denial of all "120 concerns," accompanied by an occasional misrepresentation of the protesters' positions and an insistence that a school could not be considered segregated if it had both Negroes and whites, regardless of proportion. (The Seven Years report used 10 per cent as its criterion.) Meanwhile, the protest group had not succeeded in reaching agreement with the ad hoc committee. Thus it began to look like the June 6 board meeting would consist of the presentation of the Seven Years report, followed by the presentation of the school administration's rebuttal, and the board's adoption of the ad hoc committee's recommendation. At this point,

Melvin Sykes and the parents' group announced that they were preparing a revision of their report, which they managed to complete by working night and day between the twenty-second and the sixth. The new report was titled not Seven Years . . . A Report, but Eight Years of Desegregation in the Baltimore Public Schools: Fact and Law. The new report was studied with legal citations, and was affectionately referred to as "The Brief." It charged discrimination in the transfer and bussing policies, "districting," and in new construction, all these factors leading to unnecessary and hence illegal double-shift schooling for Negroes. At the same meeting, the NAACP's June Shagaloff appeared and gave testimony supporting the parents' group in strong terms. It was now clear that the ad hoc committee report would not go far enough, although it had recommended the complete abolition of "districting." The board unanimously adopted the ad hoc committee report and the meeting was quickly adjourned.

At this point, the issue could have exploded. It seems clear that the school administration regarded the charges made as unfounded, while the parents felt that none of their statements had been rebutted.

Strategically, the Sykes-Bramhall group had by now made it clear that they were prepared to go to court, and furthermore it was assumed by everyone that the militant Baltimore NAACP was waiting in the background, ready to begin demonstrations any time the original protest group failed in its tactics. Meanwhile, one of the Negro board members issued a statement urging the board to take action to meet the demands. At the end of July, the NAACP did stage a small demonstration, but generally they were trying to stay in the background to avoid jeopardizing the negotiations. The suit was never filed. Instead, a series of private meetings were held which included at various times board members, the superintendent, Melvin Sykes, and members of the parents' group. At the same time, Frank was keeping in touch with the board and trying to build a consensus. By the end of the summer, the school system had purchased enough school buses to transfer 5,000 students and completely eliminate double shifts. In addition, the transfer policies were liberalized and

all districting was eliminated, which also introduced Negroes into several previously all-white schools. Then the board adopted, by a six to two vote, a new policy statement which committed the board to drop "color-blindedness" and to establish a policy of integration. (The new statement had been submitted to the protest group for approval.) The sudden integration of previously all-white school met with short-lived opposition. A resolution was presented in the city council which in effect charged the board with having brought about the defeat of the neighborhood school by failing to build enough Negro schools. However, the Republican Mayor, Theodore McKelden, transferred the blame for this onto the previous administration and the argument collapsed. At the same time, parents in two areas which were receiving Negro transferees appeared to complain to the board. However, the board stood its ground, and the opposition died out rather quickly.

Interpretation

This is the first case we have examined in which the civil rights movement achieved something close to a total victory. Was this because the Baltimore parents' group was more skilled and used superior tactics? This may be part of the story, but not the major part. It is true that the parents' group, and especially Melvin Sykes, were determined not to publicly embarrass the board, to make their charges as specific as possible, and to maintain a good atmosphere for negotiation. It seems likely that their ability to make a rather convincing case that school policy was being administered in a discriminatory fashion may have made it easier for the board to act. Although ideological issues were involved, they were not prominent. And of course the demonstration in the Eight Years report that they were able to prepare a court suit helped strengthen their position. In addition, the Baltimore NAACP, which is sometimes accused of being rabble rousing and difficult to work with, was a model of cooperative behavior, staying in the background during almost the entire period of negotiation.

But this in itself is not a convincing explanation. First, there is no evidence that if they had taken the case to court, the court would have ordered the complete elimination of double shift, the complete elimination of districting, or the new policy statement. Second, there is no evidence in our other cities that discreet negotiations are more successful than demonstrations.

While the tactics used may have been best for this situation, they succeeded primarily because the Baltimore Board of School Commissioners was made up of men who took very liberal positions on race relations. As we turn to examining the structure of the leadership of Baltimore, we see that this would almost necessarily be the case.

One might argue that the protest group had an advantage in presenting its case because of its informal ties to the school board; its attorney, Melvin Sykes, was on close personal terms with the board president, Frank. (During May of 1963, while he was threatening to make a public statement at the June 6 meeting, Sykes went to the Maryland Bar Association meeting in Atlantic City. Frank was also at the meeting, as chairman of a committee on judicial selection, which proposed new procedures for the selection of judges. Sykes also spoke in favor of the committee report, and Sykes and Frank worked together on this issue.) It was no mere accident that Frank and Sykes should be able to work together like this, but neither was it a shrewd tactic on the part of the parents' group to select Sykes for this reason; rather it was a consequence of community structure.

To understand this, we must start, literally, at the top. The industrial and financial elites of Baltimore are organized into the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC). The committee is limited to one hundred men. Each member must be the president of a large corporation, and minimum membership fee is \$1,000 per year. The GBC has committed itself to rebuilding Baltimore and has been heavily involved in developing urban renewal projects and attracting new construction and new industry to the city. But it has also gone beyond these goals, which are the common

denominator of the civic elites across the country, to a commitment to saving the central city through what might be called social urban renewal. In this way they have committed themselves to improving race relations and getting benefits to Baltimore's large Negro population. This commitment is reflected in the personality of its leadership. One of the top influentials in GBC is James Rouse; he is nationally known as a builder of "new towns" with a flair for using social scientific ideas in the process. In addition, his biography in Who's Who mentions that he is a past president of the Maryland Chapter of United World Federalists. The executive director of GBC is William Boucher; he previously was employed as state director of Americans for Democratic Action, and was president of the local American Civil Liberties Union.

Baltimore Neighborhoods, Incorporated, was set up by the GBC to deal with the problems of stabilizing integrated neighborhoods. They employed Edward Holmgren, previously with the Chicago Urban League, as director and have worked closely with the parent GBC. It was Baltimore Neighborhoods which put Dorothy Sykes in touch with Shirley Bramhall, and it seems likely that Holmgren (who was one of the signers of the Seven Years and Eight Years reports) participated in the recruitment of Melvin Sykes.

At the same time, the Baltimore civic elite have played a role in the selection of school board members for many years. In 1954, when Baltimore planned to desegregate its schools, one of Baltimore's most prominent men, Walter Sondheim, became president of the board. After desegregation went off without incident, he resigned to head the Baltimore Urban Renewal Commission, which was about to embark on a series of major projects. Thus it was not completely an accident that the president of the Board of School Commissioners and the attorney for the plaintiff should both be prominent Baltimore attorneys.

In addition to its usual role of representing religious and racial groups, the Baltimore board has one other "ticket-balancing" device; each

of Baltimore's three major schools--the University of Maryland, Johns Hopkins, and Morgan State--must be represented. The University of Maryland's board member is William Stone, dean of the medical school. He is one of the two board members who voted against the second policy statement.

William McElroy is the distinguished young chairman of the bio-chemistry department at Johns Hopkins; a committed liberal, his only reluctance about the bussing program stemmed from the inability of his colleagues in the education department to produce persuasive evidence that bussing would not have any unfortunate psychological consequences. McElroy chaired the ad hoc committee set up by the board at the beginning of the controversy. J. Percy Bond is vice-president and director of admissions at Morgan State; a liberal and a Negro, he has not, however, been active in civil rights issues.

The remaining six members of the board are: Eli Frank, Jr., the only Jew, who is a corporation lawyer and comes from an old and prominent Baltimore family. His father served on the board and also founded a private school. John Sweeney is a young Catholic lawyer who is a partner in a substantial law firm. He has been active in civil rights issues, and before joining the board organized a successful fund-raising operation for a crippled high school student. As chairman of the board's building committee, he is possibly the third most influential member of the board (behind Frank and McElroy). Mrs. Elizabeth Murphy Moss, the board's other Negro, is the daughter of Carl Murphy, publisher of the Afro-American, and considered by many to be the most influential Negro in the city. She is a columnist with the paper and is an outspoken militant on civil rights issues. During the controversy, she issued one major statement urging the board to take action. Sidney H. Tinley heads a large mortgage banking firm. (Tinley was not present when the policy statement was adopted.) John Sherwood, the senior member of the board, is from an old and wealthy Baltimore family. He introduced the policy statement. The last member, Mrs. M. Richmond Farring, is the board member most closely identified with local politics; she is a neighborhood clubwoman who is close to the

regular Democratic organization in her area. She voted with Stone against the final policy statement.

This board is quite different from any we have seen so far in this report. Not only Frank, but several other board members are liberals on racial issues who seem to have had little difficulty mastering the complexities and ambiguities of the school integration issue.

For a brief time during the controversy, the liberalism of the Baltimore board was almost offset by the more conservative school staff, which in its general position was similar to the administrators we have observed in other cities. In the long run, however, it is easy to understand that the board would be able to command the authority of the school administration; for one thing, at least four board members (Frank and the three college faculty members) have had direct experience in educational administration and hence would not be easily intimidated by the staff's claims of expertise. In addition, the authority of the school board is implicit in the fact that it traditionally does not give its superintendent a contract; he is employed on a day-to-day basis.²

The Baltimore staff did take one important action during the summer which probably helped the preparations for the new policy statement. Brain planned and held a conference of school superintendents on issues of racial integration. Superintendents from several cities which had successfully handled the integration issue were present. Not only does a conference such as this one permit exchange of specific tactical ideas, they also enable big city superintendents to develop ways of relating the integration issue to the educational ideology which they share. In the case of Baltimore, our informants felt the conference had an important effect on local public opinions.

It is perhaps curious that our most liberal boards so far have appeared in the two border cities, Baltimore and St. Louis. In fact,

²We are not suggesting that the board actually made any threat to fire Brain or any assistant superintendent; apparently Brain was highly respected by the school board.

there are many parallels between the two cities. But in St. Louis there is not the clear impression that the elite of the community are committed to civil rights (although St. Louis did pass a series of civil rights bills in the city council); this may explain why Schlafly moved somewhat more slowly than Frank. (More likely, it was simply because Schlafly was restricted by serving on an elected board.) The other difference is in the support which schools receive from the voters; whereas St. Louis, like most cities, must always worry a bit about bond issues referenda, the voters support the Baltimore bonds by overwhelming votes.

Thus we see that the Baltimore story is simple and short, but it stops short of being a complete explanation. Is it really true that Baltimore has a "political culture" which is more liberal than that in our other cities? This is a possibility which we are really ill-equipped to examine in this study. It may be true. If it is, we do not have a good explanation for it.

CHAPTER VIII

SAN FRANCISCO

In the other cities we have seen how concern over a particular school can escalate into a full-scale assault on de facto segregation (Baltimore and Newark are examples). In both these cases, the rejection of the specific demands lead to increased pressure for more general solutions. In San Francisco we see an unusual reversal of this pattern; a specific demand was made and it was more or less met by the school board without reducing any of the pressure for a more general solution. San Francisco is in some ways our most important case, for it points out better than any other city that there is no necessary relation between the actual number of students in integrated schools, or the school's willingness to take concrete steps to integrate schools, and the ability of the school system to avoid conflict.

The school desegregation issue, in both general and specific forms, appeared in December, 1961. The local CORE chapter had organized that year and announced that it would demand that the school board take action to eliminate de facto segregation. (This was the year of the New Rochelle decision.) Its representative, Mrs. Beverly Axelrod, appeared to testify at a board's meeting in December, but the board was tied up in another issue and she agreed to defer her testimony until January. The other issue that prevented her from testifying was the question of what to do with the old Lowell High School building. Lowell, the city's elite college preparatory high school, had vacated the old building. The superintendent of schools, Harold Spears, suggested that the board appropriate funds to renovate the building make it usable as a junior high school to accommodate the increased enrollment caused by the relocation of Negro families from an urban renewal project into this area. At the time, the civil rights groups paid no attention, although this was to become a major issue very quickly.

At the January meeting, Mrs. Axelrod was joined by Frank Quinn of the Council of Civic Unity, which was an interracial human relations organization. The statements which they presented were modest. CORE asked for a racial census; the Council added a request that a board-appointed citizens committee and the superintendent each prepare a report on de facto segregation. (In a sense, Quinn was also a spokesman for the NAACP, since he addressed the board as a representative of the Bay Area Human Relations Clearing House, in which the NAACP was active. Both Quinn and Mrs. Axelrod are white.) The board voted to have the superintendent report at the next meeting.

Spears's report, presented in March, angered the civil rights leaders. He stated that the school system would not take teachers away from more important duties by administering a racial head count. He then proceeded to report on racial imbalance, using the 1960 Census figures for nonwhites. There are more Orientals than Negroes in San Francisco, so the figures were dismissed by the civil rights movement as useless. CORE immediately criticized the report as being inadequate and the board's Negro member, James Stratton, joined in the criticism, implying that a head count would be a good idea. The board members discussed the issue, but no formal vote was taken. The implication was that Superintendent Spears would make a fuller report at a future meeting.

In April a representative of the NAACP national office made a statement saying that the board should adopt a program of bussing students to relieve racial imbalance. The local NAACP refused to deviate from its more conservative position, however. Its president, Terry Francis, notified the school board that the NAACP did not intend to file a court suit, and that it did not favor bussing of students. The NAACP would be forced to repeat this disclaimer over and over. (In fact, the schools were at that time bussing 1,500 students from overcrowded schools, many of them Negroes being transferred to white schools. However, the NAACP repeatedly complained that data on the bussing program was not being made public by

the schools. This may be why the NAACP was not able to mesh its statements with board policy.)¹

For example, a few weeks after Francois' statement, a white homeowners' group, the West of Twin Peaks Neighborhood Council, issued a statement that it was opposed to the NAACP's bussing program.

While the civil rights groups and the board were waiting for the superintendent's second report, the State Board of Education met and drafted a resolution requiring local school systems to take positive steps to reduce de facto segregation. Superintendent Spears replied at a news conference that the state was trespassing on local autonomy and accused the state of threatening the democratic foundations of the schools. He then added that the school board's legal adviser had advised him that the state board had no authority to control school district boundaries. Spears was immediately criticized by the NAACP, and the school board president, Sam Ladar, commented that Spears had not consulted with the board before making the statement.

The deterioration of the superintendent's relationship with the civil rights movement was reflected in another explosion a week later, when a group of Negroes protested the production of a stage version of Huckleberry Finn at one of the city high schools, including a Negro playing the role of the slave, Jim. Although this sort of issue might have been ignored in another city, the incident proved several days of controversy.

The promised report by Superintendent Spears on school segregation was made on June 19. Spears's report was a complete disappointment to the civil rights groups. Spears began by saying that "although the question of racial interaction in any area of civil affairs has its emotional overtones, the subject can lend itself to rational and deliberate treatment. The point of departure in this investigation has been the educational implications, since the function of the American public school

¹The school system insisted that the bussing statistics were available, however.

is the effective instruction of the pupils therein. . . ." He then went on to discuss in detail the changing racial composition of the city, the way in which attendance boundaries are set, and reviewed the Census data (for nonwhites rather than Negroes) for different parts of the city. Although the superintendent noted that bussing to relieve overcrowding sometimes resulted in integration, he added that he did not (and by implication, should not) consider racial integration as even a secondary goal of the transportation of pupils to relieve overcrowding. He also stressed that bussing weakened the home-school tie, and noted that bussing was inconvenient to Chinese children who were in a hurry to reach after-school classes in Chinese culture. The report went on to discuss in detail programs for compensatory education and the prevention of juvenile delinquency. It observed that the school system had done a good job in setting up nondiscriminatory hiring policies for teachers and noted that the board's attorney had held that the school system was not obligated by either the Brown or the New Rochelle decisions to change its attendance policies.

He then stated the school system's philosophy on the issue:

We are now faced with the movement to emphasize differences in the color and race of pupils, with teacher, parent, and child. In some Eastern school systems, such records are now prepared annually. One asks for what purposes do we so label a child, and in turn, post a sign on his school, indicating the racial make-up of the student body at the moment?

If we were preparing to ship these children to various schools, in predetermined racial allotments, then such brands would serve the purpose they have been put to in handling livestock. But until somebody comes up with an educationally sound plan for such integration, then this racial accounting serves nothing but the dangers of putting it to ill use. . . .

It is quite apparent that as more courts face the technicalities of the issue, we should expect the injection of the question of the purpose of the American public school, a matter that has been somewhat ignored up to this point.

Without a doubt, state school codes do not speak of social adjustment as a purpose in the establishment of public schools. Instead, they speak specifically of subjects to be taught. . . .

it is true that any school or any classroom provides a social situation, for when two pupils or more are grouped for instruction the element of human relationships enter the picture. But this social situation has never been stated in law as a purpose of a school. Rather it is a condition that arises because efficiency of school operation demands that children be grouped for instructional purpose, rather than to be tutored individually. The teacher naturally takes advantage of the group situation to teach beyond the subjects which constitute the curriculum, but nobody has ever justified through public expenditure the organization of schools primarily for the social purpose.

The school is an instrument through which society both preserves the culture and brings out social change. The school is actually an instrument of social change, but as such an instrument, the children are not to be used as the tools. . . .

The Brown Case in 1954 and the Taylor Case in 1961 were both concerned with the civil rights of individuals. As there is an attempt to push broader interpretations in the court cases ahead, then the child's educational rights must be brought out in relationship to his civil rights, lest there be possible conflict. Certainly such refinement of issue will demand the opinion of the educational profession as well as that of the legal profession.

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Returning to the specific case at hand, I have no educationally sound program to suggest to the Board to eliminate the schools in which the children are predominantly of one race, as has been suggested to the Board by the Congress of Racial Equality. If such schools are educationally unsound, as has been charged by the Bay Area Human Relations Council, then certainly any program to improve the situation would need to be educationally sound if established by official Board action.

In short, Spears was arguing that unless a program of integration could be shown to improve the school's ability to educate students, then the school had no business being concerned with it. Even if the segregated classroom was bad educational practice (and he apparently felt that there was no evidence to support this view), there was nothing the schools could do about it, since existing integration plans were educationally unsound in that they defeated the purpose of the neighborhood school and required formal recognition of the student's race.

After Spears's presentation, the board decided to put off any attempt to arrive at a general policy until the following fall, and set aside the meeting of September 18 to discuss his report.

Central Junior High School

During the same month (May, 1962), the Central Junior High School issue came to life. The area around the proposed Central Junior High School had experienced a steady increase in Negro population from approximately 8 per cent in 1950 to 35 per cent in 1960, resulting in overcrowding in Franklin Junior High School, an overwhelmingly Negro school. With the opening of the new school, several predominantly Negro elementary schools could be redistricted to relieve this overcrowding. Although we have no racial data on the schools for that time, it appears that Central Junior High School would be approximately 60 per cent Negro when it opened. The new boundaries also included two predominantly white schools which would be transferred from a white middle-income junior high school. One was Gratten, serving a predominantly white area adjacent to the University of California Medical School. The community included moderate and high-income whites and Negroes. Its residents included Mrs. Axelrod of CORE, the attorney who had earlier presented the National Lawyers' Guild's plea for integration, NAACP education chairman Burbridge, and the man who was to succeed him in that office, Reginald Major. By May, the Gratten Parents and Friends Committee had been organized and protested that their children were being transferred into a racially imbalanced school and that panic-peddlers were already ringing doorbells through the Gratten area. Spears had incurred the wrath of one of San Francisco's most articulate and outspoken neighborhoods. Since Mrs. Axelrod was one of the Gratten group, CORE was quick to back them. The Gratten group was not, however, completely trusted by the NAACP. They, after all, had a choice: they could simply try to get out of the predominantly Negro school themselves or they could choose to stay in Central but press for a redrawing of boundaries to increase the number of whites in the school. They chose the latter tack and

thus established themselves as integrationist, rather than merely anti-Negro. In addition, the Gratten group had written the superintendent complaining about his stand on the State Board of Education statement a few weeks earlier.

The Gratten group asked for and received a hearing at the June board meeting. More than three hundred persons were in the audience for the meeting. After hearing Spears report on racial issues, the Gratten parents testified. They asked that the board clarify several points: First, what would be the racial make-up of the school? Second, what was the long-range plan for the school? Since it was an old building, partly unusable, it was unclear whether Central was a stopgap arrangement or whether the board would embark on extensive remodeling. They made it clear that something should be done about the racial composition of the school.

The board listened with some sympathy to the Gratten parents. However, the board also noted that this was their last meeting before adjourning for their July vacation. At first they proposed to postpone the matter until they had developed a general policy in September. This would, of course, be after school opened. Then the board decided to hand the responsibility for a decision over to Spears and instructed him to meet with the Gratten parents within ten days; they further instructed Spears that he should feel free to take any action he wished on the matter. The board themselves had not gone on record whether they favored or disapproved of taking race into consideration in setting school boundaries. Granted, the school board did have a policy of general support for neighborhood schools, but within these rather vague bounds, they were in effect empowering Spears to make policy on this matter while the board was on vacation. Spears was reluctant to accept this carte blanche position.

At this meeting with them, Spears apparently managed to conciliate some of the parents by promising to keep the school under review during the first semester it was open. But there was also a good deal of misunderstanding. Apparently an agreement was reached with the Gratten parents which collapsed the next day. In any case, by the end of July, an impressive

array of statements and threats had been made. The San Francisco Chronicle called for elimination of every predominantly Negro school, and strongly backed the Gratten parents. Francois of the NAACP spoke to the Gratten parents and urged them to consider filing suit, picketing, and boycotting the school.

The next meeting of the board was held August 7. Again a crowd turned out, only to hear board president Ladar reaffirm that the board would not take action until the September 18 meeting. CORE immediately began a sit-in, as the board adjourned after midnight. The Gratten parents and the civil rights groups had meanwhile won the support of Mayor Christopher, the San Francisco Labor Council, and the Teachers' Union. The schools were picketed by CORE on August 12. The next day the Examiner joined the Chronicle in urging that the racial imbalance of Central be improved.² That same day the NAACP announced that it would boycott the school and would arrange for volunteer teachers to maintain a private school for the Central students. On August 14 Spears announced that Central Junior High School was a temporary expedient. This is the first public hint that the school system was considering not opening the school at all. But as Spears was making this statement, the Gratten parents announced that they would participate in the NAACP boycott. The next day they filed suit against the schools. The suit was hurriedly drafted and was not taken very seriously by any of the participants; however, it did provide for the mechanism for negotiations. When the Gratten attorneys appeared before Judge Alfonso D. Zirpoli, Zirpoli refused to set a date for the hearing, but instead urged the board to meet with the plaintiffs. The parties agreed to try to settle out of court. School board attorney Breyer had originally asked that hearings be put off until after the special September 18 meeting of the board, but Judge Zirpoli merely postponed the hearing until after the regular August 21 board meeting. Although no agreement was made at this

²The Examiner called for the addition of three all-white schools to the Central district. The result was to add impetus to the organization of a segregationist group in that area.

meeting with Judge Zirpoli, the Gratten representatives did mention that they would be satisfied if the Central plan was scrapped completely.³ Board president Ladar stated he was willing to meet with the Gratten group, and a meeting was set for three days later. Meanwhile, the noise level increased steadily. An anti-integrationist group, the Citizens Committee for Neighborhood Schools, was organized and released a series of statements. This group, which drew much of its strength from the all-white areas just beyond Gratten, was arguing that any move to redistrict Central to improve racial balance would be illegal discrimination against whites. They were in danger of having Negroes bussed into their schools; in addition, if Central were to be balanced, their children would be likely candidates for transfer into it.⁴

While Ladar and a second board member, Mrs. Claire Matzger, were meeting with the Gratten group's attorney, the Citizens Committee for Neighborhood Schools was demanding that negotiations be stopped and June Shagalloff of the NAACP was in town urging boycotts, suits, and picketing against the board. In the midst of this, Ladar met with the Gratten group's attorney (who had a few days earlier been quoted as advocating a campaign of harrassing board members with phone calls at home), later saying that the meeting had been friendly and helpful. At this point Ladar made it clear that the board would no longer put off the issue until September 18, but would discuss it at the next meeting, August 21.

³Judge Zirpoli was in a strong position to chair the negotiating session. As a liberal Democrat on the Board of Supervisors, he had had previous experience dealing with the school board and the civil rights leaders.

⁴It should be noted that the overlapping of neighborhood and ideology was by no means perfect. As seems to be the usual case, those persons who were faced with problems of retaining whites in an integrated neighborhood were supporting integration, and those groups who had not yet had Negroes move in were segregationists. But this does not mean that every member of the Gratten group was a loyal civil rights activist, and the chairman of the Citizens Committee for Neighborhood Schools, Leon Markel, was the ex-treasurer of the integrationist Council for Civic Unity and a well-known supporter of a state FEPC law.

That board meeting, like the preceding two, was held in the school system's auditorium. This time there were 1,200 persons in the audience. At the meeting, Spears informed the board that the community pressures had made it impossible to maintain an educationally sound program at Central, and he recommended that plans for opening the school be dropped. Ladar stated that this represented no victory for anyone but would settle the issue, and the board voted unanimously to leave Central vacant.

Everyone expressed a little bit of dissatisfaction with the situation. Spears had stuck to his position that the schools were only concerned with education by giving an "educational" reason for changing policy on the school. The NAACP expressed concern that many of the Negro pupils would be in a less balanced school than Central if they were returned to Franklin. And the Citizens for Neighborhood Schools accused the board of giving in to anarchy. The board, and particularly Ladar, had continued to maintain a good image with the civil rights groups, but Spears remained very much a target now. In any other city the solution of the Central School issue would have been viewed as a radical integrationist act, for many of the students were reassigned into white junior high schools, including one in the heartland of the Citizens for Neighborhood Schools. However, the civil rights groups were still on record as opposing bussing.

The De Facto Segregation Issue Continues

The school segregation issue was still very much alive. Spears told a teachers group that they could expect the civil rights movement to pick out more schools for attack. At the September 18 meeting, demands were made that the board call for a racial census, adopt a statement endorsing "maximum" integration as a goal, and appoint a citizens committee. The board took no action on the first two demands, but did appoint a board committee of Mrs. Matzger, James E. Stratton (the board's Negro member), and Joseph Moore to make a report. The following month the NAACP filed suit, asking the court to order the school system to present a plan to eliminate de facto segregation.

The board's committee reported six months later, in April, 1963. The committee endorsed the idea that race be considered when new school sites were selected, and advocated redrawing of school boundaries to reduce segregation. It also advocated the open enrollment of all high schools and the appointment of an assistant superintendent for racial problems. The report went on to reject the possibility of bussing as a solution to racial imbalance. (At that time the schools were still transporting to relieve overcrowding, moving 3,000 students, many of whom were Negroes attending white schools.) The NAACP endorsed the report as a "delightful surprise." The board discussed the recommendations, and only one board member, Adolfo De Urioste, was critical of it. He joined the rest of the board in an unanimous vote adopting it.

During the next two years, the school desegregation issue moved along in a slow-paced fashion. The NAACP suit was pursued unenthusiastically, since its legal position was ambiguous, and the school administration was gleeful when the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of a similar case in Gary, Indiana. Meanwhile, the civil rights movement was busy demonstrating on the employment front. The school system implemented its high school open enrollment plan in the fall of 1963. A minor explosion occurred in 1964 when the board voted four to three to take no position on the referendum to repeal the State Fair Housing ordinance, and a board meeting was picketed shortly thereafter.

In the spring of 1964, a few days before the deadline for submitting propositions for the November election, Spears presented the board with plans for a bond issue for new school construction. The board and the community reacted with surprise and some confusion. Since the plan called for a high school in a location which would result in it "being properly integrated," Spears commented that he expected the civil rights groups to "go along with it." In fact, the movement at this point was in no mood to go along with anything. Reginal Major (now NAACP education chairman) promised support in a highly qualified manner, and other groups protested the lack of time to study the proposal. The NAACP finally decided to oppose

the bond issue. Bond issues require a two-thirds vote, so the NAACP opposition would be a serious threat to passage. In addition, the Central Labor Council announced that it would oppose the bonds unless the NAACP agreed to support them. Spears met in a pair of meetings with the NAACP. The agreement reached was a strange one, for the meeting found Spears opposed to building permanent schools in the ghetto and the NAACP in favor. The result was that Spears modified the plan to include construction of schools that Spears said he "would have never dreamed of asking for."

After the Johnson-Goldwater election of 1964, the direct action groups, CORE and the new United Freedom Movement, began a campaign of picketing and threats of boycotting. Finally, in the summer of 1965, Spears agreed to meet one of the demands presented in January, 1962, and took a racial census of the schools. The census found that the eight high schools ranged in their Negro populations from 4 to 34 per cent. The fifteen junior high schools ranged from 2 to 90 per cent, but only two were more than 50 per cent Negro. Of the ninety-five elementary schools, all had some white students. Using the 10 per cent point as a threshold, nine of the elementary schools would be classified as segregated Negro, compared with eighty-five where Negroes attended school with whites. One school of the ninety-five had no Negro students at all. Seventy-six per cent of all San Francisco Negro pupils were in integrated elementary schools. (For St. Louis and Baltimore, the figures are 14 per cent and 20 per cent.)

Interpretation

The civil rights movement's unfriendly critics sometimes accuse it of provoking conflict for no apparent reason. The San Francisco story helps us to understand why school integration conflicts sometimes appear this way. As the conflict escalated, it became easier and easier for new demonstrations to break out. It also became harder and harder to understand what the fights were about. On two occasions Spears told his board

that they could expect the civil rights movement to support a particular proposal. In the first case he was planning to reduce overcrowding in a school by transferring students into a new integrated school nearby. That was Central Junior High School. In the second case, he was planning the construction of a new, integrated high school; that was the 1964 bond issue. Spears can be forgiven for not understanding the civil rights movement. On the other hand, there is a steady underlying theme of the conflict that does make sense. It would be difficult for any civil rights movement to be at peace with the San Francisco schools.

At the most concrete level, Central Junior High School was not primarily a civil rights issue. The Gratten neighborhood saw the threat of engulfment by the ghetto and asked for, and received, relief. As in Baltimore and Newark, it was easy for a liberal and militant integrated neighborhood to incorporate its demands into the policy of the civil rights movement, and thus it was easy for the movement to support them in turn. As we have now seen in four cities, the people who have the most to lose psychologically from segregation are whites who are forced into predominantly Negro schools. But the Gratten demands were met. In fact, if we look at the civil rights movements' concrete demands, most of them were met. The schools are more integrated than any of our other northern cities. An active transportation program hauls low-income Negroes into high-income white schools, and the Negro schools do not suffer the problems of overcrowding, high teacher turnover, etc., in the same severity as many other cities. Even when the NAACP took a stance apparently in rejection of integration, and demanded ghetto schools, the schools were built.

But in the abstract, the demands of the civil rights movement were fairly consistent, and these demands were never agreed to. It is important to recognize that the civil rights leadership is not, and does not attempt to be, the general leadership of the Negro community. Whereas the general leader must work toward a variety of goals to meet the many needs of a

neighborhood or a community, the civil rights movement has a much more restricted set of goals. To oversimplify considerably, these are to eliminate racial discrimination and create the symbols of racial nondiscrimination--in other words, to establish racial equality in both the concrete and the abstract. The San Francisco movement recognized from the beginning that there would be little if any actual discrimination against Negro pupils in school districting. They therefore focused on asking the school board to recognize that racial integration was a positive value, by drawing up a plan to intentionally integrate schools. Like the other northern movements, they did not feel it necessary to actually achieve anything resembling total integration. At the minimum, they wanted a statement of policy endorsing integration as a positive value and some evidence that this statement was being implemented in good faith. In fact, the movement waited from January, 1962, until April, 1963, when the board subcommittee reported for the policy statement which merely committed the board to consider integration as a goal in new school construction and re-districting, and even after that, they complained that Superintendent Spears was not enforcing the new policy. At this level, it is understandable that the issue should explode as it did.

If this interpretation is correct, then we see why in San Francisco as in other cities, compensatory education cannot be considered a substitute for integration. Compensatory education may be good for Negroes but it does not help to meet the specific goals of the civil rights movement. Thus compensatory education is more or less irrelevant. But this line of reasoning leads us to another question. Why did the civil rights movement oppose the bond issue and demand ghetto schools? One tentative explanation is that the NAACP, like the Urban League, is not single-mindedly concerned with civil rights. The Urban League was originally developed as a social welfare agency and has only recently become an accepted member of the civil rights community. The NAACP is in many cities a well-established organization with a large membership which in many ways is the spokesman for the Negro community on many issues. Thus it tends to supply general leadership

rather than civil rights leadership. In addition, the NAACP concentrates on legal action, and thus becomes the natural home of Negro lawyers--some of whom expect to become holders of political office. But political leaders are by definition general leaders. Throughout our story the San Francisco NAACP was badly split between the militants and moderates. In 1962 its president was Terry Francois, who later became the city's Negro alderman (in San Francisco, supervisor). But after the NAACP's successful coalition with the Gratten group, two of the militant residents of Gratten--NAACP education chairman Burbridge and Reginald Major--were elected to the key offices: Burbridge as president, Major as education chairman. By 1965 both Burbridge and Major had resigned and the moderates had regained control. Thus there are two possible explanations for the NAACP's demand that new schools be built in the ghetto. First of all, the militants may have been reluctant to support anything the school board did, but after having taken the leap into opposing the bond issue, needed to think of some compromise which would enable them to support it. In addition, a campaign against the bonds would have been a serious drain on organization resources. With the NAACP board evenly divided between militants and moderates, some compromise device was in order--the construction of new schools was an obvious candidate, and it was attainable. The organization could be confident that if this is all it insisted on in return for its support, it would be able to "win" and therefore could escape having to oppose the bonds. But it was a compromise that fell between two stools--neither group in the NAACP really wanted it. Or possibly the NAACP leaders may have chosen that moment to behave like general leaders rather than civil rights leaders. Of course, schools must sometimes be built in racial ghettos; if Francois, as supervisor, had asked for this, no one would have been surprised; what is surprising is that the NAACP elected to play Francois's role. This switch from "status" to "welfare" goals is only one of the ways in which the San Francisco civil rights movement was unstable. It was also in a state of organizational flux: Spears was forced to deal with at least nine different civil rights groups (the Gratten group, the community council from that

area, CORE, the Urban League, the NAACP [both local and national], the Council for Civil Unity, the United Freedom Movement, and the Bay Area Human Relations Clearing House).⁵

From this viewpoint, Spears's 1962 report, from which we quoted, is very important. For in this report he refused to set racial integration as a goal of the schools, but instead dismissed it as irrelevant. In addition, he accused the civil rights leadership of having illegitimate values--of wanting to stigmatize children by conducting a racial census.⁶ Thus in this speech he managed to reject in toto the basic goal of the movement--to establish the symbols of racial equality. Despite this, we have no reason to think that he was in any way anti-Negro. Spears had apparently no hesitation at all about sending Negro children into all-white schools, including schools in recognizably anti-Negro areas. But he insisted that this was by accident; he simply did not believe that he, as an educator, should do anything to increase integration. Spears has articulately presented a point of view which seems to be shared by many school administrators--that the details of school operation are matters which laymen are ill-equipped to consider. The civil rights leadership was simply not qualified to make sound decisions on questions of school organization. Or as Spears told a teachers group, "We are the ones who know about teaching and about the best way to group children for learning."

On two occasions Superintendent Spears publicly commented that the school system could expect more difficulty with the civil rights movement.

⁵In addition, the San Francisco Chronicle was responsible for much of the confusion about bussing. Its editorial, during the Central Junior High School controversy, called for total integration--meaning the same white-Negro ratio in every school. In its way, the Chronicle is as flamboyant as any blood-and-gore tabloid, except that the Chronicle gets its headlines from (sometimes ridiculous) civic crusades. It may be that the Chronicle is a prototype of the future American newspaper, in which civic affairs, rather than sex, become amusement for the masses.

⁶More practically, Spears was also concerned that white parents might start running from schools where the head count showed a high Negro enrollment.

In the speech just referred to, he told the teachers to expect a boycott (this was said during the moratorium on direct action in force during the Johnson-Goldwater campaign). Earlier, at the end of the Central Junior High School issue, he had predicted that the movement would not be content, but would go looking for another school to make into an issue. Given the militancy of the San Francisco movement, Spears was somewhat justified in expecting trouble. But if Spears was a political martyr, he was martyred as much by his school board as by the movement, for the school board seemed surprisingly conservative for cosmopolitan San Francisco, and, more important, it seemed to us to be consistently reluctant to take action. It was Spears who conducted the actual negotiations over the bond issue, and it was the board which first instructed Spears to take whatever action he wished in the Central issue, then dawdled through the summer until the issue nearly exploded. Spears was not insulated by his board from the civil rights issue; he made many of the major decisions. It is fashionable now for critics of the schools to accuse professional schoolmen of arrogance. But as Joseph Pois suggests in his intelligent study of Chicago, the superintendent-dominated system is often the result, not of an arrogant superintendent, but of a weak board (Pois, 1964).

In comparison with other cities, the San Francisco school board seems less aggressive in making school policy. The reason lies, we think, in the complex, semi-political recruitment structure of the San Francisco board. Between 1962 and 1965, the board included four Republicans and three Democrats; three Protestants, two Catholics, and two Jews; two women and five men; one Negro, one labor leader, and at least two members who were active in Republican party politics. With a seven-member board, it is not easy to construct such an arrangement and still guarantee the presence of enough skilled and energetic persons to make up a leadership core. Since we did not trace the history of the board, we do not know how rigid this appointment formula was. It may have been partly a consequence of the fact that Mayor George Christopher, who appointed this board, was planning to run in the Republican primary for governor. But it is traditional

in San Francisco to appoint a religiously balanced board, which contains some civic leaders but which politically is as much bipartisan as it is nonpartisan. Before the appointment of the board's first Negro, Stratton, there were three white Protestant Republicans. In order to maintain the same religious and political composition, the Negro would have to replace one of these.⁷ In addition, Christopher needed Negro support in his forthcoming attempt at the governorship, and Stratton was going to campaign for him. It is easy to find a Negro Protestant, but harder to find one who is active in Republican politics.

If we are correct in describing the rules for balancing the board, the appointment formula would look something like Figure 1. It cannot be very flexible. For example, the Central Labor Council's representative would almost certainly have to be a Democrat. Although in the past the board included Republican Jews, both of the Jews on the board in the 1960's were Democrats, and it would probably be difficult to replace either with a Republican at this time. Thus one Catholic and all Protestants would have to be Republican if the four to three balance is important.

There are a few places where the appointment pattern might be varied; for example, the Republican Catholic might be female, freeing one of the other positions for a man. But the formula is still tight enough to make it difficult for the mayor to select a board which has a strong core or leadership. The appointment formula also naturally resulted in a very heterogeneous board. Four members (the two white Protestants and the two Jews) are unusually wealthy--probably wealthier than any of the board members in the preceding six cities. The other three members are: a social worker, a small businessman, and a union official.

Bipartisanship also results in a board which is heterogeneous on ideological lines. The result is that the board has at times had difficulty agreeing on policy. The racial issue has tended to divide the board on

⁷We are told that Negro leaders were invited to ask the Jewish leadership to surrender a seat. This may have been a facetious statement.

ethnic lines; for example, the board voted not to oppose the Constitutional amendment prohibiting fair-housing legislation by a four to three vote, with the two white Protestants and the two Catholics outvoting the two Jews and the Negro.⁸

Seat No.	Religion	Party	Other Characteristics	Who Is Consulted?
1	Protestant	Republican		Party leaders, political advisers, civic leaders
2	Protestant	Republican?	Female	"
3	Protestant	Republican	Negro	"
4	Catholic	Republican		"
5	Catholic	Democratic	Labor representative	Central Labor Council
6	Jewish	Democratic		A Jewish civic leader (active in Democratic politics?)
7	Jewish	Democratic	Female	"

Figure 1.--Appointment formula for the San Francisco school board.

⁸The San Francisco school board was strongly criticized for taking this position. In California governmental agencies take positions on referenda frequently. In addition, the civil rights movement argued that since the board had blamed de facto segregation on housing patterns, it was incumbent upon it to lend its support to any movement to break down housing discrimination.

The San Francisco board resembles Baltimore's in that several of the seats are "reserved" for representation of a particular group. However, there is an obvious difference between earmarking seats for university faculty and setting seats aside for representation of the wealthy pioneer families of San Francisco.

Finally, several of the board members are politically active, although none of them can be considered to be purely political appointees. One of the board members is a member of the Republican National Committee; others apparently have participated in political club or fund-raising activities. Although four board members are wealthy, only two can be considered active members of the "civic elite" who are involved in community "projects." In neither of the two western cities studied is there a clear line separating the political activists from the civic elite; thus, although this is not the usual "political" board, it cannot be considered "nonpolitical," either. This is an intriguing point which we shall return to in Chapter XIII.

So again we see that ultimately the principal factor in deciding the course of the school integration issue is the composition of the board. In San Francisco the inarticulate board passed a good deal of responsibility on to the superintendent. In defense, he withdrew into an extremely "professional" stance, which in turn resulted in his being accused of arrogance. However, his ideological position is really not much different from that of other superintendents who are protected by their boards.

The San Francisco board is above average in its degree of acquiescence to civil rights demands. If we look only at action, not words, the San Francisco board and Superintendent Spears have probably gone as far as any of our cities in integrating their school system. The system has never faced a school boycott, and had they not been confronted by a very militant civil rights movement, they would have had less difficulty. But San Francisco did make a serious mistake in not realizing that while action may speak louder than words, words speak also.

CHAPTER IX

PITTSBURGH

The school integration issue appeared some time between 1959 and 1963 in all seven of the cities we have examined so far. But in Pittsburgh the schools experienced a unique history of racial peace up to 1965, and when the de facto segregation issue was raised in 1965, it was done with relatively little controversy. Pittsburgh has not yet seen any large-scale demonstrations aimed at the schools.

Since the school integration issue arose in earnest only after we had completed interviewing in Pittsburgh, we will not describe the action in great detail, but an overview of the debate, coupled with the history of race relations prior to 1965, will be sufficient to permit analysis.

In most cities we could locate a period of smoldering opposition to the school system which led to the eruption of conflict. However, this is not the case in Pittsburgh. On two occasions attempts had been made to trigger demonstrations against the schools. The first was a trivial incident--the complaint of a Negro parent that there had been discrimination in the casting of a school play. The civil rights groups did not support the complainant. In the second case there was some pressure to promote a Negro to the position of school principal; however, the issue died a natural death. (The person in question was later transferred to a central office supervisory post.) In both cases demonstrations collapsed for lack of support.

The de facto segregation issue was raised by the Urban League at one closed-door meeting of a school board committee in the early 1960's. Reports by the Urban League and the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations also raised the issue, but all of this hardly adds up to a concerted campaign.

The school system effectively headed off demonstrations by doing three things: First, it has taken only limited action to increase integration, but more important, it has not waited for the demonstration before taking action; instead it has acted in anticipation of protests. Second, it has pioneered in compensatory education. Third, it has developed a pattern of close, and indeed constant, communication with the civil rights leadership. It is an essentially simple formula.

And even when we look in detail at what the schools have done, we do not uncover a complex story. For example, when a group of parents met with the board and asked for some action to relieve overcrowding in their schools, the board's senior Negro member, Richard Jones, spoke up at the next meeting and suggested that the board discuss the situation. Almost immediately, an open-enrollment plan was adopted. Students were permitted to transfer (paying their own bus fare) to any underutilized school in the city. Some 450 students took advantage of the transfer plan the first year. (The number is now 900.) Although this is less than one-half of 1 per cent of the Negro enrollment, it did result in the integration of at least two all-white elementary schools. At that time Jones did not advocate a policy statement; he felt that the board had been committed to integration, and that a policy statement would be insulting to themselves. Since that time, the school board has continued to take racial censuses, has redrawn at least one school boundary to improve racial balance, and has experimented with bussing to relieve overcrowding which has resulted in integration.

Pittsburgh has also been a leader in developing compensatory education. The schools received Ford Foundation funds to develop a team-teaching program, which has now been expanded to include over one-half of the city elementary schools.

The school system has also promoted Negroes to administrative positions, has increased integration of faculties, and has pioneered among big cities in crusading against what school superintendent Sidney Marland called "lily white" school texts.

The civil rights leadership reacted to this with mixed emotions. They generally saw the board as well-intentioned, but resented the fact that very little had actually been done to increase integration. The board had no immediate plan for integration; it was setting its hopes on a long-range plan to establish educational parks--high schools of as many as five thousand students, surrounded by feeder schools in educational parks. Although this is only in the planning stage, the educational park program has already attracted national attention.

But the civil rights movement was generally restrained. There are probably two reasons for this. First, the civil rights leadership respects the school board and the superintendent. As one leader puts it, "It is a good school system, and we would hate to do anything to get it into trouble." Second, the civil rights movement may have some trouble getting far enough away from the school system to attack it. The school board and the superintendent have as a matter of policy held regular informal meetings with many civil rights leaders. The board has worked closely with the Urban League, and Marland and one of the two Negro board members, Mrs. Gladys McNairy, are on the Urban League board. Marland, who was previously a suburban superintendent, has made excellent use of Frank Bolden, a Negro ex-newspaperman now on his staff, to strengthen his contacts and help him to develop a sophistication in dealing with civil rights groups.

The school board also has good contact with the civil rights leadership through the Negro board members. In the 1940's Richard Jones and Homer Brown were two of the leading civil rights attorneys. Together they brought suit to force the schools to hire Negro teachers in 1937. In 1950 Jones (then NAACP president) obtained an injunction against the city requiring it to provide police protection to Negroes swimming in integrated swimming pools. Brown was appointed to the school board, then left to accept an appointment to the County Court. Jones was later appointed to the board and has moved into an influential position--he is chairman of

the Business Committee and serves with the board president and the superintendent on the Internal Management Committee. At the same time, Jones has retained his contacts with the civil rights movement.

The school integration issue appeared in 1965 primarily as an outgrowth of concerns about overcrowding at Westinghouse High School. The NAACP, the Urban League, and the City Commission on Human Relations made statements critical of the school system's inactivity. The board responded by bussing 140 Negro students out of an overcrowded elementary school, but took no action at the high school level. Civil rights groups picketed in August. The board responded to these actions in three ways: First, it recruited a group of consultants to make recommendations to increase integration. Second, it devoted its annual report to "The Quest for Racial Equality." While the report did not list any short-run plans for integration, it did commit the board to integration and upgrading Negro education in strong terms. (We shall return to the annual report later.) Third, in direct response to the Westinghouse protest, the board adopted a plan to pay the transportation of students transferring out of overcrowded schools. The transfer plan was adopted in November, 1965.

At this writing the issue is very much alive, but apparently the school board is handling the school integration issue now in approximately the same way it was earlier. Although it did not take action prior to demonstrations in this case, it has kept channels of communication open. In addition, the tone of the annual report, coupled with the presence of the committee of consultants on integration, may have led some civil rights leaders to expect that demonstrations will not be necessary to persuade the board to adopt an integration plan in 1966.

As we have seen in other cities, the style of communication, and the ideological position implied by the communication, are important factors in the board's relationship with the civil rights movement. For this reason, we will take a closer look at the Pittsburgh school board's annual report. In its actual recommendations, the report could be considered

moderate. While it commits the board in no uncertain terms to pursuing integration, it announces no new specific plans and promises not to adopt integration proposals which are "forced, unnatural, or irrational." Thus it seems to promise that no large-scale bussing program will be adopted. The report does place high hopes in the construction of the educational parks (but this is admittedly distant) and offers to use any reasonable integration plan in the short run. The report then goes on to emphasize the importance of compensatory education, integration of faculties and hiring of Negroes in nonprofessional positions, and the importance of using texts which presents racial issues fairly. All this is not too unusual. What is unique is the amount of information present, the candid way in which it is presented, and the overall tone of the document. The report contains twenty-two tables presenting such information as the percentage of Negro teachers in the system over the past ten years; the percentage of Negroes among nonprofessional employees hired last year; the number of scholarships awarded to graduates of predominantly Negro schools for each of the last four years; racial composition of the faculties of various schools; the number of segregated schools and the extent to which segregation has increased over the past decade; and the median achievement scores of white as opposed to Negro schools. These data are well-guarded secrets in most cities.

The tone of the report is reflected in the letter of transmittal:

This report is addressed to all the people of Pittsburgh. It seeks to declare the position of the Board of Education on the subject of racial equality in the schools. It is a statement, as starkly honest as we can make it, of the progress so far and of the large unfulfilled hopes that we in the Board of Public Education have for Negro boys and girls in the Pittsburgh Public Schools. It is a statement of the frustrations and contradictions confronting the Board on this immensely difficult subject. The report is intended neither to pacify Negro citizens, nor to console or reassure white citizens. It is a diary of the work of the Board of Education on the most critical problem in urban America-- the assurance of equal educational opportunity for all our children.

We will disappoint the civil rights advocates who look for sudden integration but who give little help in concrete counsel toward

solutions. We will startle the white citizens who see to live in white isolation. We will disturb those, both Negro and white, who think that the social revolution of 1965 will pass over soon and that we will return to the old ways. We will not return to the old ways. and your Board of Education is determined that every possible resource of the schools shall be invested in the education of every Negro child for his ultimate, genuine integration by his own choice and by his own worth. We and our faculty declare ourselves in this report prepared to take every reasonable and rational means at our disposal to achieve this goal.

We believe that a lifetime of work remains to be done.

Respectfully submitted,

The Board of Public Education

The letter of transmittal and the rest of the report talk about the Negro revolution, not in pedestrian legal or educational terminology, but in a language which conveys a sense of drama. The report is also unusual in that it speaks about these racial issues in the language of the civil rights movement. Other cities have shied away from this language, probably because it implies acceptance of the goals of the civil rights movement, or because the school system feels that Negroes would be offended. The report itself notes this:

Any report such as this, which deals with the facts of a major social revolution, risks the use of words which have acquired emotional overtones. We have not tried to avoid these words. We speak of "deprived neighborhoods" as those sections of the city where social, economic, intellectual, and residential conditions are low. While not all Negroes by any means are deprived, nor is deprivation confined to Negroes, the fact remains that most of our deprived neighborhoods are occupied primarily by Negroes, and most of our Negro families and children are deprived in one way or another. Many other terms in our current vocabulary stir emotional reactions from Negro or white. . . . We use these terms without apology or undue explanation. They are meaningful terms, contemporary to contemporary problems.

The commitment of the board to integration is made in no uncertain terms. For example, it expresses "pity" for those white children whose parents have taken them to the suburbs to avoid integration. The Christian Science Monitor, commenting on the report, said, "This is strong stuff. One

hesitates to use the word unique, but if any other board of education has seen fit to make as equally strong a statement in an annual report sent to the public, we do not know of it."¹

But the report is also determined to avoid a self-congratulatory attitude; thus a section of the discussion of racial integration is headed "A Losing Battle." At another point, referring to the number of students using the new free-transfer provisions, it comments that "a record of 900 transfers out of a total of 18,000 Negro students enrolled in schools with predominantly Negro enrollment gives no great cause with satisfaction." (Actually, this seems to be a quite high number in comparison with other cities.) Although the report is not completely candid in all its statistical analysis, in some cases statistics are used which are unnecessarily critical of the system. For example, it notes that the increasing Negro enrollment has meant that on a percentage basis fewer Negroes are in integrated schools. But it does not bother to add that this same increase in Negro enrollment has the effect of increasing the percentage of whites in integrated schools. The general theme of the report is one of pessimism. It notes with candor some of the dilemmas facing it:

This report in many ways has been a recitation of forces working at cross purposes, one against the other. We have not attempted to please anyone in declaring the hard facts we face. We have stated without qualification that we believe in integrated schools. This works at cross purposes with those who seek to preserve all-white neighborhoods. . . .

We ask for mature and constructive leaders who will be willing to work with us--long hours, perhaps, sometimes for small gains. We have some such leaders and workers, especially from Negro organizations. Yet we find that some in positions of leadership gain

¹Newspaper reactions to the report were varied, and a study of the reactions would itself be interesting. For example, the Wall Street Journal concluded that the main point of the report is that it expressed the board opposition to "reassigning students to relieve racial unbalance" and that it took "a relatively 'hard' line on forced integration." The Journal article implied that Pittsburgh had done less than other cities to integrate faculties; the Monitor, that it had done more.

their satisfactions in making public accusations in sweeping statements that contribute nothing. Even when they are invited to help us discover solutions, they offer no solutions except the repetition of the cry, "Freedom Now!" We too, as Board members, cry "Freedom Now!", but we ask for the help of responsible Negro and white leaders in discovering how "Freedom Now!"

Compensatory education means just what it says. As long as there are marked deficiencies in the educational achievement of children in schools in our deprived neighborhoods, those children must have a larger share of the limited tax dollars. So long as there is not enough money to do all the things for all the children of the city that we feel we should do, we must make the bitter choice to do more for the deprived, even at the expense of those not deprived, if necessary.

But the note of pessimism is tempered with great aspirations. It refers to a long-range goal of rebuilding the school system into educational parks as the most promising of the board's "feverish efforts to bring about improved integration." In rejecting a demand by the Urban League to appoint an assistant superintendent for integration, it even includes this comment, which could be read as a satirical reference to the way in which other cities have used the appointment of a Negro "superintendent of integration":

We do not contemplate the establishment of a staff position such as that of "Director of Human Relations." The struggle for equality of opportunity and the rejection of discriminatory practices are the responsibility of every employee of these schools, starting with the Superintendent. In fact, the Superintendent of Schools spends approximately half his time working with matters of racial equality. . . .

Interpretation

The whole approach of the school board to the issue of integration reflects a carefully thought-out position, a position which emphasizes understanding and anticipating the demands of the movement and taking action in advance, and which stresses the importance of communicating with and supporting the "responsible" leadership. Or as one of the staff said,

"This is what keeps the Larry Landrys out of Pittsburgh."² The board's position also involves an emotional commitment, reflected in the language of the annual report quoted above.

Several school board members commented that after Calvin Gross resigned to accept the New York superintendency, prospective candidates were interviewed extensively about their attitude toward racial issues. At that time, race was not a salient issue to the rest of the community, and this again demonstrates the fact that the school board's actions are part of a long-range "strategy."

A "strategy" consisting only of fine pronouncements and no action would be disastrous in the long run. Hence, we should reemphasize that Pittsburgh has taken action, and they have taken some action without waiting for demonstrations.³ This is really not true in any other city, except possibly in Buffalo before the Woodlawn issue broke out.

Since the board has had at least two superintendents during the period when the strategy was in effect, it seems fair to conclude that this policy was set by the board and not by the administration. In addition, the school board has shown its capabilities in other areas--for example, the board has been able to attract as superintendents "promising young men" who have received national recognition while at Pittsburgh. Sidney Marland is one of these; his predecessor was Calvin Gross.

What kind of school board does Pittsburgh have? Before the reform of 1911, Pittsburgh schools were governed by two separate central boards and sixty-one local district boards--all politically controlled and graft ridden. The reform of 1911, coming at a time when progressivism was strong and when the chief Pittsburgh industrialists--Carnegie, Mellon, and others--were very active in the city, established a strong elitist tradition in

²Landry was the militant leader of the Chicago boycotts.

³Of course, the first acid test of the board's willingness to integrate schools will come in 1966.

school board appointments. The board has fifteen members, who are appointed by the Court of Common Pleas. With a board of this size, it is relatively easy to "balance the ticket" with the appointment of a labor representative, two Negroes, two Jews, Catholics, and persons to represent the west side of the city. But the board also has a number of prominent attorneys and industrialists. The large board relies in its decision making on a core group which includes predominantly high status persons, but which also has included Negroes and retired teachers. (One of the two Negroes on the board, Mrs. Francis McNairy, is the wife of a steelworker.) Thus the board, while predominantly high status, does effectively cross status levels. The continuity of the board is partly maintained by the board members, who locate prospective candidates for vacancies and recommend them to the judges. With the possible exception of the two Negro appointments, the ticket balancing seems to us to be only a token gesture. For example, the board does not contain a single person who can be identified as a member of the large Catholic ethnic groups in the city. Pittsburgh, sometimes called the birthplace of Czechoslovakia, does not have a single East European Catholic on the board. And of all the board members, only Richard Jones can be said to have any strong ties to the ruling Democratic party. The appointment of the second Negro, Mrs. McNairy, might be seen as an attempt to increase Negro representation. At the time of her appointment, influential Democratic party leaders were urging an appointment from the CIO (the present union representative, John A. Feigel, is a typographer; William Hart, of the Steelworkers, also served on the board with him until a few years ago). However, the judges rejected this advice. Mrs. McNairy, like Richard Jones, is not just a Negro--she was city-wide president of the PTA at the time of her appointment (and as we noted, is on the Urban League board). The inability of the Democratic party to influence appointments (or its unwillingness to do so) is reflected in the large number of Republicans on the board. In addition, the judges of the Court of Common Pleas represent both parties; this also tends to minimize the number of political appointments.

As in Baltimore and St. Louis, the presence of members of the civic elite on the Pittsburgh board is associated with the existence of a powerful organization of the elite. The Pittsburgh equivalent of St. Louis' Civic Progress or the Greater Baltimore Committee is the Allegheny Conference. The post-World War II renaissance of Pittsburgh, which culminated in the anti-air pollution campaign and the redevelopment of the Golden Triangle, was the work of men like R. K. Mellon, H. J. Heinz, Benjamin Fairless, department store owner Edgar Kaufmann, and Alcoa's Roy Hunt, to name only a few. It is interesting to note that few of these men would stand to gain economically from rebuilding the city--their businesses are tied to national markets. Our informants explained this by saying that these men were concerned about Pittsburgh not as an economic center, but as a place to live.⁴

All the resources of the civic elite have not been brought to bear on the schools, however. The Pittsburgh schools are in a very tight financial situation, and the Allegheny Conference is only now going to bat for them in the state capital after years of silence. Critics of the reform movement have noted that pulling the schools out of politics would seem to make it difficult for the schools to marshal political power. There is some evidence that this is the case in Pittsburgh. It would also seem reasonable that a school board so unrepresentative of the community would have difficulty developing a base of support among voters, and this may also be true. Ten years ago, when the board submitted a tax increase to referendum, they received a very bad beating. However, school financing is not the subject of this report, and we are not at all convinced that the out-of-politics board suffers financially. Baltimore, which also has an elite board, has always received very heavy support for its prospective bond issues.

In the area of our research--race relations--we can say that the Pittsburgh schools have received the support of the community. At first

⁴Williams and Adrian (1963) refer to this political style as being "oriented toward providing amenities."

glance, the Pittsburgh annual report would seem to be an invitation to attack from the white conservative voter. Furthermore, if the ethnic blocks are the strong opponents of integration, they will not hesitate to assault a school board dominated by Anglo-Saxons, Jews, and Negroes. It also seems unlikely that such an attack will come. On the other hand, those cities which consciously attempted to represent the citizenry are the ones most torn by conflict. This is one of the dilemmas which we must analyze in this report.

CHAPTER X

A DEFINITION OF THE ISSUE, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE DECISION PROCESS

In the preceding chapters we have looked at the way in which the school integration issue was handled in eight cities. There is a great deal of range, from the repeated demonstrations of Bay City to the half-hearted civil rights activity of Lawndale, from the quick agreement reached in St. Louis to protracted fighting in San Francisco. It is the task of this chapter to sort out the common threads in these stories so that we can see the basic ingredients of the school integration issue. First, we will look at the civil rights groups involved, and the demands made by them; then we will turn to the other actors--the school superintendents, the school boards, and the white voters--to see if we can find the recurrent factors in their responses.

The Civil Rights Groups and What They Want

Perhaps we should pause to point out the obvious--that in none of the eight school systems did the civil rights movement succeed in integrating a particularly large number of schools. In no city did the proportion of Negro students who were attending integrated schools increase by more than 5 per cent as a result of the raising of the integration issue. Given this, it seems fair to ask, why have the civil rights movements in three of these eight cities dropped the issue? Don't they want integration?

Our curiosity about this is further whetted when we observe that there is no relationship between the number of Negroes in integrated schools and the extent to which the movement is satisfied. Table X.1 points this out. Table X.1 would suggest that integration is not the "real" issue, and there is some truth to this. Let us look at the eight cities again. If we review the cases, we see that the issue is further

complicated by the fact that many of the protesting groups were not really civil rights organizations. In four cities, interracial neighborhood groups and white liberals were in the forefront of the protest.

TABLE X.1

PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO STUDENTS WHO ARE IN INTEGRATED SCHOOLS,
AND AMOUNT OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVITY

City	Percentage of Negroes in Integrated Schools	Level of Civil Rights Activity ^a
San Francisco	70	High
Bay City	57	Very high
Pittsburgh	48	Very low
Lawndale	37	Moderate
Newark	28	Low
Buffalo	20	High
Baltimore	17	Very low
St. Louis	14	Moderate

^aThis ranking will be discussed and justified in Chapter XI.

Therefore, we must begin by separating out the various types of organizations which made demands on the schools and looking at the goals of each. It is perhaps surprising that the integrated community group should appear so frequently in our stories. In St. Louis, Baltimore, Newark, and San Francisco, the protest originated from a community which was integrated but in danger of becoming all Negro; in all four cases the community group wanted to maintain a sufficiently high percentage of whites (or a sufficiently low percentage of Negroes) to prevent whites from moving out. Stated in this way, their position sounds like it might be closer

to the "keep the Negroes out" demands of segregationist white communities than to those of a civil rights group. However, in three of the cities the neighborhood group was clearly identified as pro-integration. We can summarize all three cases by saying that the community group believed the school system to be favoring all-white schools at the expense of integrated or all-Negro schools. They argued that preventing Negroes from attending all-white schools caused Negroes to overload integrated schools, and hence they pressed for a city-wide program of integration. In St. Louis the West Side Community Conference argued that the schools were allowing whites to transfer out of neighborhood schools. In Baltimore the parents charged that the board was bussing Negroes into schools in integrated neighborhoods in order to avoid sending them to all-white schools. In Newark they charged that construction of an all-white school near them would pull whites out of the presently integrated schools. In each case the relief requested involved either keeping whites in the integrated schools or sending Negroes into all-white schools, or both. In San Francisco the goals of the Gratten group were not as clearly in agreement with the civil rights movement. Basically, the Gratten group wanted their junior high school to have a minority of Negroes in it and opposed the opening of Central Junior High School because it would have been 50 to 60 per cent Negro. However, in terms of integration, Central was an improvement over the existing situation, for some of the Negroes scheduled to attend Central were in a virtually all-Negro school. The Gratten parents solved the dilemma by arguing, not that Negroes should be excluded from Central (that would have been a simple anti-Negro position), but that racial balance should be a city-wide goal, with no school having a majority of Negro students. In a city with a large Negro population such a goal would be ridiculous, but in San Francisco it was reasonable enough so that the civil rights groups could endorse it without appearing irresponsible. But when they were denied this goal, the community accepted, as a compromise, the closing of Central and the return of the students to their respective schools. Thus, although the organization was committed to integration, it accepted a compromise which actually

retarded integration. In all four cases the integrated community groups adopted a universalistic approach to the issue--they could not support school integration in their own area without advocating it in the whole city as well. Thus we see that one of the major forces operating to integrate schools is the need to maintain racially stable neighborhoods.

We were surprised at how frequently the integrated neighborhood group appeared as a proponent of school integration; we were also surprised at how seldom the Negro "community leader" appeared in this role. We made this distinction between the "civil rights leaders" and Negro "community leaders" in the interpretation of the San Francisco story.

In the North community leaders might be elected officials, members of the Negro civic elite, or leaders of neighborhood groups, while only leaders of full-time civil rights groups like the NAACP or CORE would qualify as civil rights leaders. "Community leaders" are concerned with the complete range of needs of the Negro community which they attempt to represent, whereas "civil rights leaders" are concerned only with preventing discrimination or promoting the equality of the races. In the Deep South community leaders might well be considered civil rights leaders, since nearly anything the Negro community wants may require overcoming the prejudices of whites before it can be obtained. Thus, if a group in a northern city were to protest the absence of a library in an elementary school, this might be treated as a community action with no racial significance. In the South, however, that same protest could easily be a demand by Negroes for equal educational facilities, and the leaders of the protest would be fighting to overcome racial discrimination. For this reason, one often cannot distinguish between community leaders and the civil rights leaders in the Deep South; the local Negro business elite or the most prominent Negro political leaders may also double as leaders in the NAACP or even SCLC and CORE. In the North, however, we usually have no difficulty distinguishing between "civil rights" and "general" leaders.

Except for the interracial neighborhood groups, the school integration demands were usually pressed by civil rights leaders. In only two cases can we find Negro community leaders in the forefront of the school desegregation protests, and even these cases are ambiguous. The only Negro political leader who was active as a proponent of school integration was Alderman Clay in St. Louis, but he is one of the new breed of civil rights-oriented politicians. Most of our Negro school board members behave like community leaders. Of the Negro board members, Richard Jones (Pittsburgh) and Dr. Wright (Buffalo) come closest to being specialists in civil rights activity. Of course, when a civil rights issue becomes of overriding importance, the Negro board members, like other Negro community leaders, tend to drop other matters to concentrate on civil rights. They are not anti-civil rights; they just do not specialize in it.

The three types of actors--white liberals, community leaders, and civil rights leaders--seem to differ in the goals toward which they are oriented. James Q. Wilson distinguishes between "welfare" and "status" goals among Negro leaders. He defines "welfare" ends as "those which look to the tangible improvement of the community or some individuals in it through the provision of better services, living conditions, or positions." "Status" ends are "those which seek the integration of the Negro into all phases of the community on the principles of equality--all Negroes will be granted the opportunity to obtain the services, positions, or material benefits of the community on the basis of principles other than race" (Wilson, 1965, p. 185). When an integrated community struggles to maintain itself, it is primarily concerned with protecting the life-style of its residents from the evils of the ghetto. Hence we put this goal toward the welfare end of the continuum. The integrated neighborhood groups are frequently led by white liberals, and we hypothesize that compared with Negro civil rights leaders, white liberals are welfare oriented in other ways as well. For example, the Buffalo Citizens Committee for Human Relations was involved in operating a compensatory education program. The white education chairman of the Newark NAACP stressed inadequate educational opportunity in Negro

schools. Both are clearly "welfare" goals. Even when the white leadership asked for integration, the approach often seemed to be welfare oriented. Thus the demand for integration in Baltimore resulted in the complete elimination of double-shift schooling for Negroes. Among the white liberals, there is often the implicit or explicit assumption that integration is a positive educational value for the child in the integrated school; therefore, the success of the integration program can best be measured by actually counting the number of white and Negro students in integrated schools; the ultimate goal is, of course, integration for everyone. Our impression, although it cannot be demonstrated statistically, is that the majority of the civil rights leaders who held the goal of total integration were whites. In addition, we gained the impression that white liberals were harder to satisfy, possibly for this reason. (Of the eight cities, the civil rights leader who expressed most dissatisfaction to our interviewers was white in five cases. It may also be that white leaders have a stronger sense of efficacy than Negroes and thus are less satisfied with, or accustomed to, taking "no" for an answer.)

There is another seeming contradiction here: how is it that a utopian goal such as total integration goes hand in hand with a "welfare" orientation? However, the contradiction is not a logical one. There is nothing in the notion of "welfare orientation" which requires that it be accompanied by limited goals. Wilson (1965) argued that these "welfare" leaders tend to be more conservative; we are merely saying that in our biracial sample we have found a somewhat different pattern.¹

The Negro "community leader" must almost of necessity hold "welfare" goals, and thus he is more like the white liberal in this respect. However, the traditional Negro civil rights leaders--the NAACP officers

¹The relationship between "status" goals and limited goals has probably changed in the past few years; SNCC's and CORE's southern shock troops may be more welfare oriented than the NAACP leaders who were the "militants" of a decade ago. However these new groups do not appear in our study.

who appear in all our stories--are much more "status" oriented. The typical civil rights leader's main goal can be put simply. Stated negatively, it is to eliminate racial discrimination and all the symbols of it. Stated positively, the goal is to persuade society to accept the concept of racial equality. This approach is stated most clearly in the Pittsburgh Urban League's report on school segregation in that city: "We regard a community as integrated when opportunities for the achievement of respect and the distribution of material welfare are not limited by race." We will call these goals "symbolic" ones; our definition is close to Wilson's definition of "status" ends. This definition, deceptively simple, seems to explain the pattern of demands made by the movement in almost all our cities. In particular, it clarifies the Bay City and San Francisco stories.

In Bay City and San Francisco most of the focus was upon the demand for a statement of policy committing the school system to integrate the schools. Here we see excellent examples of the de facto segregation issue. These two school systems are statistically the most integrated in our sample. In neither case was it assumed that the school system was trying to prevent schools from being integrated. Rather, the board was asked to recognize and to express regret over schools that were segregated as a result of housing patterns. In neither Bay City nor San Francisco did the demands go much beyond this point; if they had, they might have followed the Buffalo pattern of asking the board to integrate a particular school. The great concern over the importance of policy statements about de facto segregation fits with the hypothesis that the civil rights movement has as its goal obtaining public commitment to the principle of racial equality.

Notice that in all eight cities there was no real pressure to desegregate a large number of schools. The most significant action, in terms of number of students, occurred in Baltimore, where white liberals handled the negotiation. This brings us to our second hypothesis: that if the goals of the movement are oriented toward symbolic equality, then

limited integration is sufficient; a commitment toward integration, and the demonstration that the commitment was made in good faith, are enough. On the other hand, the white liberals and other welfare-oriented integrationist groups would not be satisfied with this.

Curiously enough, it would seem that if an organization's goals are symbolic, then it is more important to place whites in integrated schools than it is to integrate Negro students. Surely one of the clearest demonstrations of belief in integration would be to place a few Negroes in every school, so that no white student receives the "privilege" of being able to avoid contact with Negroes. Similarly, integration of teaching staffs, and particularly the placing of Negro teachers in white classrooms, is an effective advertisement of racial equality.

The phrase "symbolic goals" has a somewhat negative connotation, and it may be important to clarify this phrase at this point. In a sense, most arguments in favor of integration are symbolic. The social science literature referred to in the Brown decision's footnote 11 argues that the Negro child is unable to develop an adequate sense of self-worth in the segregated school, since the school is a symbol of the unwillingness of whites to permit interracial contact. Thus there are two arguments in favor of integration of schools: the first, stemming from Brown, is that the segregated classroom is a barrier to the child's learning. Since this argument assumes a direct link between integration and the improvement of education for each individual child, we have called this a welfare orientation. The other approach sees the integrated classroom as a symbol of racial equality which the entire city will see. Integration may not benefit the individual child, but it will benefit the Negroes as a whole by helping to break down the traditional beliefs in social inequality. We have called this the more symbolic orientation, but really both arguments see integration as a valuable symbol. The only argument that sees integration in nonsymbolic terms is the statement that the school system will provide better education to a classroom which has some white students in it.

("Sitting next to a white child is no guarantee that my child will learn, but it does guarantee that he will be taught.")

From this viewpoint, the battle over Lawndale's Woodside High School makes much more sense. Recall that Woodside was built to serve high-income families. After the school was completed, there was no reasonable way to district the school so as to enroll more than a handful of Negroes in it. Nevertheless, there was considerable pressure to redistrict the school "fairly." The board voted not to redistrict, stating that no redistricting could integrate the school. What was the point of the argument? In our terms of reference, the construction of the school, with its gerrymandered boundary, and the removal of these students from the older integrated schools, was perceived as an act of favoritism toward these students. In particular, one of the ways in which these students were being favored was by permitting them to avoid contact with Negroes, or even with lower income whites. But the goal of the movement is to eliminate any symbols of favoritism, and to prevent any action which would indicate that white students are "more important" to the board than Negroes. Thus integration was not the relevant issue; the symbol of racial favoritism was. This same parallel appears in southern desegregation; even when only a handful of Negroes are involved, a school board is seen as more liberal if it spreads the Negroes through several schools rather than only "contaminating" one group of white students. The success of an integration plan is measured by the number of whites affected. Southern School News and this report both measure integration in terms of the number of Negro students in white schools--presumably on the assumption that this is the number of students benefiting from integration. From the point of view of the civil rights movement, it might be better to measure the number of white students in integrated schools.

Compensatory education is another good example of how the civil rights leader sets priorities. From the viewpoint of one concerned with eliminating discrimination and establishing the symbols of desegregation,

actual educational techniques are more or less irrelevant. And this is the attitude of the "ideal" civil rights leader toward compensatory education--it is irrelevant to his goals. It may take on some relevance if the school board chooses to state that compensatory education is designed to compensate for the deprivations which Negroes have been and are being subjected to. Unfortunately, the typical school board makes it clear by its use of the phrase "culturally deprived" and by its extension of compensatory education to poor whites that compensatory education is not designed for this purpose but only to overcome inadequate home and neighborhood environment. In some cases the civil rights leaders will object to this failure to recognize the special case of the Negro. However, the common reaction is to express support for compensatory education but to consider it no substitute for integration. The more welfare-oriented leader will be able to write an equation between compensatory education and integration, since they both benefit the individual child.

Finally, we are now able to advance an explanation for why the school integration movement so easily becomes a personal attack upon individual school board members or school superintendents. If the overriding need of the Negro community is recognition as racial equals, and the demands of the civil rights movement to achieve this end are rejected, then it might follow (although this is poor logic) that the reason why the demands were rejected is that the school board or the superintendent reject the concept of racial equality. But just as procedures like school gerrymandering are symbols of racial inequality which must be eliminated, the individual who opposes the civil rights movement is also a symbol of racial inequality who must be removed from office for this reason. In fact, the opponent of the civil rights movement can be seen by the movement as guilty of immoral behavior. As we shall see later, there is some utility in viewing the civil rights demonstration--the sit-in or the boycott--as a means of punishing such persons.

This distinction between welfare and symbolic goals apply to other civil rights issues as well. The major goals of the civil rights movement--

fair employment, open housing, integrated schools, equal use of public accommodations--all fit our definition of symbolic demands in that the emphasis is upon removing barriers to Negro mobility, rather than actually trying to move Negroes into these newly opened opportunities. For example, the NAACP may negotiate with an employer to hire Negroes, but once the employer has agreed, the NAACP ordinarily will not feel that it is its function to recruit applicants. The same is true in public accommodations; once a lunch counter is "opened," the civil rights movement will usually not concern itself with whether Negroes want to eat there or not.

Of course, no civil rights organization is purely symbol oriented. This is especially true of the Urban League, which has a strong social welfare orientation, the "white liberal" civil rights groups, and the NAACP, which often includes some major community leaders and young political leadership. It is this conglomeration of symbol- and welfare-oriented goals which makes the movement somewhat unpredictable. We discussed this earlier in analyzing the San Francisco NAACP's insistence upon construction of new schools. Ordinarily, school construction is irrelevant to the civil rights movement's symbolic goals (except in the South of two decades ago, when the building of a Negro school could often be considered a victory for the local NAACP). When a northern NAACP begins pressing for school construction, the shift of goals may baffle the school system. Similarly, the frequent combination of welfare and symbolic demands may lead to internal contradiction--for example, the demand that good teachers be kept in Negro schools and the demand that Negro teachers be allowed to teach in white schools.

Much of the criticism of the movement--that it personalizes the conflicts, that it is not really interested in the improvement of Negro education, or that it pays excessive attention to the words and not the deeds of the schools--can be seen as a misunderstanding of the symbolic goals of the movement.

In another respect, these criticisms serve the function of stressing the tension between the civil rights movement and the Negro community as a whole. The movement is a specialized interest group, with highly restricted goals. As we have pointed out, there is some contradiction between these goals and the more welfare-oriented goals of the "man in the street." This is best reflected by the fact that before the St. Louis civil rights movement began supporting bussing, there had been community opposition to it; conversely, after the new schools in the West End were opened, the most militant of the movement picketed the construction of these "ghetto schools." The problem is complicated by the fact that there is no clear means by which the civil rights leadership is made responsive to the will of the Negro community. They are not elected as political leaders are. How, then, can we know that they "represent" Negroes?² This problem exists on paper more than it does in reality. For one thing, the movement receives votes of confidence in the form of participation in massive demonstrations. If the movement becomes too extreme, its support from Negro general leaders and from the Negro masses will fall off, boycotts flop, and the competition among civil rights groups will influence the leaders to find a more popular issue. This is the sort of social control which Carl Sandburg advocated: "Maybe some day they'll give a war and nobody will come."

The other reason why this tension is not troublesome is that the civil rights leaders have been recognized as the heroes of Negro culture. And this in turn is evidence that Negroes endorse the values of the civil rights movement. In the 1940's it was common practice for the NAACP to listen to a complaint about schools in some southern community, then transform the community's grievance into a demand for integration. Similar tactics have been used in northern schools in the past few years. That the

²NAACP officers are elected by vote of the full membership. This occasionally results in the replacement of civil rights leaders by "community" leaders. One striking example is Chicago, where in the early 1950's the precinct workers associated with the Democratic party voted as a bloc to elect a candidate supported by Negro political leaders.

tactics are successful indicates the Negro community is willing to accept the values, and the leadership, of the civil rights movement.

Two major problems which face the movement, according to this analysis, are, first, it cannot publicly reject a welfare orientation and thus it cannot admit that "good intentions are enough." Hence it must appear unwilling to compromise. If the movement did take a welfare orientation, including an insistence on integration for every Negro child and a program to meet all the needs of Negro students, it obviously would still be demonstrating in every city in our sample. Yet it cannot simply say, all we want is a demonstration of good faith. The other dilemma, which is perhaps no more a problem to the civil rights movement than it is to other social movements, is that there is no clear formula which can be used to obtain their goals. How, after all, does one obtain a change in community values, such as the acceptance of racial equality? It is perhaps for this reason that the demands made are so often procedural--demands for meetings with the board, for policy statements, and for committee reports are examples. The movement's problem is in finding a way to specify its goals; the result is to give the school system considerable freedom, and possibly more freedom than it wants.

The Response of the School Superintendent

One barrier to the civil rights movement is the school superintendent. During the civil rights controversies, eleven different superintendents served in our eight cities. We obtained no information on one of these-- Philip Hickey of St. Louis. Of the remaining ten, seven can be said to have acted autonomously, without board instruction, to reject demands of the civil rights movement; in contrast, only three stand out as having urged their board to take a liberal position.

In studying the statements made by these superintendents, three themes recur very regularly. The most common is the insistence on a "color-blind" policy, of ignoring racial distinctions. Thus superintendents have opposed referring to schools as segregated or integrated and

have argued that taking racial censuses of either pupils or teachers would be illegal or at least embarrassing to both students and staff. Of course, plans which require the schools to attempt to obtain integration have been accused of being discriminatory. One Buffalo board member's statement, that integrating Woodlawn Junior High School would discriminate against Negro students by limiting their numbers in the new school to make room for whites and that these students "should not be sacrificed on the altar of racial balance" reappears, in less colorful language, in the statements of several superintendents. Most school policy is "color blind" as well. All eight cities in our sample have some sort of open enrollment policy; in several cases it was adopted as a result of demands for school integration. Yet in only two cases is the plan actually keyed to a racial criterion. Everywhere else, transfers are allowed on the basis only of overcrowding and available space, and in most cases the school system does not attempt to determine whether such plans increase or reduce integration. The exceptions are Buffalo and Newark, where transfer privileges are extended only to students in predominantly Negro schools.

Although five of the eight cities use busses to transport students out of crowded schools, and in each case the result is to increase integration, in none of the cities is the racial composition of either the sending or receiving school considered officially as a criterion in arranging such transfers. Finally, we should observe that compensatory education programs for the culturally deprived are also color blind in their administration. Very frequently, pointed reference is made to poor whites or other non-Negro minorities so as to advertise the fact that the program is not for Negroes per se. (This why the Pittsburgh annual report's statement on compensatory education is so surprising.) In extreme cases, school superintendents have sometimes managed to speak at length about integration or civil rights issues without ever using the word Negro.

Coupled with this attention on color blindness is the stress placed on a narrow definition of the function of the school as "educational," rather

than "social." This is most clearly expressed in the statement that the bringing of students together in the classroom is a necessity of teaching, but that the effects of the resulting interaction between students are not within the purview of the educational system. The school administrator expresses great reluctance to "expand the function of the schools" as demanded by color-conscious integration plans. One device is to argue that existing law required color blindness, and therefore any attempt to integrate schools, or even to measure the extent of integration, is illegal.

The third theme which recurs in the statements of school superintendents, although not as often as the first two, is an extreme defensiveness about the schools, coupled with an intolerance of "lay" criticism. Thus some school administration reports seem to delight in point out errors made by critics. Frequent references are made, not always with justification, to the inability of lay persons to make decisions on problems requiring educational expertise. Finally, the defensiveness of some school staffs is reflected in their unwillingness or inability to engage in coherent dialogue--criticisms are frequently answered with either flat disagreement or vague, overly detailed, or off-the-point replies. The two most striking exceptions are Pittsburgh's Marland, who has regularly engaged in long conversations with civil rights leaders and supplied highly detailed and clear information on racial issues, and Buffalo's Manch, who openly admitted that there was no particular "computer mythology" involved in the selection of a school boundary for Woodlawn High School.

Another defensive tactic, particularly used to insulate the administration from the board, is the production of large quantities of statistics, often slightly irrelevant or more detailed than necessary; one result is to impress the reader with the staff's expertise and the complexity of the problem.

Of course, these defensive tactics are to a greater or less degree common in all organizations which must meet public criticism, and we have no evidence to indicate that they are much more common in this field than

in others. However, the field of education is somewhat unusual in its emphasis upon a defensive ideology--a creed that insists that school administrators be chosen from among those persons with teaching credentials, for example, and which makes frequent reference to "laymen."

On the basis of our interviews and the documents collected, we propose that these three themes taken together represent one sort of "ideal type" of superintendent behavior. Obviously, no superintendent behaves in this way at all times, and some school administrators do not fit the "ideal" at all.

If we try to capture all three of these themes in a single phrase, we could say that they represent components of a narrow and defensive definition of their occupational role. Now, what are some possible explanations for this ideology?

We should consider the possibility that the ideology is just a device to conceal anti-Negro sentiment. This strikes us as unlikely, however. The private attitudes of the superintendents, as expressed on our questionnaires, are not particularly conservative on racial issues. Further, the men who are more liberal on race are just as likely to express the values we have discussed here as are the more conservative men; there does not seem to be much correlation between the racial attitudes and the ideological position we have defined here.

A much more reasonable hypothesis is that the superintendents feel insecure in their positions and react accordingly. This could easily be the result of their social backgrounds.

The only channel into the school superintendency is through the ranks of teaching. This means majoring in education in college, usually teaching school for several years, and then rising through administrative posts. This restricts the number of persons eligible for the post dramatically. First, they must be male in almost every case. But education is a woman's field, and the male students who major in it tend to be of low socio-economic status. This means two things: any school superintendent

will be highly mobile socially, and he may bear strains associated with his minority position in a feminine occupation. The big city school superintendent has probably risen far beyond his expectations. It is hard to imagine that he anticipated becoming a highly paid executive when he entered teachers college. We have few or no data on the occupational attitudes of men who are highly mobile. There is some general research on the emotional pressures on upwardly mobile men, but we know of no data on attitudes toward work. It intuitively seems reasonable that such a person might have difficulty accepting the tremendous responsibilities coming from the school superintendency and feel quite insecure about his ability to stay in office. In addition, the superintendent is in constant interaction with a school board which (especially in small cities) is made up of high-status community leaders, aggravating this situation.

There is also little in the research literature to help us evaluate the second point, that teaching school is "woman's work." It seems plausible that the men in an occupation dominated by women will feel that their masculinity is partially denied. This could in turn make them more defensive and more resistant to criticism--an attitude which they might retain even after rising to the top administrative posts which are overwhelmingly male.

There are other and more important reasons why the administrator could develop a defensive attitude, or a defensive ideology, from his work as a school teacher or principal. As a teacher he is solely responsible for the success or failure of his students, and unlike the college instructor, he must deal directly with their parents. Other occupational roles require this face-to-face dealing with clients, but usually this means clients who are of lower status, like relief recipients or prisoners, or clients who are under fairly direct control (nurses dealing with hospital patients); or else they are in situations where the professional competence of the bureaucrat is not so easily questioned (doctors, lawyers, ministers). But the teacher is not obviously doing anything which the parent is

incapable of doing. Indeed, parents do teach their children. Furthermore, he has few or no criteria by which to determine whether he is doing a good job or not. He is also subject to a second criticism--not only is he not teaching Johnnie well enough, he may be teaching him the wrong way. For in at least some cases, he is the harbinger of foreign values--classical learning or middle-class behavior patterns, for example. Fortunately for the contemporary teacher, these "foreign values" now seem widely diffused through the society. Parents want their children to go to college, and if they must learn certain subjects to get into college, the parent is agreeable. But the present generation of superintendents began teaching in the 1920's, when this problem may have been much more serious. The problem is complicated by the fact that the teacher must resist parental intrusions in the classroom while at the same time urging them to "take an interest in their child's education."

Thus the teacher must develop values to protect himself from being required to justify the material he teaches and the grades he gives. The professional ideology of the teacher does this--by insisting on certification, on methods courses, on rejecting the use of lay persons in teaching roles, and in extreme cases, in the theories that preschool education by parents may retard the child.³ Whatever the legitimacy of the positions, the point is that they enable a teacher to resist the criticisms of the parent who tried to "tell the teacher a thing or two" and of citizens groups who argue that the schools don't emphasize the three R's. In addition, the use of educational testing, and particularly the I.Q. test, may help the teacher to justify his actions; if his students don't learn as much as the parents expect, it is because of their low I.Q.'s.

Finally, when the teacher becomes a superintendent, he again finds himself in conflict with the community, this time represented by a school

³Harper Lee satirizes this in To Kill A Mockingbird; her treatment of the teacher who forbids the child's father to teach her to read reflects a disrespect for the teaching profession which is common in twentieth century writing.

board which he sees, often correctly, as conservative and traditionalist.⁴ The simple dichotomy between policy and administration is a false one; the superintendent finds himself spending part of his time trying to persuade the board to adopt his policy ideas, and more time trying to protect himself from board interference in ongoing administration.

If a profession is made up of men who share common needs for a defensive ideology, the profession will develop such an ideology. In addition, the profession as a whole may need such defenses. The public school has had to deal with a variety of encroachments in its history. It has had to contend with corruption in politically sponsored systems, so that now keeping politics out schools is a watchword. In addition, it has fought with the public on Deweyism, on the teaching of reading, on vocational education, on the teaching of German during World War I, on Communism in textbooks, and a host of other issues.

Apparently the educational profession and many individual superintendents responded to these conflicts in three ways: by narrowing their frame of reference so that they could silence their critics by refusing responsibility for increasing juvenile delinquency, moral decline, the lack of patriotism of its graduates; by "trading" low priority values, about the rights of labor or of Negroes, for higher priority values such as freedom of curriculum reform; and by developing the claim that expertise was required to make school decisions, so that critics could be ignored.

⁴Vidich and Bensman (1958) paint a portrait of the local school administrator as an innovator who was constantly straining to get his conservative board to support some new step. One study of school board members in Illinois found that 28 per cent of the board members stated that one factor in the board's rejection of a candidate for school superintendent was the candidate's "unsound educational views." In addition, the study notes that "it was particularly noticeable during interviews with board members that they were especially conscious of the need for the candidate's having a background which would fit the community. Most boards expressed the quality desired in these terms: "We wanted someone who would fit into the community and become a part of it--someone who would be happy here" (see Baker, 1952, pp. 69-71).

The pattern we have outlined, of a defensive profession made up of low status men who have had to resist public demands throughout their careers, is present in big city school systems, but it was even clearer in the small town America of the 1920's and 1930's. The foreignness of education, the demands of parents on teachers, the absence of academic freedom, and the conservatism of elected school board members--all the factors we have listed are exaggerated in the dense social network of the small town. For the teacher, "Stadt Luft macht man frei." And curiously enough, the recruitment pattern for the big city school superintendencies tends to attract men from small town and farming backgrounds. First, the rural or small town high school student, presumably because of his more limited occupational horizons, is more likely to go into teaching. In addition, if he begins teaching in a small town (where he is one of the few male teachers), he can more quickly rise to a principalship and become a superintendent at a young age. Thus the small town teacher gains administrative experience while his big city colleague is still in the classroom. Big cities want experienced men as superintendents, but experienced men can only be found in the small cities; the men who become superintendents in small cities tend to be teachers in smaller cities, and the men who teach in such cities tend to be born there.⁵

This argument is supported by an analysis of college seniors choosing educational administration in 1961 (Davis and Bradburn, 1961). First, only a tiny fraction of college freshmen (0.2 per cent) choose

⁵Baker (1952) notes that even boards of education in very small communities place high value on previous experience in considering candidates for superintendent; in fact, 53 per cent of the superintendents in systems employing ten to nineteen teachers had been superintendents prior to coming to their present job. Baker writes "This emphasis [on having experience as a superintendent] seems somewhat unrealistic in terms of recruiting young men." And later he notes, "There is little question that boards are seeking young men as superintendents." Thus we see that the small town teacher is probably the only one who can climb the ladder fast enough to be both young and experienced, as these boards wish.

educational administration as a career. This number increases through the four years of college very rapidly, but even as seniors, there are at most barely enough students selecting educational administration to fill the demand. Only 5 per cent of all persons going into public education specify educational administration; this would imply a ratio of one administrator to twenty teachers, which is probably too low. The persons choosing this field are few enough to make accurate estimates impossible, but we do find the following statistically significant differences: Students choosing educational administration are from poorer families, and families where both parents have low educational attainments. Of thirty occupational careers, the educational administration students are the lowest in father's education; even students choosing nursing and agriculture are higher. They are also overwhelmingly rural; students from farm areas are twice as likely to choose educational administration as are students from metropolitan areas. In response to a series of questions in which the respondents were asked to describe themselves, the students oriented toward educational administration saw themselves as religious, conventional, and not intellectual. In this sample, a majority of the persons directed toward educational administration intended to put off graduate training until after they had taught for at least a year.

We can also document this pattern by examining the biographies in Who's Who for the men who direct the schools which participate in the "Great Cities" research program (Table X.2). In 1964, eleven of these superintendents were listed in Who's Who. They can be divided into two groups: the "locals" and the "mobiles." The three "locals" all grew up in large cities and began their teaching in the city where they are now superintendents. Of the remaining eight, six were born in small towns, only two went to urban universities, and seven began teaching in small cities. They spent a median time of eight years at the rank of teacher or principal. Notice that three of these men deviate from this pattern conspicuously. Calvin Gross is an urban product, the only mobile superintendent who began teaching in one big city and then wound up as superintendent

CAREERS OF PROMINENT SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS

City	Name	Place of Birth	Undergraduate College	First Teaching Position	Number of Years As Teacher or Principal	Age at Advanced Degree	First Administrative Post	Age (1963)
<u>LOCALS:</u> Los Angeles	Jack P. Crowther	Salt Lake City	University of Utah	Los Angeles	8	M.A. -46	Asst. Supt., Los Angeles	54
Buffalo	Joseph Manch	(In Poland)	University of Buffalo	Buffalo	12	Ed.D. -45	Staff, Buffalo	53
Philadelphia	Allen Wetter	Philadelphia	Temple University	Philadelphia	22	--	Dist. Supt., Philadelphia	63
<u>MOBILES:</u> Washington	Carl Hansen	Wolbach, Nebraska	University of Nebraska	(In Nebraska)	20	Ed.D. -38	Asst. to Supt., Washington	57
San Francisco	Harold Spears	Snayzee, Indiana	Wabash College	Evansville, Indiana	No Data	Ed.D. -37	Supt., Highland Park, Illinois	61
Baltimore	George Brain	Thorpe, Washington	Central Washington State	(In Washington State)	6	Ed.D. -39	Asst. Supt., Bellevue, Washington	--
Milwaukee	Harold Vincent	Knox, Indiana	Greenville, Illinois	Asst. Principal, Washington Springs, South Dakota	11	L.L.D. -54	Asst. Supt., Canton, Ohio	66
Chicago	Benjamin Willis	Baltimore	George Washington University	Henderson, Maryland	12	Ed.D. -49	Supt., Denton, Maryland	62
(Deviants): Detroit	Sam Brownell	Peru, Nebraska	University of Nebraska	Principal, Peru, Nebraska	2	Ph.D. -26	Supt., Grosse Pointe, Michigan	63
New York	Calvin Gross	Los Angeles	UCLA	Los Angeles	4	Ed.D. -36	Supt., Weston, Massachusetts	44
Pittsburgh	Sidney Marland	Danielson, Connecticut	University of Connecticut	West Hartford	3	Ph.D. -41	Supt., Darien, Connecticut	49

in another. Samuel Brownell also differs from the other mobiles, since he went on immediately for a doctorate without pausing to teach. He is possibly the only man in this list who had a clear picture of his future career at the time he took his bachelor's degree. Sidney Marland's career resembles Gross's and Brownell's in that he also took less than the usual eight years to move into central administration. The presence of these three deviant cases actually tends to support our general thesis, since these three men are highly respected by the critics of the "educational establishment."

We have one final bit of data to bolster our argument. Five school superintendents gave us background data which included their father's occupation and the educational attainment of their parents. Of the five, two were the sons of farmers, one of a small town merchant, and two of blue-collar workers. None of the five had fathers who attended college, but three had mothers who had at least finished junior college. Thus we see that the interaction between civil rights leaders and school superintendents has the preconditions for conflict. They literally do not speak the same language. In addition, both live in a hostile (to them) world and are unlikely to be very patient in dealing with each other. In six of our eight cities the school integration issue quickly became a conflict between the movement and the superintendent. In St. Louis and Baltimore the superintendent wrote rebuttals to the charges of the civil rights leadership which were received angrily by the protesters. In Newark demands that the superintendent be dismissed were made even before the first school integration incident occurred. In Lawndale and San Francisco the superintendents flatly refused the first demands made upon them. (Excerpts of Spears's speech appeared in Chapter VIII.) Finally, in Bay City, the superintendent was criticized by the movement, although his successor has taken a more liberal position than his board and has not been criticized as much. Only two superintendents, Manch and Marland, have held the respect of the civil rights leadership (and Manch fell out of their favor after Woodlawn).

The School Board and the White Voter

But the school superintendent, in almost every one of our cases, has found that racial policy was taken from his hands by the school board. In six of our cities we can mark a point when the major decision which most influenced the outcome of the school integration issue, was made, not by the superintendent, but by the board. In some cities it is easy to locate such a point: in Baltimore, for example, when the school board assumed responsibility for negotiation with the civil rights leadership, or in Newark on the two occasions when the board members and the mayor met with the civil rights leadership to reach a compromise. In San Francisco the board's ad hoc committee presented a report which was, according to one NAACP leader, a "pleasant surprise" after Spears's earlier speech. In Bay City the superintendent's recommendations were disregarded. In Buffalo, while it is true that the school superintendent supported the final plan to segregate the Woodlawn school, it seems likely that he would not have done so if the board had not made its own position clear. In St. Louis it is harder to trace out the relationship between the board and the superintendent, but the board, not the superintendent, appointed the citizens committee which made the recommendations on which the compromise was reached, and we have other evidence to indicate that the superintendent was advised by the board to take action to meet the demands. In the remaining two cities, Lawndale, and Pittsburgh, there has been no evidence of any disagreement between the board and the administration, but in both cities the administration stays in close touch with the school board and seems to be responsive to its will. Both these cities changed superintendents without changing social policy.

We cannot easily characterize the "typical" school board in the way we have the "typical" superintendent and the two types of civil rights leaders. As we have seen, board members vary considerably in their backgrounds, motivations, and attitudes toward the school integration issue. Further, the board members are in an ambiguous situation, where there are

few clear guidelines to permit them to reach a decision easily. There are several reasons why there are no convenient guidelines.

The typical school board is not closely knit. It ordinarily meets to handle the legal paperwork of the schools, and at irregular intervals it makes specific decisions about a particular school or on a particular policy. But it can be thought of as making school policy in a firefighting fashion; if an issue comes up, it acts; otherwise, it doesn't. It may not take a position at all on some of the most fundamental issues of school policy, simply because those particular policies have not been made salient by community discussion. The result is that the school board does not, either as individuals or as a group, have a highly articulated educational policy. This means that almost every time the board attempts to argue with its superintendent, or every time the superintendent comes to the board for guidance, the board has some difficulty making a decision. Every issue is different and every decision can take a good deal of time. The school integration issue is a good example of this.

One necessary reaction of the typical school board is to avoid issues which are not important, for no other reason than to save time for issues which are. An issue must pass "a threshold of saliency" before the board can consider it. The result of this is that in virtually every city the initial complaints of the civil rights movement are ignored. Even Pittsburgh did not take action on integration until the second time the issue was brought up. Of course, this makes the board appear to be defending the status quo. By the time the civil rights movement begins to make noise, they can rightly claim that the school board has been ignoring the problem, and the school board begins to discuss the issue with one strike against it. The second step the school board may take to avoid lengthy discussion of the issue is to refer it to the superintendent. As we have already pointed out, the superintendent and the civil rights leadership do not make a good partnership, and in none of our eight cities was the issue resolved at this level. In the typical case the civil rights

movement interprets the superintendent's remark as a flat rejection of their request, or even as insulting. Thus, by the time the board realizes that it must handle the issue itself, tempers are already frayed on all sides.

When the board does begin to consider the issue, it must first develop ground rules for its decision-making process and a frame of reference for its decision. This is difficult, principally because the issue is different from most that the board faces--it involves the total community, it has strong emotional overtones, and it is general, rather than specific. If it adopts the standard tactic, of holding public hearings in an effort to determine "what the citizens want," it may not receive much help. In several cases the civil rights movement has simplified the board's problem by making specific, procedural demands: the adoption of a policy statement, for example, or the appointment of a committee to study the issue. But this does not help the board to decide what concrete action it should take.

Two school systems used the outside committee of citizens at this point. St. Louis appointed such a committee only a few days after the issue opened. In Lawndale the Citizens Committee was appointed at the request of the civil rights movement.

In other cases, the board or a special committee of board members may attempt to formulate policy without the help of outsiders. In such cases, if the committee members attempt to serve as a fact-finding body, they may find themselves overwhelmed by the reports of the administration, and become mere spokesmen for the administration position. (For example, the report of the board subcommittee in Baltimore was considerably more cautious than the board's behavior only a few months later; this despite the fact that the subcommittee members were quite liberal in outlook.) If, however, the board attempts to develop a position independent of the administration, it will soon be in relatively uncharted waters. Left to its own devices, the board must develop a philosophical position on the school integration issue.

One might argue that the board's situation is not this ambiguous; that the board realizes that the white parents will not tolerate school integration, and the board therefore has the simple, if not easy, job of trying to squelch the civil rights movement. Actually, this does not seem to be the case. First of all, we know that some elements of the white community supported the civil rights movement in most of our cities. In addition, we know from several national surveys that northern whites express support for integration. For example, an NORC poll taken in 1963 found 75 per cent of northern whites saying "yes" to the question: "Do you think white and Negro students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?" More to the point, another poll found only 7 per cent of northern whites saying they would object to sending their child to a school with a few Negro students, and only 34 per cent would object if the school were half Negro (Erskine, 1962; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1965). We can also see from our eight case studies that segregationist opposition was not an overriding factor. In Baltimore and St. Louis the opposition to school integration appeared principally after the school integration decision had been made; in both cases the opposition was short lived. Since these are our most southern cities, we would expect the opposition in other cities to be even weaker. The opposition to school integration in Bay City and Lawndale appeared only after the board had made it clear that it would not integrate the schools in question; in these cases the segregationists played the role of supporting the school board rather than opposing them. (When one of the leaders of the Woodside parents in Lawndale ran against a school board member in the election, he was eliminated before the run-off election. In Bay City, there had been no opposition to bussing of Negroes before Mrs. Smith began campaigning.) In Buffalo the petitions opposing the integration of the Woodlawn school were submitted before the board took a final decision on the matter, but they were in support of board member Parlato's proposal. In all three cases the white parents' groups appeared only after their point of view had been taken by either the school board or some members of the board. They did not initiate the opposition. In effect, the school board apparently recruited their support in two cases.

If the anti-integrationists are in opposition to the school board, they can be squelched fairly easily. San Francisco is perhaps the most striking case: the Committee for Neighborhood Schools protested plans to increase the number of whites in Central Junior High School and also opposed bussing of Negro students, but the school system did bus Negroes into the junior high school where the committee was strongest and there was no public opposition. Obviously, these anti-integration movements are weak; they are not self-initiating except in the border cities and usually do not survive their first defeat. (Contrast this with the reaction of the typical civil rights movement to rejection of demands.) We might even go so far as to advance this hypothesis, which the data in all our cases seem to fit: that the school board can mobilize community support for its position, regardless of whether that position is segregationist or integrationist.

But this is only part of the story. We still have to reconcile the survey findings, which suggest that there is very little opposition to school integration, with the fact that there was at least some opposition. Let us look at the four northernmost cities, Bay City, Buffalo, Lawndale, and San Francisco, again.

Let us look first at the Bay City school board elections. In Bay City virtually the only stable voting pattern is along ethnic lines. In voting for the Irish Catholic, Smith, and against the candidates of the Citizens for the Bay City Public Schools, the voters are not breaking any traditions; no Negroes and very few other non-Catholics have ever been elected to any city office in the city. Mrs. Smith's campaign only made more salient the already overriding ethnic factors. In the 1965 elections, the issue was the bussing of Negro students into white schools, which the school board had gone on record as opposing. However, at the time the board took this position, the school system was routinely doing this, and there had been no opposition. The simplest explanation of this is that the white voters were not objecting to school integration, but to the attempt of Negroes (and the other non-Catholic supporters of "reform") to exercise their political power.

In Lawndale racial integration was again not directly the issue, although socio-economic integration may have been. Most of the Woodside parents' pressure was directed toward stopping the proposed "fair" re-districting of Woodside, which would have removed some whites from the Woodside High School (returning them to the other predominantly white schools) and brought other white students into the school. Race as such could hardly be the issue, unless it again was the objection of whites to the demonstration of Negro political power. More likely, parents were defending the idea that Woodside was the high prestige school in the city; any redistricting would destroy Woodside's image as the elite school.

In Buffalo the issue was more clearly racial. But even here there are a couple of other factors. One was that the white students were being removed from their own school, which would itself be a cause for objection; the second is that they were being forced to walk into the ghetto. In essence, the plan to integrate Woodlawn was "reverse bussing" without the busses. The following year Negroes were transferred out of the ghetto into a previously white school, and there was much less objection. This is exactly the pattern in New York City; there was little objection to bussing Negroes into white areas, but a great deal of protest to pairing (Princeton-planning) of schools. Again, the difference seems to be the resistance to being moved out of one's home school and objection to being made to go to a school located in an all-Negro neighborhood.

In San Francisco, as we have mentioned in the case study, the motives of both the integrationist Gratten parents and the segregationist community groups were the same: to prevent racial change in the community housing. For Gratten, this meant maintaining a predominantly white (or "racially balanced" school); for the other areas, it means staying in all-white schools and keeping Negroes out. In certain cities where the ghetto is expanding, the bulk of the opposition to school integration may actually stem from fears of residential invasion.

If these incidents are representative, we can hypothesize that much of what passes for opposition to school integration is not that at all. White parents will not protest integration as long as (1) the school their children are to attend is not predominantly Negro; (2) white students are not transferred out of their present schools; (3) white students are not forced to attend schools located in the ghetto; and (4) neighborhood racial stability is not threatened. To this we might tentatively add one qualifying statement--whites may protest if they feel that the school integration program is too obviously a surrender to Negro political power. This statement is still somewhat oversimplified; we do not mean to suggest that this is a hard and fast formula. But this "formula" might explain why in at least seven of our eight cities, Negroes are traveling into all-white neighborhoods to attend previously all-white schools without community objection.

Thus we see that the board is free to take action within broad limits. It will not be under much pressure from segregationist groups while it is making its decision.

At the same time, the civil rights movement is not exerting much pressure either. At least it is difficult to argue that the demonstrations and other tactics of civil rights groups are particularly frightening to the school board. In most cities court suits have been filed, but they were either dropped or settled out of court in every case. In both Bay City and Buffalo the state government was brought in, and in the case of Buffalo this seems to have forced the board to act. (In both cities state action came after our interviewing, so we have only newspaper reports of the action.) But in at least five cities the board was in little danger of being overruled by higher political authority. Picketings, sit-ins, and street demonstrations are embarrassing to the school board only if the school board chooses to be embarrassed. (In St. Louis the rush hour march was a minor public inconvenience.) The ultimate weapon in the civil rights arsenal is nothing more impressive than a one-day school

boycott. In contrast, when the school board deals with a teachers union, it is often threatened with a strike of indefinite duration; even the National Education Association can take action to discourage new teachers from entering the system.

Finally, the school boards in most of these cities operate independently of other community leaders. Only in Newark did the mayor take an active role in negotiating a settlement. In Lawndale, Bay City, and San Francisco the mayor expressed some dissatisfaction with the way the schools were handling the issue. Lawndale and Bay City have independently elected boards, so that the mayor has very little power. In San Francisco, Mayor Christopher's letter in support of integration was presented to the school board, but it is difficult to know how much effect this had on the board. In Baltimore the city council threatened to call the school board down for having been negligent enough to have to use widespread bussing to solve its overcrowding problems. However, the mayor managed to squelch this issue. In general, we do not think that any of these boards were greatly influenced by other city officials.

For these reasons we argue that the school board can take any of the broad range of options. It is not necessarily bound by any particular philosophy of education. In fact, the typical school board seems to behave in a highly pragmatic fashion while it moves from one issue to another as they become urgent. But the first question put to it by the civil rights movement is a philosophic one: Should the schools intentionally attempt to integrate schools, or shall it continue to operate in a color-blind fashion? In all eight cities the school board has been asked to go on record to (1) recognize the existence of segregated schools and (2) promise to do something about it.

Such a statement meets some of the more symbolic goals of the civil rights movement; it puts a governmental body on record as opposed to discrimination, not only in the schools but in effect in housing as well, and commits it to making a demonstration of its belief in racial equality.

There are no clear educational arguments which can be made either for or against such a policy statement. There are very few data indicating that Negro children learn more or derive other psychological benefits from being in integrated schools. On the other hand, there is no educational argument which would make the integration of schools a bad policy. The school board thus makes its decision without any particular rationale. There are several reasons why a school board might be reluctant to adopt such a statement. Some board members might feel (correctly, in most cases) that this is a foot in the door, and that the board will then be under pressure to integrate schools. Or the board may feel that such a policy statement is unethical or illegal; that the correct position is that of color-blindness, and that the proposed statement is an act of racial favoritism toward Negroes. Or the board may feel that white citizens would disapprove of such obvious capitulation to the civil rights movement. Finally, the board may mistrust the motives of the civil rights movement; they may feel that the movement is "really" asking for immediate integration of all schools, or something like that. The roots of these differences in perception lie in the view the board members have of the civil rights movement, and these roots appear in the tone with which the board carries out the negotiation, and appear in the wording of the statement that is finally issued by the board. Some boards, in their effort to avoid showing favoritism, will shun the word Negro and use phrases such as "concentrations of minority groups." Such a phrasing also means that the statement need not admit that schools are "segregated." In these cases the tone of the statement conveys an unwillingness to recognize as legitimate the language and the goals of the movement. More commonly, the board can simply put off adopting such a statement until after demonstrations have begun in earnest. In large measure this defeats the purpose of the statement, since one of the reasons why the movement wants the statement is as a demonstration of good intentions. Policy statements like the above have been adopted, in one fashion or another, in seven of our cities.

Normally, the board is next faced with a concrete issue--a particular school or policy becomes the issue. There are now fewer elements of ambiguity, but there is also more pressure on the board to try to anticipate the reaction of whites. At this point, the board is likely to first look for tactics to establish firm ground rules for the negotiation by defining the issue in either "legal" or "educational" terms. The school board chose to file suit to determine the legality of the existing policies. Other boards have not actually filed suit, but have stressed legal interpretations of their action; for example, the board might charge that a proposal for integrating schools is unconstitutional. The school board may also attempt to redefine the issue in the terms of the educational profession by developing a plan for compensatory education. However, as we pointed out earlier, the civil rights groups may consider such a plan to be irrelevant to the integration issue. In general, the civil rights groups resist both the legal and educational definition of the issue. Whether the board meets the demands of the civil rights movement depends again to a considerable extent on the perception of the movement which the board has. If it decides that the movement does not have the support of the Negro community, or that it is shortsighted and unreasonable, then the board may feel there is at least a good possibility that its proposals are unsound, and ignore or attempt to refute them. Or the board may feel that it has been insulted by the movement and take steps to defend itself. Again, the board members' general attitudes toward the race question are the most important factor in deciding how it will react.

The action which the board takes will tend to be a compromise; frequently it is a compromise which gives the substance of integration without the form. It may, for example, choose to integrate a particular school, explaining carefully that this was not done to increase integration, but only to relieve overcrowding, etc. (this was the standard Pittsburgh approach). For example, the board may present an open enrollment

plan which is not in any way keyed to the integration question; student transfers which would increase integration are given no priority over those which would reduce it. Only the Buffalo and Newark open enrollment plans had a specific pro-integration formula built into it. Similarly, bussing is to relieve overcrowding and for no other purpose, even though, as in St. Louis, the bussing program may dramatically increase integration.

None of the eight cities we have studied actually increased integration by any great amount; the number of Negro students involved is always less than 10 per cent of the total Negro enrollment. However, this has frequently been sufficient to satisfy the civil rights groups. Again, much depends upon tone--the speed with which the board moves, and the extent to which it demonstrates good intentions. But this tone in turn depends upon the attitude the board has toward the civil rights movement.

Thus we have argued that the board, operating without any clear guidelines or educational policy, hunts for a pragmatic solution, one which will keep the schools functioning and satisfy the various complainants. In doing so, it reacts more than anything else according to its general attitude about the Negro revolution. And it is this feeling which sets the "tone" of the action and determines the response of the movement.

The Effectiveness of Different Tactics

Since the amount of civil rights activity does not seem to have much effect on the outcome, we do not expect different types of tactics to be important. However, we can draw a few conclusions about the effectiveness of different strategies on the part of the civil rights movement.

1. Specificity.--One of the differences between civil rights movements is the specificity of the demands made. In Bay City a very general demand for the recognition of de facto segregation led to a complete escalation of conflict and a severe defeat for the civil rights

movement.. In the two cities where the phrase "de facto segregation" was widely used the controversy became very intense. In addition the subtle demands, such as the redistricting of Woodside in Lawndale, also seemed to cause difficulty. On the other hand, the highly specific demands-- don't open Central Junior High School, stop segregating bussed children, don't transfer students to Peshine School, etc.--were more likely to be met. However, the pattern is not very strong; the redistricting of Vailsburg High School in Newark was a specific demand which lost. It may be that one reason why specific demands are more often met is that the board lacks a frame of reference for dealing with highly abstract or subtle issues.

2. The effectiveness of neighborhood groups.--One rather intriguing finding is that the traditional civil rights groups (in most cases, the NAACP chapters) are less successful in achieving their goals than are neighborhood groups. In Table X.3 we have listed the twelve major organizations involved in the eight cities. In the left-hand column we have listed traditional civil rights groups and noted whether their demands were rejected, partly accepted, or accepted. On the right we have done the same with the other groups involved.

This very striking difference is not easy to explain. Part of this is due to the fact that the noncivil rights organizations usually had much more specific demands and part of it is because they are sometimes willing to settle for less. But intuitively, this does not seem to be the total explanation. It does not seem likely that any NAACP could have extracted as many concessions from the Baltimore board as the Sykes-Bramhall group did, and it is hard to believe that any community group would have been rebuffed as thoroughly as the Bay City NAACP. What are some other explanations? One factor is that the board is accustomed to dealing with parents groups. They have a favorable "response set" which leads them to almost automatically try to meet the demands. To pick up a slightly different shade of this statement, the parents groups appear

somewhat more "legitimate" in that they are obviously self interested. (One might argue that the altruistic NAACP, which is concerned with all Negro children, should be considered more legitimate, but this is obviously not the case. Their altruism is often viewed with suspicion.)

TABLE X.3

EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

City	Traditional Group		Other Group	
	Name	Outcome: Demand Was	Name	Outcome: Demand Was
Pittsburgh			Community group	Accepted
Baltimore			Parents organi- zation	Accepted
St. Louis	NAACP	Accepted	West End Community	Accepted
San Francisco	NAACP-CORE	Partly accepted	Gratten parents	Accepted
Newark	NAACP	Partly accepted	Clinton Hill Hawthorne parents	Rejected Accepted
Buffalo	NAACP	Rejected		
Lawndale	NAACP-CORE	Rejected		
Bay City	NAACP-NEFM	Rejected		
Percentage "accepted"		17%	83%	
N		(6)	(6)	

Finally, possibly because of their deeper commitment or because of this sense of legitimacy, the noncivil rights group is more willing to take drastic action. The Bay City NAACP called two one-day boycotts, but the Gratten and Hawthorne parents were willing to go on indefinite strike.

This, we think, is one of the more interesting aspects of the civil rights movement, which has been overlooked in other discussion. In general, civil rights groups seem to be quite conservative in the types of actions they are willing to take. Consider just two examples of other groups: Labor unions, including teachers unions, have called indefinite strikes. White parents protesting integration have boycotted schools for long periods of time, not only in the South, but in cities like Gary and Chicago as well (Tipton, 1953).

The third reason we think community groups are more effective is that they represent, in several cases, white as well as Negro parents, and the simple fact is that regardless of how liberal a school board is, it treats white people with more respect than it does Negroes.

3. The effectiveness of court suits.--Here we have few data of value since none of the eight cities saw a suit carried all the way into court. Six suits were filed in five cities, but two of them (Newark and San Francisco) were settled out of court and the other four (San Francisco, St. Louis, Lawndale, and Bay City) never came to a hearing. Of these, the first three will apparently never go into court. These suits seem to have died for different reasons. The one in St. Louis became outdated when the school system abolished bussing in contained units. The San Francisco suit was apparently considered to have doubtful legal merit. It was a suit asking the court to order the schools to act to eliminate de facto segregation. The Lawndale suit seemed to have somewhat better chances, however, and we have no explanation for the NAACP's refusal to pursue this one. It is difficult to see what the civil rights movement has gained from these suits. The open enrollment plan adopted in Newark can hardly be considered a major victory, and it probably could have been obtained more easily by direct action. It is true that the suit provides a vehicle for communication between the opposing parties. This was especially true in San Francisco, where Judge Zirpoli was able to prod the parties into negotiations.

If the courts were to take a clear position on the de facto segregation issue, this might clarify the issue in the minds of the school board members and simplify negotiations. However, it may be very difficult for the courts to arrive at such a position.

The filing of the suit works to the disadvantage of the civil rights movement and to the advantage of the school board, since it tends to discourage other action. Either party can claim to be waiting for the outcome of the suit. In several cities the filing of the suit brought other demonstrations to a halt.

The petition to the state department of education serves the same sort of function as a court suit, although state departments vary in their legal authority. In Buffalo, the petition to Commissioner Allen brought very quick results for the civil rights movement.

4. The school boycott.--The school boycott is the heaviest artillery in the civil rights movement's arsenal. We should distinguish again between the strike, which is of indefinite duration, and the boycott. The strike is a very powerful and very effective weapon. In the two cases where it was either threatened (Central Junior High School) or used (the Hawthorne-Peshine transfer), it seemed to be very effective. The school boycott is a different sort of tactic. In one way, it seems to be a purely symbolic weapon; it may represent some slight loss of funds in state aid, depending upon the accounting system for the average daily attendance formula, but this is usually not mentioned and hence is of no importance. Otherwise the boycott, like any other demonstration, is an attempt to embarrass the board. It also has the function of demonstrating the support within the community for the civil rights movement. People are "voting with their feet." We noted earlier that one reason why the civil rights organization is not as effective as the community group is that its base of support is not as obvious. By holding a successful boycott, the movement makes the entire Negro community the protagonist in its fight. In terms of bargaining, however, the disadvantage of using the boycott is that

it is the heaviest artillery. Once the school board has survived it, it knows that it has nothing worse to fear. Another disadvantage of the school boycott is that it is difficult for the Negro school board members to support it. If they do, they can be criticized for condoning truancy.

Actually, by the time a boycott is held, the only hope for the civil rights movement is that additional actors will be brought into the situation. This is in fact what happened in the second Bay City boycott when the State Advisory Commission was appointed. In Buffalo, the school boycott may have been an effort to persuade State Commissioner James Allen to intervene.

The Tactics of the School Board

The citizens committee.--Only two cities, St. Louis and Lawndale, used the citizens committee. In both cases, the report presented was "liberal." In St. Louis this was principally because the committee was predominantly liberal. In Lawndale, however, the committee was expected to deliver a conservative report and it did not. (The board rejected the committee recommendations.) We think that this case fits our general thesis also. Unlike the school board, the citizens committee has not been embarrassed by picketing, it has no reason to feel defensive, it is insulated from the superintendent's educational philosophy. The committee must prepare a report, and its choice is between recommending the adoption of programs advocated by the civil rights movement and advocating nothing. It seems very likely in this situation that it will not go to either extreme and hence will recommend some limited number of steps to the school board. This is enough to have the report labeled as "liberal" by the civil rights leadership. But this is only deductive reasoning, and we have only the two cases in our sample with which to check our conclusion.

Tactics for suppressing segregationist opposition.--As we noted earlier, none of the school boards had difficulty suppressing segregationist opposition after an integration program had been adopted. The

two cities which were confronted with this problem (Baltimore and St. Louis) handled this opposition in essentially the same way--by mobilizing the support of the community elites, acting with as much unanimity as possible, and pressing the integration program through at a fairly rapid rate. In 1954, when Baltimore was faced with the problem of integrating its schools, the mayor appointed one of the city's most influential citizens to the school board presidency. When the board adopted its new policy statement in September, 1963, the resolution was presented, not by a Negro, or a college professor, or a Jew, but by the board's only Protestant businessman. In this way the board was able to indicate that the policy had the support of the mainstream of the white community. In both Baltimore and St. Louis the affected communities were given opportunity to protest, but in both cases the decision was taken late in the summer so that the issue was nearly a fait accompli by the time these hearings were held. The effect of all this was to make the segregationists feel that they were a minority among whites. In St. Louis the protest groups may also have been influenced by the fact that the Negro board members voted against the various resolutions adopted by the board. This made it clear that the board's new policy represented the intention of whites and was not simply a capitulation to the Negroes.

Summary

In this chapter we have described the school integration issue. To summarize the discussion very briefly, we have advanced the following series of hypotheses.

1. The demand for school integration comes from either the NAACP (or other civil rights groups) or from the residents of integrated neighborhoods. Demands tend not to come from all-Negro neighborhood groups or from the Negro political or civic elites.
2. If the demand comes from the NAACP, it will tend to be general in tone. If the demand for integration comes from an integrated neighborhood,

it will grow out of the community's concern for maintaining integrated schools in order to prevent the flight of whites.

3. The goals of the civil rights leadership can be seen as either "welfare" goals or "symbolic" goals. White liberals and Negro community leaders tend to hold welfare goals, while Negro civil rights leaders tend to hold "symbolic" goals. Persons who hold "welfare" goals are concerned with the education of individual Negro children, thus they support compensatory education. They favor integration because they believe it beneficial to the student, thus they hold to the (long-range) goal of completely eliminating segregated schools. Leaders with "symbolic" goals are concerned with elimination of racial discrimination and with establishing racial equality as a major community value. Thus these leaders are not so concerned with compensatory education and tend to evaluate an integration program not merely on the basis of the number of students involved but according to whether the school system has demonstrated its acceptance of the principle of racial equality. These leaders may be more conservative in their use of demonstration than are "welfare"-oriented leaders.

4. Since traditional civil rights groups tend to have "symbolic" goals, while the Negro community as a whole must hold both symbolic and welfare-oriented goals, the civil rights movement can best be understood, not as the representative of the Negro community but as a special interest group which is concerned with a limited range of social problems. While this occasionally leads to conflict between community interests and civil rights concerns, the civil rights movement can usually depend upon the Negro community for support.

5. The response of the school superintendent to the civil rights movement frequently contains three elements: (a) an insistence that the only morally correct position is strict nondiscrimination (color blindness) and that efforts to intentionally integrate schools are improper for this reason; (b) an insistence on a narrow definition of the function of the school which stresses "educational" rather than "social" values, and

hence sees integration as outside the school's province; and (c) an unwillingness to engage in serious discussion of the issue with "lay" persons, and an extreme defensiveness in the face of criticism.

6. The school superintendent's narrow and defensive ideology may have its roots in the need of the educator to protect himself from the criticism and the interference of the community and also in the fact that big city school superintendents tend to be from very low status (and frequently rural) backgrounds.

7. In the northern cities studied, segregationist groups had difficulty organizing and were usually short lived. The strongest segregationist groups came into being when the school board was also opposed to integration. In general, the school board is able to muster community support for its position, regardless of whether its stand is pro- or anti-integration.

8. In seven of the eight cities, the school board, rather than the superintendent or the mayor, made the major decisions on the school integration issue.

9. The school board makes its decisions about integration in the absence of any guiding frame of reference or general educational philosophy. The decision is a difficult one for other reasons: The issue is highly symbolic, and hence vague; the civil rights movement does not state clearly what it wants; and there is a heavy moral tone which suggests the possibility of bitter conflict. This tension and ambiguity mean that the board's decision is heavily influenced by the subjective attitudes of the board members toward the civil rights issue in general.

10. There is one interesting exception to the general principal that the tactics used by the civil rights movement have little effect on what the board does. We find a general pattern that the board will be more likely to act if it is confronted by a neighborhood group than if it is dealing with civil rights organizations.

CHAPTER XI

SCHOOL SYSTEM ACQUIESCENCE

The Stages of the Decision Process

In the preceding chapter we presented a description of the school integration issue; in this chapter we shall use a comparative analysis of the eight cities to demonstrate two facts: first, that the behavior of the school board is largely independent of the extent of civil rights activity; second, that the outcome of the school integration issue is very largely dependent upon the character of the school board.

We are now in a position to construct the profile of the typical northern school integration controversy. The issue seems to divide itself into six stages. We can describe the controversies in all eight cities in terms of these stages.

Stage 1: appearance of the issue:--The desegregation issue does not arise in a vacuum. In each of our cities civil rights groups had previously made occasional statements, and in some cases there was a full-scale discussion of some issue. Usually these events were of minor importance or were far enough in the past to have little effect on the present negotiations. Some time after 1961, the issue was raised again. This time, however, the groups who presented the request were armed with the tactics developed by the southern civil rights movement and the legal precedent of the New Rochelle case. The initial demand was made by either a community group (Pittsburgh, Baltimore, St. Louis, Newark) or by a civil rights group, usually the NAACP. (The NAACP was active in every city, and was the most prominent civil rights group in most cases; in San Francisco and St. Louis, direct action groups were also heavily involved.) The demands may vary from concrete demands (don't put the boundaries around Vailsburg High School at that particular place) to procedural demands (prepare a report on de facto segregation) to highly symbolic ones (adopt a policy statement).

Stage 2: the rejection of the demands.--In most cases this initial complaint was rejected and in several cases the civil rights movement interpreted this as an insult. In St. Louis and Baltimore the board appointed committees to prepare reports on the question; in both cases the school administration released a report first which denied every charge made. In Bay City the board refused to make the requested policy statement. In Lawndale, the superintendent issued a statement affirming his previous position. In San Francisco the superintendent read his position paper in which he argued that there was no educationally feasible plan for increasing integration. In Newark the board refused to reconsider the Vailsburg school situation. Only in Buffalo and Pittsburgh did the board take a particularly sympathetic position to these first demands and only the Pittsburgh board actually did anything--they adopted an open enrollment plan at the next meeting. Following the argument developed in the preceding chapter, these initial rejections of demands are the result of three different factors: the delegation of authority to the superintendents, who are opposed to expanding the school's value system to include integration as a goal; the reluctance of the school board to deal with an issue which has not yet become very salient; and the school board's distrust or disapproval of the civil rights movement.

Stage 3: the first civil rights action.--The civil rights leadership next proceeds to call the issue to the board's attention more forcibly. In most cases this means threatening demonstrations. In Baltimore it meant preparing the report, threatening to release it to the press, and then threatening to bring suit. In Bay City the first school boycott was held. In Newark suit was filed. The effect of these first demonstrations was to make it clear that the issue would not be a transient one, and that the board would soon be forced to take a clear public position on the issue.

Stage 4: the key response.--At this point, the school board makes a response which we call the key response simply because it sets the tone for almost all the later actions. (Bay City does not fit this model

because the boycott put off negotiation temporarily.) In most cases, the body which makes this decision (except in Newark, the school board) makes all later ones as well. The actions taken at this point tended to be more favorable to the civil rights movement than anything the board did previously. In St. Louis the Maher report was more favorable than the earlier administration report; similarly, the Baltimore board began to look like it would not support Superintendent Brain's position. Newark adopted open enrollment in order to settle the suit out of court. In San Francisco the board agreed to close the proposed Central Junior High School. In Buffalo and Lawndale, however, the board rejected the demands of the civil rights movement. In Pittsburgh, where the school integration issue is still building, the key response will probably turn out to be the adoption of the limited high school transfer plan in 1965. (Since the negotiations are still going on at this writing, we will not use Pittsburgh as an example in our discussion of stages of the process.)

Stage 5: escalation and resolution.--By its action, the board has taken a position, and in the eyes of the civil rights movement "has shown its true colors." If the board has begun to acquiesce to the demands made of it, continued demonstrations will be accompanied by negotiations until additional concessions are made. Three things can happen: the civil rights leadership will be satisfied and drop the issue; the school board can publicize certain concessions which will tend to satisfy the general Negro community leaders or the Negro community as a whole, thus cutting off the movement's grass roots support; or the civil rights movement will remain dissatisfied, but will be unable to find a particular issue to focus on. In this last case, the issue will remain dormant for a period of time, only to spring up again later. Baltimore is the best example of the first case, when the leadership is satisfied; St. Louis is a good example of the second case, when the Negro community withdraws its support of the movement; and San Francisco and Newark are cases where the issue was resolved, but only temporarily.

In the remaining cities the issue was not resolved. Here demonstrations in protest of the board's position increased in intensity; in some cases they were not directed so much to bringing about negotiations, but were efforts to embarrass and therefore punish the board for its failure. Since the position of the civil rights leadership tends to be directed toward bringing the board members to a position supporting racial equality, it defines those board members who do not respond as immoral; since they are immoral, they should be punished. The board may reply in similar language, attempting to define the protestors as themselves lacking in moral qualities; they may for example, emphasize that the movement is made up of beatniks, Communists, or just "troublemakers"--each phrase invoking an image of immorality. At this point the issue has escalated beyond a point of resolution, and in principle this state of affairs could continue indefinitely.

It is interesting to note that the comparison of the case studies suggests that demonstrations, once they have succeeded in raising the issue, have little effect on the board's behavior. The board has committed itself in what we have called the "key" response and continues on this line thereafter. If the key response was favorable to the movement, then continued low-pressure demonstrations will be sufficient to extract the additional concessions which the movement wants. But if the initial response was not favorable, more intensified demonstrations will do little to change the public attitude of the board. Additional concessions will be given grudgingly if at all. However, the increased pressure may have the important effect of bringing other actors onto the scene. The second boycott in Bay City resulted in state intervention, for example. Similarly, it was rumored that large-scale demonstrations in Buffalo would have caused State Commissioner Allen to intervene. (The demonstrations flopped, but the commissioner did take action when the Buffalo NAACP petitioned his office formally.)

Stage 6: introduction of new actors.--If the state commissioner or some other new actor enters the picture, the issue is drastically redefined. In Buffalo he came in on the side of the integrationists. But he

has much more powerful resources at his command. His presence also redefines the negotiation process. The board is no longer negotiating with the civil rights movement, but with a figure of authority. Thus the board is provided with a new frame of reference. If integration is necessary in order to conform to state law, then few school boards will oppose integration. The entry of the state (or federal) authority is also gratifying to the civil rights movement. The school board has taken an immoral stand; the state has rebuked them for it. Higher authority has recognized the principal of racial equality. It does not matter a great deal that subordinate bodies do not accept the value of integration as long as it is clear that they will not be able to exercise final authority. For this reason, it may be to the school board's advantage to encourage state or federal intervention. The school board will sacrifice some freedom, but it is not obvious that they will regret the loss.


Civil Rights Activity and Acquiescence

We are now ready to begin examining the intercorrelations between these various factors in a systematic fashion. The basic technique we will use throughout this report is to show graphically the relationship between two variables by ranking the cities on each variable and plotting the correlation as a "scatter diagram." In order to capture the element of "tone" in the response of school boards, we will define a special variable called acquiescence. Acquiescence can be thought of as the extent to which the school board acted to bring the civil rights movement closer to its goals, both "welfare" and "symbolic." Thus acquiescence must consist of two elements: actions taken to further integration or upgrade education for Negroes and actions which recognize the value of racial equality and the legitimacy of the civil rights movement. Acquiescence can be defined for any particular period of time, but throughout most of the study we will define it for the entire period from the first raising of the issue to

the time of our interviewing.¹ This rank ordering, like most of those to be presented in this report, is subjective. In this case it was developed by first having the interviewers fill out a questionnaire summarizing the actions taken by the school system. Armed with these questionnaires, the staff met several times to clarify the definition of acquiescence and agree upon a rank ordering. We cannot demonstrate with "hard" numerical data that this is the correct rank ordering; instead, we will describe in detail the basis for this ranking of the cities.²

¹This time period does not include the 1965 controversy in Pittsburgh, nor the integration plan adopted by Buffalo that year.

²Since this use of "subjective" ratings of the cities on variables may properly be considered suspect, we should perhaps point out how this differs from more conventional techniques of analysis. In any analysis we are concerned with the correlation between two variables, which we shall call A and B. Ordinarily, we measure A and B with "indicators." Indicators are usually measures taken from a questionnaire or from some other "hard" source of data, so that there is little opportunity for bias to enter the analysis. However, the indicator is very frequently not an exact measure of the variable with which we are concerned. Furthermore, it is usually impossible to know what the true relationship between the indicator and the variable is. And bias does enter, in an important way, in the choice of indicator. Once the indicators which connect the two variables are agreed upon, routine statistical analysis can be used from this point on. Schematically, the result is shown in the accompanying figure.



The existence of a correlation between A and B can be assumed only if there is a correlation between the two indicators; there is a high correlation between the two indicators and the two variables which they are assumed to measure; A and B are unbiased indicators. There is relatively little opportunity for the investigator's bias to enter, but there is a good deal of opportunity for unknown bias and error. The result is that

First, let us consider our ranking of cities based only upon the specific actions taken. We were unable to arrive at a complete rank ordering and were forced to permit some ties. In particular, it was difficult to distinguish between the two cities which seemed to have done the most to meet the specific demands of the civil rights movement, and the two cities which have done the least. Our ranking is as follows; for each city we have listed the factors which seem most important in locating the city on the scale.

- 1-2. Baltimore and St. Louis are tied for most acquiescent. Baltimore's large-scale increases in bussing, its total elimination of double shift, and its expansion of open enrollment qualify it for first place; St. Louis' integration of the bussing program greatly increased the amount of integration. In addition St. Louis increased teacher integration, adopted open enrollment, and has a widely publicized and apparently successful compensatory education project.
3. Pittsburgh, which began limited bussing, adopted open enrollment, and has a highly regarded compensatory education program. We rank Pittsburgh below Baltimore and St. Louis because the number of students affected by desegregation actions is not as large as in the other two cities.
4. San Francisco met the specific demands of the movement by closing Central Junior High School and building schools as requested. However, it did not adopt any general program which increased integration as the first three cities did.

it is usually very difficult to make any statement about the size of the true correlation between A and B; even if the correlation between A and B is high, we can expect the use of the two indicators to give us a much lower measured correlation; on the other hand, a low measured correlation could be the result of bias or some other error, without a real correlation between A and B.

We have chosen to approach this problem in a different way. We have not used indicators, but have instead measured subjectively the magnitude of the real variables and performed our analysis with these subjective measures. This procedure should increase the amount of bias but decrease the other kinds of errors. In our judgment the technique we have used is preferable for this particular problem, but of course we cannot prove that this is a better procedure.

5. Newark, which adopted open enrollment and met the specified demands to reassign the students from the Hawthorne school, has done little else to further integration. Like San Francisco, its program of bussing to relieve overcrowding has not figured directly in the integration issue. It also has not met various criticisms of education in Negro schools.
6. It is difficult to distinguish among the last three cities, all of which have refused some demands made but have also made other concessions. Buffalo refused to integrate the Woodlawn School, but did integrate other elementary and high schools. (It adopted open enrollment after our interviewing was completed.) Lawndale refused to adjust the boundaries of Woodside or permit transfers into it, but it did adopt an open enrollment plan. Bay City publicly refused all demands, but in fact was bussing Negroes into integrated schools to relieve overcrowding. Of the three, we rank Buffalo highest. This give us the ranking shown in Table XI.1

TABLE XI.1

RANKING OF CITIES ON SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN TO MEET CIVIL RIGHTS DEMANDS

<u>Ranking</u> ^a	<u>Name of City</u>
1-2	Baltimore, St. Louis
3	Pittsburgh
4	San Francisco
5	Newark
6	Buffalo
7-8	Lawndale, Bay City

^aRanking is from 1, most action taken, to 8, least action.

We next attempted to rank the cities according to the "tone" of the board's behavior. This was more difficult to do, and in fact the final ranking on tone was little different from that on "action." Tone is mostly dependent upon the public and private statements of the board members or other decision makers to the civil rights leadership. Our ranking contains two ties.

- 1-2. Both Pittsburgh and Baltimore reacted to the movement in highly positive ways. However, we considered that Pittsburgh took some action without being prodded, and that Baltimore's administration was hostile during the first days of the negotiations. Therefore, we placed Pittsburgh ahead of Baltimore.
- 3-4. We found it difficult to distinguish between St. Louis and San Francisco, both of whom took a generally pro-integration stance, but were also publicly critical of the civil rights movement. However, we felt that San Francisco's refusal to oppose Proposition 14 was sufficient to place it below St. Louis.
- 5,6,7. Newark's board was generally unfriendly to the civil rights movement, but not in a very aggressive way. It remained graciously silent most of the time. Buffalo, on the other hand, alternated between some strong anti-civil rights statements from some of the board members and strong pro-integration statements from the superintendent. Lawndale took a firm anti-civil rights position, but was not critical of the civil rights leadership. We found it impossible to distinguish among the three cities and left them tied.
8. A review of the case study indicated clearly that Bay City qualified for this position.

The final ranking is shown in Table XI.2. Our final ranking of acquiescence is simply the weighted average of these two rankings. As Figure XI.1 indicates, there is a strong correlation between the two. Whether this was caused by our inability to separate the two factors or by the natural correlation between public attitude and public behavior is difficult to say. The most acquiescent cities are simply those with the lowest ranking on both scales, and they appear in the upper right-hand corner of Figure XI.1. The combined ranking appears in Table XI.3.

After considerable discussion, we were unable to agree upon the ranking of the first two cities, and left them tied in the ranking.³

³ If we sum the two rankings of "action" and "tone," Baltimore has a combined score of $1 \frac{1}{2} + 2 = 3 \frac{1}{2}$, compared with Pittsburgh's $3 + 1 = 4$. However, this simple summing is not satisfactory, since it assumes that the intervals between ranks are equal, and that each factor would have equal weight. Fortunately, the correlation between the two factors is so high that almost any set of plausible assumptions about how to combine the two factors would produce the same rank ordering in the other six cases.

TABLE XI.2

RANKING OF CITIES ON "TONE" OF RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

<u>Ranking</u>	<u>Name of City</u>
1	Pittsburgh
2	Baltimore
3	St. Louis
4	San Francisco
5,6,7	Newark, Buffalo, Lawndale
8	Bay City

TABLE XI.3

RANKING OF CITIES ON ACQUIESCENCE SCALE

<u>Ranking</u>	<u>Name of City</u>
1-2	Pittsburgh, Baltimore
3	St. Louis
4	San Francisco
5	Newark
6	Buffalo
7	Lawndale
8	Bay City

Now let us look at some of the relationships among the stages of the decision process as we have described it. First, let us define the "key response" in each city and look at the effect of civil rights action on the key response and on final acquiescence. The key response is the first response made by the school board after civil rights has been defined as an issue of importance. In keeping with this, we chose the following incidents: each of these incidents can be ranked in order of their degree of acquiescence and we have done so in the following list.




Figure XI.1.--Components of Acquiescence

Note: Cities are indicated by their initials. Some cities appear on the line between two rows because they are tied with another city in one of the rankings.

1. Pittsburgh: adoption of open enrollment after hearing parents' testimony
2. Baltimore: decision by ad hoc committee to eliminate districting (June, 1963)
3. San Francisco: decision to close Central Junior High School (August, 1962)
4. Newark: adoption of open enrollment to settle suit (January, 1962)
5. St. Louis: receipt and adoption in general terms of Maher committee report (June, 1963)
6. Lawndale: refusal to change Woodside boundaries (January, 1961)
7. Bay City: fruitless discussion of de facto segregation prior to the first boycott (June, 1963).
8. Buffalo: designation of Woodlawn School boundaries (March, 1963).

It should be noted that in most cases the action taken in the "key response" plays only a partial role in determining the final level of acquiescence for the city.

We noted earlier that the key response seems to depend upon the civil rights movement acting forcefully enough to make it clear that the issue will have to be resolved, but that otherwise the response is relatively independent of the level of civil rights demonstrations. We ranked the eight cities on the level of civil rights activity preceding the key response.⁴

⁴The ranking is as follows:

Civil Rights Activity Prior to Key Response

- 1.^a St. Louis: street demonstrations, partial boycott
2. Newark: suit filed
3. San Francisco: threats of suits and boycotts
- 4-5. Bay City and Buffalo: threat of boycotts
6. Baltimore: threat of public release of Seven Years report
7. Lawndale: testimony of NAACP
8. Pittsburgh: testimony of parents' group.

^aHighest activity level.

In Figure XI.2 we see that there is no correlation between the prior amount of civil rights activity and the willingness of the board to acquiesce in its key response. For one reason why this is so, consider the difference between Newark and Pittsburgh. Both adopted open enrollment. In the one case the action was criticized; in the other it was accepted. In Newark it seems clear that open enrollment was accomplished only because of the court suit, but the fact that it took a suit to get it left a bitter taste in the mouths of some of the NAACP leadership. On the other hand, the decision in Pittsburgh was unanticipated, and therefore doubly pleasant. Given our definition of the symbolic goals of the movement, this is as it should be. That demonstrations are required is evidence of the school board's unwillingness to endorse integration. Therefore, the more one demonstrates, the more likely it is that the school board will capitulate, but the less value their capitulation will have in paying homage to racial equality as a community value. Demonstrations both encourage and prevent acquiescence. Actually, this is only a minor part of the story. In general there is simply no correlation between the level of civil rights activity and action taken by the board. San Francisco agreed to close Central Junior High School under considerable public pressure; under much less pressure the Baltimore board did more. Presumably neither of these cities would have acted without some pressure from the movement, but how much pressure seems irrelevant.

Let us now move to the next phase, which we have called the period of escalation and resolution. What effect does the key response have on this period? In Figure XI.3 we have plotted the acquiescence of the key response against the level of civil rights activity following the response.⁵

⁵Our ranking of level of civil rights activity in the period immediately following the key response is as follows, from highest to lowest:

1. Bay City: two boycotts, sit-ins, etc.
2. Buffalo: demonstrations, a boycott, and a petition to the state department of education
3. St. Louis: some picketing, threat of boycott
4. San Francisco: testimony, threat of pursuing suit
5. Baltimore: threaten suit
6. Lawndale: testimony
- 7-8. Pittsburgh and Newark: no action

The correlation, as one might anticipate, is negative and of respectable magnitude. The cities which were acquiescent thereby earned themselves a period of grace; those which had refused to take action were punished accordingly. The deviant case which keeps this correlation from being higher is Lawndale. One factor which may have prevented civil rights activity there was the superintendent's retirement and the board's involvement in the selection of his successor. (If this one case is eliminated, the correlation becomes $-.81$.) However, this is not a satisfactory answer for Lawndale; like Newark, the other "satellite city," there was never a very high level of civil rights activity there. (Newark is the other city which falls below the line.)

On the basis of this finding, we might expect the school desegregation issue to behave in a cyclic manner in these cities. The cities which initially acquiesce avoid further demonstrations and hence can avoid further concessions, while the initially unresponsive cities are subjected to more demonstrations. Later these cities respond to the demonstrations by becoming more acquiescent, and the demonstrations will shift back to the cities which have rested on their laurels. In the long run, all cities become target for demonstrations, and all cities acquiesce. This is in part true, in the sense that at this time there is not quite as wide a divergence between the most and least acquiescent cities as there once was. But this is a minor part of the story; in general, cities which are acquiescent at the beginning remain most acquiescent.

In Figure XI.4 we have plotted the acquiescence of the key response against the final acquiescence scale developed in detail earlier. The correlation between the two ratings is very high. Two deviant cases lie above the diagonal, while the rest are very near it. The deviant cities are St. Louis and Buffalo. St. Louis lies above the line because at the time of the key response, it was still unclear whether the board intended to take action or not. In retrospect, it seems likely that action would have been taken under almost any condition; that Trafford Maher had been asked to




Figure XI.4.--Relationship of Board's Key Response to Its Final Level of Acquiescence

head the citizens committee should have been a tip-off to this. The other case, Buffalo, is simply unstable because of the delicate balance of power between the liberal superintendent and the more conservative school board, and because of changes in the composition of the board.

Thus we see that the acquiescence of the school board is determined almost at the very beginning of the decision process. It follows as a corollary that the extent of civil rights activity has relatively little influence on the degree to which the school system meets the demands made. Rather, the extent of acquiescence determines the level of activity, as we have seen. In Table XI.4 we have summarized the total civil rights activity over the entire period of the decision,⁶ and in Figure XI.5 we have plotted this against the level of acquiescence. Civil rights activity includes various types of demonstrations, testimony and threats of demonstrations, and court suits and petitions to other authorities.

We see that the general negative correlation persists; nonacquiescent cities are faced with the most activity. The correlation is not especially high. More important, there is no single deviant case which can be singled out as lowering the correlation. Throughout the middle range of the figure, there is considerable free variation. Apparently the civil rights activity is not wholly determined by the behavior of the board. (In Chapter XIV we will return to this table and try to locate the factors which cause this unexplained variation.)

That civil rights activity tends to be caused by acquiescence, rather than the other way around, supports our thesis that the civil rights movement is concerned with symbols of "interracial morality"; we might think of the demonstrations as attempts to punish the board for its "sinful" behavior. This may in part explain why the later stages of the decision process in some nonacquiescent cities take on the character of a war, in which punishing the "enemy" becomes more important than anything else.

⁶It is difficult to arrive at this ranking of cities in total level of civil rights activity, simply because we must necessarily compare apples and oranges in the process. (How many boycotts are equal to a court suit?)

TABLE XI.4

RANKING OF CITIES ON TOTAL AMOUNT OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVITY^a

Ranking	Name of City	Amount of Civil Rights Activity
1	Bay City	Sit-ins, vigils, street marches, two boycotts, election activity
2	San Francisco	Two suits (one settled, one dropped), intense but sporadic demonstrations
3	Buffalo	No suit, but petition to state commissioner of education, one boycott and one threat of a boycott, limited other demonstrations
4-5	St. Louis and Lawndale	St. Louis threatened a suit, held a limited boycott, threatened a general boycott, and held a street demonstration Lawndale did not engage in very much direct action but did file a suit and conducted a well-organized election campaign
6	Newark	Settled suit out of court, and in one neighborhood boycotted a school
7	Baltimore	Threatened a suit, prepared reports
8	Pittsburgh	Prepared reports, testified

^aRanking is from 1, most activity, to 8, least activity.

In the nonacquiescent cities, the later demonstrations have little effect on the board. Probably this is because the situation has then escalated into a warlike situation in which the original goals lose priority. These later demonstrations may be effective only if they succeed in involving additional actors (such as state officials in the cases of Buffalo and Bay City) or in changing the composition of the board (as was attempted in Lawndale).




Figure XI.5.--Relationship between Acquiescence and Amount of Civil Rights Activity

Of course, we are neglecting the effect of demonstrations in one city on the national climate and on other cities. Certainly, the presence of heated demonstrations in other cities is a spur to cities like Pittsburgh. In this sense the object lesson is a clear one. Consider Figure XI.6, which plots the acquiescence of the city against the length of time the civil rights activity continued. This figure makes it clear that non-acquiescent boards pay a price. And this time there is no unexplained variance; the rank order correlation is almost perfect.⁷ This is, of course, as it should be. We think that the criteria we have used to measure acquiescence are the same as those used by the civil rights movement in deciding whether to continue demonstrations.

This also helps clarify the low correlation between acquiescence and amount of civil rights activity (Figure XI.5). The low correlation is not due to unexpected differences in the duration of civil rights activity but to unexplained variation in the intensity of the action during the time spent protesting.

We can summarize the data shown in these figures with the following two hypotheses:

⁷Our ranking of the extent to which demonstrations continued after the board had taken action is as follows:

- 1-2. In Pittsburgh and Baltimore there was almost an abrupt end to civil rights activity. (The issue reappeared in Pittsburgh in 1965, but this cannot be considered a continuation of the earlier decision.)
3. In St. Louis demonstrations were attempted during the fall of 1963, but these hardly got off the ground.
4. In Newark activity stopped only to spring up again in another part of the city the following year.

The other four cities are still active, and it is not clear how much longer they will continue.

5. San Francisco continued action but on a sporadic basis.
6. Lawndale has had a high level of activity in attempting to unseat the school board members but between elections little has happened.
- 7-8. Buffalo and Bay City have both continued civil rights activity on a continuous basis. Our prediction is that it will continue longer in Bay City, where demonstrations did not reach their peak until the fall of 1965.




Figure XI.6.--Effect of Acquiescence on Duration of Civil Rights Activity

1. The acquiescence of the school system is determined to a large extent at the beginning of the decision process. It is not greatly affected by the amount of civil rights activity which takes place.

2. The amount of civil rights activity is, however, partly caused by the board response--the less the school system acquiesces, the longer the civil rights activity will persist.

The Acquiescent School Board

We are now ready to begin tracing out the causes of the differences between our cities. We shall approach this problem with a conceptual scheme which can be summarized as follows: In the final analysis, a decision is made by the group of men who have the legal authority to make it. They make the decision in the way they do because of the kind of men they are and the kind of pressures which are operating on them.

In this case the final authority for the decision lies with the school board. They must determine what the issue is, decide upon their range of alternatives, evaluate the pressures operating on them, and make a decision. Our task is to sort out these factors and decide which ones make important differences. All this is conceptually a simple process. The problems arise from the large number of components, all interacting simultaneously. We have sketched the main components in Figure XI.7.

The solid lines in the figure represent communication between the incumbents in the various positions, and also perceptions of attitudes between actors who are unable to communicate. The dashed lines represent the recruitment of actors to fill the positions. Let us look first at the solid lines, which represent channels of possible influence. The most important influence on the school board comes from the civil rights movement. While the civil rights movement is trying to influence the board to acquiesce to their demands, the board is also trying to influence the movement to cease demonstrations. Thus we should have a continuous negotiation process between these two actors. But the board is limited in




Figure XI.7. --Flow Chart of Recruitment of Decision Makers in School Integration Decision, and Channels of Influence Operating on Them

its possible range of action by influences from the political and economic leaders, by the influence of the superintendent of schools, and by its perception of what the Negro and white voters in the community will accept. The kinds of influence which these actors will exert on the board will depend upon a host of factors: the importance of racial peace, the history of previous racial negotiations in other areas of the community, and the balance of political power, to cite three. We can then trace the chain of causation back one more step, by observing that the kinds of pressure, exerted (the solid lines) will depend upon the kinds of economic elites, politicians, and voters who are present in the city. This is presumably a function of the background characteristics of the city--the kind of industry, the character of the population, and the formal rules for electing political leaders.

Given this conception of the political process, the background characteristics of the city--its industrial structure, population composition, and its formal rules for electing city officials--affect the behavior of the school board in three different ways. First, they determine the types of economic elites, voters, and politicians the city will have, and hence the way in which these groups will attempt to influence the school board. Second, by influencing the types of actors in these roles, they, in turn, influence the recruitment process for the school board, and hence the kind of board members the city has. Third, these background factors influence the relationship between the economic elites, voters, and politicians and hence set a pattern for the amount of influence exerted by each group on both the recruitment process for the school board and the actual school integration decision. For example, a city with a high status population will presumably be more liberal in racial matters, but in addition, a high status city will have a public opinion which will not permit political appointments to the school board. Or, to cite a different causal factor, a city with nonpartisan elections and a strong civil service might have weaker political parties; hence the school board might be more susceptible to influence by the mass of voters.

If we attempt to trace out the ways in which the character of the city might affect the behavior of the civil rights movement, we complete the flow chart of Figure XI.7. Ultimately, the behavior of the civil rights movement and the school board can be traced to a "final cause" (for our purposes) in the economy, population, and governmental charter of the city. But the flow chart with its thirty-five lines of direct influence and indirect influence through recruitment, indicates that there may be as many as one hundred ways in which these factors affect the behavior of the school board. And of course the chart is not complete. There are other structural relationships--e.g., the influence of the white economic elites on their Negro counterparts is not shown. There are also factors which cannot easily be represented in the flow chart--e.g., the influence of recent history on the actors. The model pictured is that of an influence system in equilibrium, where the influences balance each other out in such a way that there is no change. If there were change, we would have to allow for actors who are being influenced by the way things used to be.

We have painted a picture of a process which is hopelessly complex. Fortunately, the bulk of these possible chains of causation are of no importance. In the first part of this chapter we discussed the goals of the civil rights movement, and from this discussion developed a definition of the key variable--acquiescence. We then found that the tactics of the civil rights movement had relatively little effect on the rank ordering of the cities by acquiescence, and in particular the amount of civil rights activity had no discernible effect. We also accumulated some evidence to show that usually the superintendent had little effect on the final acquiescence score and observed that we could find little evidence of any direct and effective influence on the school board from the political or economic elites. If we are right, the solid lines in Figure XI.7 can be largely dropped from consideration. Most important, we can avoid any complex analysis of the board-civil rights movement negotiation process and partition the flow chart into two separate figures--one showing the factors which influence the board and the other showing the factors influencing the civil rights movement.

We shall next attempt to demonstrate that such a partitioning can be made. First, we shall show that some of the factors which could be expected to correlate with acquiescence if certain influences were operating in fact do not correlate, or do not correlate well. Then we will show that a factor which is not directly related to the kinds of influence the board is subjected to does explain most of the variation.

If the school board were directly influenced by the power of the civil rights movement, then we would assume that the ultimate currency in political influence--the vote--would play a role. Presumably the school board will be most strongly influenced if the civil rights movement is backed by a large block of Negro votes. In Figure XI.8 we have correlated acquiescence with a ranking of the cities by percentage of Negroes living in each city. There is a correlation: the cities with the largest Negro populations are most likely to have acquiescent school boards. The correlation is not very good, however. Four of the cities lie on the main diagonal, but four lie some distance away from it. The correlation is actually a little worse than it looks, for the only sharp break in the percentage Negro comes between the cities which rank fourth and fifth in percentage Negro, Pittsburgh (17 per cent Negro) and Lawndale (28 per cent Negro). But Pittsburgh is very high on the acquiescence scale, and Lawndale very low. (It may be that Lawndale is in a state of political instability, and the the present nonacquiescent board will be replaced by a more acquiescent one in the future.) The size of the Negro population does have an effect, but it is not a very large one.

Possibly one reason why percentage Negro does not correlate so well is that the cities with the largest Negro populations have more anti-Negro sentiment among whites. We cannot test this hypothesis directly, but we can look at it indirectly in two ways. The hypothesis is that the pressure from a large Negro population is offset by the stronger anti-Negro sentiment among whites which results from having a larger Negro population. We have no direct measure of the attitudes of whites in each city, but the indirect evidence indicates that the school system is not affected by the




Figure XI.8.--Percentage of Population Negro and Acquiescence

attitudes of the white population. In Figure XI.9 we have divided the cities according to region. There is little consistency, and what pattern is present seems to make no sense. The data indicate that the four cities in the far west and northeast are least acquiescent, and the cities in the border region most acquiescent.

We can also look at the socio-economic level of the cities. High status persons are less prejudiced, so that boards in high status cities should be most acquiescent. The data do not support this, either. Figure XI.10, which plots the percentage of the white population who are high school graduates against acquiescence, shows a weak correlation in the opposite direction.

So apparently we are correct in arguing, as we did in the preceding chapter, that the board operated independently of the attitudes of the white population. This is reasonable, of course, since they have no way of determining what those attitudes are.

Race Liberalism

On the basis of these three figures, this approach of searching for community factors which might influence the board does not seem very efficient. Let us instead work backwards, beginning with the characteristics of the board and exploring their cause. The most obvious characteristic is the liberalism of the board members on racial issues: their attitudes toward Negroes, civil rights, and the civil rights movement. We administered a questionnaire containing a series of agree-disagree questions dealing with attitudes toward race relations and other issues. We found that four of the five questions listed in Table XI.5 produced a useful scale. Of the five questions, only the first deals with a simple question of civil rights. Obviously, these school board members believe that whites do not have a "right" to segregated neighborhoods. They also reveal themselves to be much more liberal than the population at large. When a similar question was addressed to a national sample in 1963, only





Figure XI.9.--Region and Acquiescence



Ranking - Per Cent High School Graduates, among Whites

Figure XI.10.--Education of White Population and Acquiescence

43 per cent gave the liberal response. Questions 18, 26, and 27 all measure perceptions of the civil rights movement. The respondent is asked, in effect, whether the civil rights movement asks too much, demonstrates too much, or is uncompromising. Of course, there is no obviously "right" or "wrong" answer to these questions, but that does not concern us. We only want to know whether one person respects the civil rights movement more than another, without caring whether it deserves respect or not. Question 17 asks whether Negroes will learn more in integrated schools. Again, there does not seem to be any obviously correct answer.

TABLE XI.5

QUESTIONS USED TO MEASURE ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVIL RIGHTS

Question	Per Cent Saying "Dis- agree" or "Tend To Disagree"	N
7. White people have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and Negroes should respect that right	91	45
18. There is a problem with the civil rights movement because many Negroes are demanding privileges which whites do not have	68	44
17. There is no reason to think Negroes will learn more in integrated schools . . .	61	44
26. Most demonstrations have hurt the Negroes' cause more than they have helped . . .	57	42
27. In many cases, Negro leaders have not been willing to make reasonable compromises on civil rights issues	43	21

The five questions do seem to measure the same basic factor. People who give liberal responses to the "hard" questions such as whether Negro

leaders are willing to make reasonable compromises are almost certain to give liberal responses to the other, "easier" questions as well. This is indicated in Table XI.6, where the association between the items is indicated by a matrix of Yule's Q's.⁸ The fact that all the Q's are high indicates that all the questions tend to tap the same basic attitude.

One might also criticize the questions by arguing that civil rights movements vary from city to city. A school board member in a city with a militant civil rights movement might give a different answer from one in a more peaceful town without necessarily being more conservative. However, this does not seem to be the case. Most of the questions are worded so vaguely as to be nearly meaningless, and consequently it is very difficult to give an objective answer. In any case, this would not explain the fact that there is a high correlation between the answer to these three questions and the other two, which presumably have nothing to do with local conditions. In constructing the final liberalism scale we dropped question 17, which deals specifically with schools, in order to avoid contaminating the data with the actual experience a board member has had. (If he has helped to integrate schools, we might expect him to justify his action by saying that this is educationally beneficial.) This question also has the lowest correlations with the others. The remaining four questions, which have nothing to do with education directly, were then combined into a simple score for each respondent. He was given three points for each "disagree" response, two points each time he said "tend to disagree," one point if he only "tended to agree," and nothing if he "agreed." With four questions, this gave us a scale ranging from 0 to 12, 12 being the most liberal response possible. (If a person did not answer one question, his score was

⁸Q is a measure of the association which ranges from -1 to +1. It will be 0 if there is no relationship between the answers to one question and the answers to another. If it is +1, as it is in four places in the table, this means that everyone who gave a conservative response to the question numbered in the row [the "easy" question] gave a conservative response to the one numbered in the column [the "hard" question] and everyone who gave a liberal response to the "hard" question gave a liberal response to the "easy" one.

TABLE XI.6

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ITEMS OF RACE LIBERALISM SCALE (YULE'S Q)

Item	Item				
	7. White People Have...	18. There Is a Problem...	17. There Is No Reason...	26. Most Demonstrations..	27. In Many Cases, Negroes...
7. White people have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and Negroes should respect that right	-	1.00	.72	1.00	1.00 ^a
18. There is a problem with the civil rights movement because many Negroes are demanding privileges which whites do not have		-	.76	.82	.87 ^a
17. There is no reason to think Negroes will learn more in integrated schools			-	.57	1.00 ^a
26. Most demonstrations have hurt the Negroes' cause more than they have helped . .				-	.95 ^a
27. In many cases, Negro leaders have not been willing to make reasonable compromises on civil rights issues . .					-

NOTE: Item 17 was deleted from final scale.

^aThese Q's are based on nineteen or twenty cases. All other cells have forty-one to forty-two cases.

developed by extrapolating from the other persons who answered the other three questions the same way he did.) We shall simply refer to the scale as "race liberalism."

We intend to examine the relationship between the average "race liberalism" of the board and its level of acquiescence. To do this, however, we must first take into consideration the twenty-eight board members who for one reason or another did not fill out this questionnaire. We were able to solve this problem by independently estimating the scale score of everyone in the entire sample, without looking at the data. We found that we could do this rather easily, from other interview data and the voting record. The agreement between our estimate and the actual score for the forty-three board members who did respond is shown in Table XI.7.

TABLE XI.7

ACTUAL "RACE LIBERALISM" SCORES AND INTERVIEWER ESTIMATES OF RACE LIBERALISM

Interviewer Estimate	Actual Score			
	12-15	9-11	5-8	0-4
Liberal	8	11	3	0
Conservative	0	4	10	7

The amount of agreement is extremely high ($Q=+.93$), which means that we can estimate with considerable accuracy the position of other board members relative to those who filled out the questionnaire. We then used our estimated scores to locate the median person on each board--the person who fell in the center of the board and hence could be considered the "swing vote" to make up a liberal or a conservative majority. On the scale from 0 to 12, the medians varied from 9.0 for the most liberal board down to a low of 5.5.

In Figure XI.11 we have plotted median race liberalism against the acquiescence of the school board. At first glance, the correlation (.65) is disappointingly low. However, a second glance reveals an intriguing pattern. The three cities which fall below the line, being less acquiescent than we would expect from the race liberalism score, are all elected boards; the other five are all appointed. The correlation of liberalism with acquiescence is perfect among the three elected boards and the five appointed boards taken separately.

With only eight cases, we must proceed cautiously in our analysis. If we can assume that the elected boards are, because they are elected, less acquiescent, then we can conclude that the median race liberalism score of the board explains most if not all of the variations in acquiescence. Can we make this assumption about the effect of elections? It has a certain amount of plausibility. Certainly, if our analysis of Bay City is correct, the refusal of the board members to acquiesce is largely due to the fact that they are in a competition for the votes mobilized by Mrs. Smith. And in Lawndale, race was very much an issue in the school board elections.

In all three elected boards there was considerable internal friction--even in the elite-controlled St. Louis board. In our analysis of Lawndale we suggested that this tended to produce such serious differences in the board that the negotiation process was badly hampered. In St. Louis the wide differences in opinion, and the slightly different political bases of different board members, may have slowed the decision process so that the liberal actions taken did not have the tremendous impact on the civil rights movement they did in Baltimore or Pittsburgh. And in all three cities we believe that there was more thorough newspaper coverage, and hence a higher level of community interest. This also should have the effect of immobilizing the board, at least until an election like Bay City's could clarify the vote-getting appeal of the participants.




Figure XI.11.--Race Liberalism and Acquiescence

Note: (E) indicates an elected board

When we add to this picture the fact that the boards which were acquiescent--Baltimore and Pittsburgh--seem to be least concerned with representing the community, or with public opinion, we see that we have several reasons to believe that the same school board will take more acquiescent action if it is freed from having to participate in general elections. At the end of this chapter we shall present more evidence for this point of view.

If we then accept the premise that the correlation between election of the board and acquiescence is a true and causal relationship, then we can conclude that the race liberalism of the board is by far the dominant factor in explaining acquiescence.

This may seem altogether reasonable, but this finding does raise some disturbing questions. We would like to believe that the school board is somehow more than the sum of its parts, that the interaction of board members in the solution of school problems should cause a group consensus to develop which would play down the importance of the subjective attitudes of the board members. We would also like to believe that the negotiation process itself affects what the board does--that there are some ways of influencing the board which are more effective than others. Instead we are continuing to find the school integration negotiations virtually predetermined by factors outside the control of the competing parties.

Cohesion

We can support our argument that the correlation between board appointment (rather than election) and acquiescence is "real" in another way. We suggested two possible reasons: first, that the elected board is more conservative because it must face an election campaign. There is nothing we can do to prove or disprove that with our data. However, we also suggested that the elected board has more difficulty in taking innovative action because of the higher level of internal disagreement. If this is true, then appointed boards which have high internal disagreement

should also have difficulty taking acquiescent action. Certainly, there seems to be considerable difference between boards in their decision-making style. Some seem to handle an issue quietly and smoothly; others seem to be constantly involved in some difficult or tense situation. Several efforts were made to define a variable which would capture this difference. The final choice was "cohesion."

Cohesion (as used by Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 1950, for example) refers to the average level of positive feelings between the members of the group. It might be operationalized by asking each board member to give a numerical score to every other board member according to the extent of agreement (or friendliness) between them, and then averaging these values across every pair of board members. Thus a board would be lowest in cohesion if every board member disagreed with or disliked every other; it would be higher if the board were divided into two factions, with members on each side who support each other, but argue with the members of the other faction; and it would be fairly high if the board members agreed with each other with the exception of a single deviant whom all others disliked. With this criterion in mind, we were able to arrive at a rank ordering. There is a great deal of variation on this variable. At one extreme, we estimated that if two members were selected at random from one particular board, the chances would be two to one that they would disapprove of each other! Several boards are divided into a majority and minority faction, and three boards seem to have very little internal dissension.

The cities were ranked on cohesion using several pieces of data. School board members had been asked to name the board members they agreed with and disagreed with. They were also asked to evaluate the level of agreement. In addition, for each board we collected many public statements, some private statements of opinion about other board members, and records of votes on various issues.

There is a definite correlation between cohesion and acquiescence, as indicated by Figure XI.12. The least acquiescent elected board is the

least cohesive; and the least acquiescent appointed board is the least cohesive of its group. The two nonacquiescent elected boards (Lawndale and Bay City) are below average in cohesion. Thus this figure supports our argument that elected boards are less acquiescent because they are less cohesive.

Are there any grounds for supposing that there is in fact a causal relationship between cohesion and acquiescence? There are only two obvious incidents which were the result of dissension and clearly prevented acquiescence. One was Buffalo's handling of the Woodlawn situation, where the board members prepared four different plans and submitted them to the public, rather than agreeing privately on a single plan. The result was the building of sentiment for the Parlato recommendation. The other case was the inability of the Bay City board to vote for the policy statement drafted by Silverstein, despite the fact that three of the five board members favored it. Both these incidents were important--Bay City especially--and they came in the two boards with the lowest level of consensus. There is also a suggestion in San Francisco and Lawndale that the relatively low level of consensus there kept the boards from acting decisively. In San Francisco a board which frequently had difficulty taking action dragged its feet in responding to the civil rights movement. It seems plausible that this inability to act is partly a consequence of lack of consensus. In Lawndale there were a couple of occasions when the majority bloc on the board had difficulty arriving at a consensus; however, these occasions are not very important. More crucial is the question of the effect of the bad relationship between Gordon and the majority, but most of this bad feeling was the result of the board's conservatism, not the cause of it. Thus Lawndale does not seem to give much evidence for the hypothesis.

From the first three cities, we can present three hypotheses:

1. The uncohesive board will be less acquiescent because it will be unable to prevent the issue from becoming a matter of public controversy. Each board member will attempt to win public support for his point of view; but the public statements will invite public reaction. Under conditions




Figure XI.12.--Cohesion and Acquiescence

of controversy, the most extreme positions in the community will be articulated first; the liberals are already organized in the civil rights movements, hence public discussion will next lead to organization of the segregationist extreme. In the ensuing controversy the board will be unable to evaluate public opinion, yet hesitant to act in the face of public opposition; further, it will be unable to determine the extent of opposition. The result parallels a finding from a study of fluoridation controversies. Public debate tends to prevent adoption of fluoridation even though repeated surveys have indicated that it has public support (see Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, 1965).

2. Whereas the cohesive board may be able to put up a "united front," each dissenting board member will air his public position. This means that the most conservative board member will become a symbolic leader for the segregationists, whose position will gain legitimacy from the support of a public official. Thus the segregationists not only have more opportunity to organize, they have a more legitimate position to organize around.

3. Even if the board does not have to contend with segregationist public opinion, the demands of the civil rights movement require change on the part of the school board. There is an inertia in any public body which tends to maintain the status quo, and any innovative action requires discussion and agreement on the part of the board members. However, discussion will be inhibited in the noncohesive board, and the remnants of previous arguments will plague efforts to obtain agreement on any innovative action.

These seem to be plausible arguments for assuming that the correlation between cohesion and acquiescence is a causal relationship. This means that we have three variables--race liberalism, election versus appointment, and cohesion--which are sufficient to predict level of acquiescence. If we combine the variables by adding each city's ranks on each variable, we can (depending upon the amount of weight we assign to each variable) arrive

at correlations with acquiescence which range as high as +.96. Of course, with only eight cities, such techniques are not very helpful, and we have no grounds for drawing any conclusions about the relative importance of each variable. But we can conclude that the bulk of the difference between the outcomes of the school integration controversies in our eight cities can be attributed to differences in the composition and structure of the school board--differences which were present before the school integration issue came to life.

The task of explaining acquiescence is greatly simplified by these findings, of course. We can now concentrate on a closer examination of the school board. In the next chapter we shall try to determine what characteristics of the school board explain the differences in race liberalism and cohesion; when we have determined what these characteristics are, we will then in Chapter XIII try to relate this to differences in the structure of the cities which these boards represent.

Summary

The main task of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the principal dimension of the outcome of the school integration issue--the extent to which the board acquiesced to the demands of the civil rights movement--can be largely explained by differences in the structure and composition of the school board. We have attempted to demonstrate this in three ways. First, by separating the decision process into stages, we have shown that the behavior of the school board can be predicted from the action which it takes early in the campaign, before the negotiations with the civil rights groups have reached their peak, and that rather than the civil rights demonstrations causing the board to take action, the board's actions cause the civil rights groups to react in reply.

Second, we considered such factors as the region the board is located in, the socio-economic status of the white population (which

should indicate the extent of white opposition to integration), and the size of the Negro population (which should reflect the power of the civil rights movement) and found that these factors were not very helpful. (Only the size of the Negro population correlated with acquiescence; $r = +.53$.) This suggested that such obvious factors as the sentiment of the white population or the strength of the civil rights movement might not be very important.

Third, when we turned to examine the characteristics of the school board, we found three factors which do explain acquiescence--the liberalism of the attitudes of individual board members, the cohesiveness of the board as a group, and whether it is an elected or appointed body. The correlation of race liberalism with acquiescence is only $+0.65$, but the correlation is perfect among the elected or appointed boards considered separately. The correlation of cohesion with acquiescence is $+0.71$.

We are now ready to pursue this aspect of the school integration issue one more step back in the chain of causation, by asking what factors cause certain boards to have liberal, rather than conservative members, and why some boards are cohesive and others not.

CHAPTER XII

THE SCHOOL BOARD

It is a truism that liberals are different from conservatives. In the case of American race relations, we know that middle class whites are more liberal than working class whites, for example. However, these statements apply to American whites as a whole, and we have no reason to believe that any statements made about the national population will apply to the rather special collection of people who govern the schools in the eight cities in our sample. In this chapter we will examine the attitudes of the school board members to determine what factors distinguish race liberal board members from their conservative peers. (Perhaps we had better say clearly here at the beginning that liberal and conservative are relative terms and that the most conservative board members are still a good deal more liberal than many whites.) It will not come as any surprise, of course, that liberals and conservatives tend to be recruited from different sectors of the community; hence whether a board is liberal or conservative is determined by the procedures used to recruit school board members.

We shall also find that the way in which the board members are recruited has a good deal to do with whether the board members function as a cohesive group.

Board Member Attitudes

Each school board member was given a thirty item questionnaire designed to measure his attitudes toward a variety of issues. We shall now look at those responses to determine how attitudes toward race relate to other attitudes--in other words, to find out what the race liberalism scale "means." Since Negro board members almost always score at the top limit of the race liberalism scale, they have been excluded from the analysis. Slightly more than two-thirds of the fifty-nine white board members

filled out the questionnaire. A few of the others refused to be interviewed, but most nonrespondents are either from St. Louis, where no attempt was made to interview many board members, or were out of the city or were judged to be relatively inactive on the board. The sample will tend to overrepresent the most active board members and, to a lesser extent, the more liberal board members.

Some of the questions were combined to make up several scales. These are listed in Tables XII.1 through XII.4.

TABLE XII.1
ECONOMIC LIBERALISM SCALE

Item	Liberal Response	Per Cent Giving Liberal Response	N
5. The government has the responsibility to see to it that all people, poor or rich, have adequate housing, medical care, and protection from unemployment	Agree	61	44
11. Business enterprise can continue to give our high standards of living only if it remained free from government regulation	Disagree	50	42
6. It would probably be a good idea if the U.S. government set up a national health service to provide low-cost medical care to people of all ages	Agree	50 ^a	22 ^b

^aThe smaller group which was asked this question is somewhat more liberal than is the entire sample.

Yule's Q's:

	6.	11.
5.	+ .91	+ .83
6.		+ .81

^bThis question was added to the questionnaire in the middle of research; hence the lower number of responses.

The three items measuring economic liberalism are given in Table XII.1. The values of Yule's Q, given below the table, are high, indicating that we have succeeded in measuring a single factor here. The three responses seem a bit odd to someone accustomed to the liberalism of the university climate. First, there is considerable support for what would seem to be a nineteenth century platitude, that business must be kept free of "governmental regulation." On the other hand, there is also a great deal of support for the welfare state, to the point that one-half of the respondents on question 6 favored establishment of a national health service.

Constituency orientation is measured by two questions in Table XII.2. The respondents were asked to decide whether the wishes of constituents should have highest priority with the politician and the school administrator. The two items correlate, suggesting that school board members have a general tendency to orient themselves toward or away from public opinion.

TABLE XII.2
CONSTITUENCY-ORIENTATION SCALE

Item	Constituency-oriented Response	Per Cent Giving Constituency-oriented Response	N
4. A politician's first duty is to represent the view of his constituency	Agree	53	45
13. A school administrator's job is to give the community the kind of school system which the public wants	Agree	53	40

Yule's Q between the questions: +.63

In Table XII.3 we present three items which measure a more "affective" component of liberalism, whether the respondent dislikes the right wing movement, and in particular whether he feels sufficiently emotional about this to have intuitively blamed President Kennedy's assassination on a right winger. Again, the result may seem a bit surprising. Less than one-half of the sample consider organizations like the John Birch Society harmful (and considerably less would judge the Society itself dangerous). When we look at the interrelationship between these questions and the economic liberalism series, we find that none of the economic conservatives consider the right wing a problem, and only a bare majority of economic liberals do. The persons who score high on this scale tend to be associated with subcommunities that have a special concern with the right wing: of the twelve, eight are either Negroes or Jews and two of the remaining four are union officials. The items seem to scale; the one low Q occurs in a case where the distribution of responses makes the calculation extremely unreliable.

TABLE XII.3

RADICAL RIGHT SCALE

Item	Anti-Right Wing Response	Per Cent Giving Anti-Right Wing Response	N
12. Organizations like the John Birch Society harm the U.S.	Agree	47	40
22. The radical right is not a serious threat compared to the U.S. Communist Party	Disagree	65	22 ^a
30. My first thought when President Kennedy was assassinated was that it was done by a radical right winger	Agree	32	38

Yule's Q's:	22.	30.
12.	+ .63	+ .75
22.		- .03

^aThis question was added to the questionnaire in the middle of research; hence the lower number of responses.

The last scale measures the extent to which civic activity is seen as a duty (Table XII.4). The responses seem surprisingly high. One-third of the sample believe that a businessman must be active even if it costs him money, and two-thirds say that at the peak of one's career one should put civic affairs first.

TABLE XII.4
CIVIC DUTY SCALE

Item	Pro-Duty Response	Per Cent Giving Pro-Duty Response	N
10. If a businessman who is involved in a civic issue finds that it hurts his business, he is justified in withdrawing.	Disagree	35	40
28. Once a man has attained an important position in business life, civic leadership becomes more important than his business . .	Agree	71	38

Yule's Q between the items: +.77

With this tiny sample, these results would not ordinarily be worth reporting. However, there has been very little research on the attitudes of local elites in this country, and these data do provide some first approximations which might be useful for future research.

Correlations with Race Liberalism

Among the white school board members, the three dimensions which might be called "liberalism"--attitudes toward economic issues, the radical right, and race--fit together rather loosely. Economic liberalism

correlates only moderately with attitudes toward race; 37 per cent of the economic conservatives are liberals on the race series, compared with 53 per cent of the economic liberals. The radical right scale is a slightly better predictor of race liberalism; 35 per cent of those who discount the dangers of the radical right are race liberals, compared with 57 per cent of those who score high on this scale.

The two scales which do not have obvious liberal-conservative aspects are actually as good or better predictors of racial attitudes. Persons who stress the importance of civic duty are more liberal on race than those who do not (53 per cent versus 33 per cent). But by far the best correlation of all the scales is between race liberalism and constituency orientation. The finding is complicated by only holding in boards which do not experience competitive elections. In Bay City and Lawndale, almost all board members are not constituency oriented; this probably only means that they are trying to persuade us (or themselves) that they are willing to oppose their electorate. If however, Bay City and Lawndale are dropped, we find that the race conservatives are almost universally constituency oriented ($Q = .84$). There could be some sort of tautology operating here, since the second question in the constituency orientation scale specifically mentions the school administration. But if we look only at the other question--"a politician's first duty is to represent the views of his constituency"--we find an even stronger pattern (despite the very small number of cases) shown in Table XII.5.

TABLE XII.5

RACE LIBERALISM AND RESPONSE TO "POLITICIAN'S FIRST DUTY IS TO REPRESENT THE VIEW OF HIS CONSTITUENCY"

(Bay City and Lawndale Excluded)

Response To	Per Cent Race Liberal	N
Agree politician should be constituency oriented	8	13
Disagree politician should be constituency oriented	69	16

If we search the remaining questions which were administered to the school board members, we find two more correlations of interest. The questionnaire attempted to tap a militant identification with the working class whites with the statement, "Most students in expensive private schools don't learn any more than they would if they had gone to the public schools." Those who agree with this statement are more conservative on race ($Q = .33$), but the correlation is low again. The second highest correlation, next to constituency orientation, is the correlation of race liberalism with the response to "If people really understood the issues, there would be no disagreement over school policy." People who agree with this are considerably more conservative than are those who disagree (25 per cent versus 54 per cent, $Q = .56$). However, the two predictors of race liberalism are not correlated with each other ($Q = .16$), so that taken together they make a rather powerful predictor of racial attitudes (Table XII.6).

TABLE XII.6

CONSTITUENCY ORIENTATION, ATTITUDES TOWARD DISAGREEMENT,
AND RACE LIBERALISM FOR SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS
(Bay City and Lawndale Excluded)
(Per Cent Liberal on Racial Attitudes Scale)

Constituency Orientation	If people really understood the issues, there would be no disagreement about school policy	
	Disagree	Agree
Low	100 ^a (7)	50 (4)
Medium	50 (6)	0 ^b (2)
High	0 ^b (4)	20 ^b (5)

^aConflict-tolerant cell.

^bConflict-resistant cell.

Despite what should be insignificant case bases, the correlation is very strong. All seven of the persons who attached low priority to following the wishes of their constituency and who felt that disagreement would always be present in school affairs are race liberals. At the other corner, three cells are made up entirely of conservatives, with one exception. It may not be too surprising that the interviewer had pointed out at the time of the interview that this one liberal respondent seemed less than candid. So, with only twenty-nine respondents, we have something very close to a perfect pattern. Why? For simplicity, we will reduce the six categories shown in Table XII.6 to only three, by combining the three cells toward the lower right (those high on constituency orientation, whether they accept disagreement or not, and those who reject disagreement and are medium on constituency orientation) into a single category called conflict resistant, and then combining the two intermediate cells (those medium on constituency orientation and who accept disagreement with those who reject disagreement but are low on constituency orientation) and leaving the upper left hand cell as a separate category (conflict tolerant).

One very real possibility is that the respondents, having taken a position on racial matters, develop a framework of attitudes which is consistent. Certainly, if one is a liberal on race, he may recognize that there will always be people who disagree, and that if he is not following the wishes of his white constituency, how can he expect other leaders to do so? Conversely, the conservative on civil rights may rationalize his position by arguing that he, and hence others, should follow the wishes of the people. This argument is plausible, but an equally plausible interpretation could be offered for the precisely opposite finding. If liberals were constituency oriented, we would say that this is because of their desire to argue that they are only following public opinion. Certainly, we would not be surprised if in the face of current events the conservatives were the ones who claimed that there would always be disagreement, while

the liberals argued that if other people would only understand, integration would be accepted by everyone.¹

Let us rephrase the question, then, and ask what it is that makes these three attitudes consistent with each other. The one phrase which seems to sum up all three attitudes is that they are part of a "search for simplicity." If one believed there were only two kinds of people-- those who agree with you and those who misunderstand the issues; if one further believed that the task of a public official is simply to poll the public and vote as directed by the results, life would indeed be simple. Most people believe what they do is consistent with their attitudes about what they should do. And most people believe they are right when they take a stand. If they believe disagreement is only a matter of misunderstanding, then they are in effect saying that they are right and anyone who understands the issue will agree with them. If they also believe they are carrying out the wishes of the majority, then they are also saying that most people agree with them, and that the others not only misunderstand but are in a minority. This suggests more than simply close-mindedness. It implies in addition that "all is right with the world."

We think that there are two plausible ways to interpret the pattern. One is simply that these school board members are simply close-minded. Or we might slide from this to a slightly different interpretation. These attitudes also reflect an intolerance of the difficult decision, of the ambiguous issue, of the irreconcilable difference of opinion of the possibility of being wrong. It is in effect a rejection of "politics" where compromises must be hammered out and difficult decisions must be made. The questions in the race liberalism scale are not primarily concerned

¹Since the case base for this study of attitudes is small, we should point out that we found parallel findings in a survey of thirty-three southern school board members. Southerners who are "conflict tolerant" are more liberal (78 per cent liberal compared with 40 per cent in the intermediate group and 22 per cent of the conflict resistant). We have excluded the one southern appointed board and compared only the six elected boards. N's are conflict tolerant, 9; intermediate, 15; conflict resistant, 9.

with the legal rights of Negroes. It can be taken for granted that the vast majority of board members would disapprove of illegal discrimination against Negroes, at least in a questionnaire like this one. The questions are concerned with the legitimacy of the civil rights movement--whether Negroes are asking for too much, offending people with their demonstrations, and being generally unreasonable. Thus one interpretation is that the conservatives are not responding merely out of prejudice, but out of a deep-seated resentment of controversy (or possibly they resent Negroes because their presence is controversial). It is very hard to distinguish between these two different conceptions. There is not too much difference between being intolerant of differences of opinion and being intolerant of differences in social class or ethnic background. But one possible implication of the shade of difference is that if we assume these school board members are merely typical prejudiced persons, we might expect them to be aggressively so. On the other hand, if we interpret this as a rejection of complexity, we are suggesting a passive, withdrawing style of behavior. Although we have few data on this, we get the impression that few of the conservatives in the sample are adder tongued the way some of the respondents in The Dynamics of Prejudice are (Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1950). The violently prejudiced sentiments are primarily a working class phenomenon, but in comparison with the nation as a whole the school board members are uniformly of high status. For this reason, we lean toward the second explanation--that the racial conservatives are people who resent controversy, who feel that disagreement is basically illegitimate, and who long for the simple life where decisions are easy. Some other data lend support to this point of view. Recall that one question dealt with whether "expensive private schools" were better than public ones. The "conflict tolerant" respondents all agree that they are, while one-half of the other respondents believe that they are not. Again, one interpretation is that the conflict-tolerant men are willing to admit that this is not the best of all possible worlds, and the public schools they are operating are not ideal.

Another question is interesting. We asked if the respondent agreed that "Perhaps the most important qualification a school superintendent needs to have is professional qualification in school administration." Eighty-three per cent of the conflict-tolerant respondents rejected this statement, compared with 37 per cent of the others. This seems to support our notion that the conflict-resistant respondents are looking for simple solutions--if the school problems could be solved by getting a man with the right credentials, life would be simple indeed. Finally, one other pattern appears in the data. The most conflict-resistant men are almost uniformly not the influential board members.² This would seem to be evidence in favor of the interpretation that the "conflict resistant" do in fact resist becoming involved in difficult decision-making roles. These last three findings are summarized in Table XII.7.³

TABLE XII.7

CONFLICT ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD PROFESSIONALISM
OF SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT, QUALITY OF PRIVATE
SCHOOLS, AND IMPORTANCE OF SCHOOL BOARD

Conflict Orientation and Attitude	Conflict Tolerant	Intermediate	Conflict Resistant
Per cent who think expensive private schools better than public schools	100 (6)	44 (9)	45 (11)
Per cent who think professional qualifications are not most important for school superintendent	83 (6)	37 (8)	36 (11)
Interviewer rating of respondent's role on school board:			
Very important . . .	3	6	1
Important	2	3	5
Less important . . .	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	7	10	11

²The interviewers rated each board member in terms of his influence and involvement in board activity.

³The southern school board members were not rated on "influence." The response to professionalism of school superintendents is not correlated

Earlier we referred to the conflict-resistant group as people who in effect reject "politics." Certainly it is hard to imagine anyone surviving in the world of local politics believing that disagreements are only matters of misunderstanding, or that decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls. Rather we see the politician as a skilled broker of conflicting interests who is constantly confronted with difficult decisions and frequently forced to create public support for an unpopular decision. We would also expect the political leader to be more tolerant of such protest groups as the civil rights organizations. We would expect his experience with such organizations to lead him to perceive them as effective in reaching their goals and as no more unreasonable than other political actors. In other words, his experience should lead him to score toward the liberal end of our race scale. We can test this hypothesis. It is not difficult to divide our sample into those who are political professionals and those who are political amateurs. In general, there are only three ways to become a school board member: having achieved status in "civic leadership," being active in political party work, or being nominated to represent a special interest group such as organized labor. The interviewers coded each school board member into these categories.

Table XII.8 shows the number of conflict-tolerant and conflict-resistant respondents whom we identified as having been appointed because of activity in political party work. The result is again a very strong correlation, but it is exactly the opposite of the one described above. The political amateurs are conflict tolerant. It is the political professionals who "reject politics."

In Table XII.9 we show the parallel correlation, that the political activists are racial conservatives. It is perhaps easy to understand why

with conflict orientation in the South, but conflict-tolerant southerners, like the northerners, think private schools are better (67 per cent of the tolerants versus 33 per cent of the intermediates and 0 per cent of the conflict-resistant persons).

TABLE XII.8

POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND CONFLICT TOLERANCE
(Bay City and Lawndale Excluded)

Conflict Tolerance	Background of School Board Member	
	Politically Active	Politically Inactive
Per cent conflict tolerance	0	41
Per cent intermediate	28	41
Per cent resistant	72	18
Total	100	100
	(11)	(17)

TABLE XII.9

POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND RACE LIBERALISM

Race Liberalism	Background of School Board Member	
	Politically Active	Politically Inactive
Per cent race liberals	23	55
N	(13)	(29)

the politically active board members should be racial conservatives. Most have been associated with the party organization of an all-white ward and may feel that their job on the board is to represent the anti-Negro sentiment they observed there. They may, in the process of representing this sentiment, exaggerate it, but this is understandable. In

addition, they may be of low socio-economic status and be more conservative for this reason.

On the other hand, it is harder to understand the other correlations. Why should the politically experienced board member be constituency oriented? It is almost taken for granted that a practicing politician in an American city will be constituency oriented, but why is this? Even if he represents a particular ward in the city council, there is considerable pressure on him to put the welfare of the entire community uppermost. If he holds a city-wide post, such as mayor or school board member, the notion of a constituency becomes somewhat meaningless. On many issues the community will divide, making it impossible for the decision maker to merely "give the community the kind of school system the public wants," to quote one of the questions which make up this scale.

It is even more difficult to understand why the politically active school board members should feel that "if people really understood the issues, there would be no disagreement over school policy." One rather tentative explanation is that those political leaders receive their first experience, and are "socialized," in ward-based organizations. Strong neighborhood and ethnic ties may produce consensus within the neighborhood, and this apparent consensus may be heightened by decisions being made, not at this level, but on a city-wide basis. Thus the politician does not initially gain experience in the actual negotiation of conflict. The ward-based organization teaches the young politician, not that decisions are difficult, but that the world is divided into "we" and "they" (and "they" are wrong). There are few posts in government and the party which involve city-wide reconciliation of differences, and the typical political school board member has not served in any of these.

Another possibility is that the political school board member is less secure about his status than the nonpolitical board member. Most nonpolitical board members hold high status in other spheres of the community--they have distinguished themselves in business or in other civic

activity. For many of the politically sponsored board members, however, appointment to the school board may be their first honor. They are not in a position to take risks with their newly won prestige.

If we may continued speculating on this point, we should observe that in the typical big-city political organization the primary motivation for participation is not ideological commitment. The goal of the practicing politician is to become a "vote-getter"--someone with personal popularity. Thus pressure not to "offend" is very great. There is a serious internal contradiction in the demands made on political leaders. On the one hand, they are required to develop personal popularity; on the other, they are asked to be leaders. If they make decisions, they become "too controversial"; if they do not make decisions, they are "ineffective." The nonpolitical school board member, who has never had to look to public opinion for his prestige, can more easily avoid this dilemma. It is usually assumed that for the politician is popularity oriented during the early stages of his career, and when he reaches high office he "spends" this "political capital." A few of the political board members are still on their way up (or think they are). For them, it is important to avoid the controversial decision. But even those school board members who have reached the peak of their careers may have difficulty unlearning the popularity orientation which they have developed. Thus there are two reasons why these men are conflict resistant. To put it simply, they dislike conflict because conflict threatens to destroy their popularity. For to allow their motivation to be more complex, they want simultaneously to do that which is right and that which is popular and therefore wish to believe that they can do this--that everything which is popular is also right, and that there is no reason for disagreement except misunderstanding. Thus there is great pressure on the politician to "search for simplicity."

Wilson (1962) points out that one of the dangers of the "reform clubs" in New York City, Chicago, California, and elsewhere is that by injecting ideology into electoral contests, they force the politician to

follow more closely the wishes of his constituency. This is reasonable as far as it goes, but we are suggesting here that the "unreformed" city administration is also plagued with a constituency orientation. There is no contradiction between Wilson's argument and the one presented here. According to Wilson, the grass roots, issue-oriented "amateurs" force candidates to take clear positions on issues. This often means that a candidate will only be elected if his views represent the constituency; once in office, he is bound by his campaign pledges to carry out the action the public wants. On the other hand, the issueless election make it possible for the candidate to avoid committing himself and hence leaves him free to bargain, to innovate, or simply to change his mind. However, the reformers (we think) offset this to some extent by recruiting amateurs who have not been socialized in ward politics and who are less constituency oriented. So the two factors tend to balance each other out, and it remains a question which is usually more important.

Socio-economic Status and Liberalism

The other personal characteristic which correlates well with race liberalism is socio-economic status. Of course, nearly all the board members are managers, owners, or professionals, so the range of socio-economic status is limited. In Table XII.10 the occupations of the board members have been coded into nine categories. They are listed roughly in order of prestige. Business executives have been divided into three categories: very large business includes owners or top managers of large firms who report personal incomes of over \$50,000; small business refers to low-level executives or owners of neighborhood businesses; large business is the category between these two extremes. Lawyers are divided into those who are partners in firms specializing in corporation law and other high status legal work; "lawyer" refers to all others. We have grouped persons in government service with those who are employed by not-for-profit organizations (unions, social welfare agencies). The professionals in the sample are primarily physicians, dentists, or university faculty. High school teachers are

considered in the residual category, along with white collar and blue collar workers. Wives are ordinarily assigned their husbands' occupations. In the second column is the percentage of each occupational group who are race liberals. Categories have been combined where possible in percentaging.

TABLE XII.10

OCCUPATION OF SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS AND RACE LIBERALISM

Occupation	Number ^a	Per Cent Race Liberal	Per Cent Politically Active
Very large business	4	67 (9)	25 (12)
Large business	10		
Corporation law	10	71 (7)	10 (10)
Professional	14	33 (6)	44 (9)
Small business	9	0 (5)	62 (8)
Lawyers	12	40 (5)	75 (8)
Not-for-profit employees	5	38 (8)	25 (8)
White collar, etc.	4		
Retired	1		
Total	69		

Note: N's for percentages in parentheses exclude Negroes and nonrespondents.

^aIncludes Negro board members.

Despite the usual small cases, the percentages show a consistent pattern. If we combine the three highest categories, we find that 69 per cent of these persons are liberal, compared with 29 per cent of the remainder.⁴ The high status persons are also more likely to deny that

⁴For the South, these percentages are 53 and 43 per cent, based on fifteen and twenty-three cases.

disagreement is merely a result of misunderstanding, supporting our hypothesis that this question reflects one's sense of security in dealing with controversial issues.

It is impossible to sort out the various factors which are operating in the sample of school board members. We have suggested some reasons why politically active board members should be more conservative, but it is also true that the political men in the sample are of lower social status, and this could be the main factor influencing their attitudes. The pattern is especially clear if we look at the social origins of the school board members. Nearly all the nonpolitical school board members are from middle class families, while the bulk of the political board members are upwardly mobile. Father's occupation is nearly as good a predictor of racial attitudes as is present occupation. Table XII.11 indicates that persons from low status backgrounds are more likely to be conservatives and more likely to be politically active.⁵

TABLE XII.11

POLITICAL ACTIVITY, RACE LIBERALISM, AND FATHER'S OCCUPATION OF SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS

Political Activity and Race Liberalism	Business or Professional	Small Business, Farm, or White Collar	Blue Collar
Per cent politically active	20	31	60
Per cent liberal on race	60	46	20
N	(15)	(13)	(10)

Note: For three respondents, race liberalism score was estimated from interviewer ratings.

⁵For the South, 52 per cent of the sons of businessmen and professionals are liberals, compared with 38 per cent of the others. The association is stronger if we use father's education as one measure of socioeconomic status: seven of the nine men whose fathers attended college are liberals, compared with only 41 per cent of the twenty-seven others.

Thus we see that there are two mechanisms operating here which might explain the race conservatism of professional politicians on school boards. On the one hand, they are drawn from low status occupations. On the other, there are pressures on them which make them intolerant of conflict which might cause them to define the civil rights movement as illegitimate. The choice between the two explanations depends in part upon one's conception of the psychology of prejudice. If, following the work of psychologists like Adorno, we believe race prejudice to be deeply imbedded and very resistant to change, the first explanation is the most plausible--politicos are prejudiced, and that's that. If on the other hand, we assume that racial attitudes are not deeply imbedded and are subject to change (such a point of view appears in the work of R. M. Williams, 1964, and Hyman and Sheatsley, 1964) we might lean toward the second explanation--that social pressures operate on politically active board members which make it difficult for them to handle conflict and from which they retreat by becoming racial conservatives. Our own guess, and it is little more than a guess, is that these two alternatives are both correct, but with the second possibly more important than the first.

School Board Recruitment and School Board Acquiescence

Thus we see that there are two basic means of recruitment to the school board. The politically sponsored candidate, who has earned his board appointment through work for the party, is likely to be upwardly mobile, a small businessman or neighborhood lawyer. If he is not himself active in a ward organization, he may be a close personal friend of the mayor or another leading politician. The bulk of the nonpolitical appointees are businessmen who have developed reputations as civic leaders or at least have been spotted by the civil leadership as "men with potential." These men are usually corporation lawyers, owners of middle-sized businesses, or second-rank executives, but in some cases owners of large corporations (or their wives) may show up on school boards. These two groups together account for over four-fifths of the white school board members. The remainder

are selected by formulas which require representation of specific interest groups. In five cities a labor representative serves on the board. In Baltimore the three universities must be represented, and in several cities a woman, preferably active in the PTA or the League of Women Voters, serves on the board. In general, these "formula" appointees are relatively inactive members of the board, although there are exceptions. Some professions are surprisingly underrepresented. There is only one white minister on a school board. Baltimore is the only city which has a college professor on the board. And the bulk of the dentists and physicians are political appointees. . One reason why these occupations are underrepresented is these persons are not known to either the civic elites or the political leadership, who are the unofficial appointing bodies.

We saw earlier that two factors, the median liberalism score of the board and whether the board was elected or appointed, were sufficient to produce the exact rank ordering of acquiescence. We can now simplify our analysis by attempting to produce factors which will correctly predict the rank ordering of liberalism. In the preceding chapter we developed a complex flow chart pointing out the ways in which community characteristics can influence the board action. We also noted that the flow chart contained far too many causal patterns for analysis. However, we are now ready to simplify that flow chart in two ways: first, we can discard the bottom half of the chart, dealing with the civil rights movement since we have seen that the actual negotiation process has relatively little effect on acquiescence. In addition, the original chart distinguished between channels of recruitment of the decision makers and channels of direct influence; but we can now ignore actual influence, for the bulk of the explanation lies in character of the school board. Hence the new chart, Figure XII.1, contains only four key elements; the four dotted lines which feed into school board liberalism and which symbolize the process of recruiting board members. We have also assumed that the Negro business and political elite and the Negro community structure will ordinarily have little effect on the recruitment procedures for the school board. The chart is still complex but it is much simpler than it was.




Figure XII.1.--Revised Flow Chart for Predicting Acquiescence




Figure XII.2.--Political Activity of Board Members and Race Liberalism

Figure XII.2 correlates the race liberalism of the board with the percentage of board members who have been active in local political parties. The school board falls into three main groups: (1) Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and St. Louis, where the number of political appointments is insignificant; (2) Newark and Buffalo, where an overwhelming majority of the board are politically active; and (3) Bay City, Lawndale, and San Francisco, where the boards are evenly divided between political and nonpolitical members. In the next chapter we will try to determine why these cities have these recruitment procedures; for now we will only concern ourselves with their

effect. The correlation between these three groups is perfect: the two political boards are least liberal, the three nonpolitical boards most liberal, and the other three fall in between.⁶

The correlation of the proportion of political board appointments with liberalism, and hence with acquiescence, is so high that there is no systematic way to bring in other variables. We have explained nearly all the variation, so other variables cannot be expected to help. However, there are other explanations which must be considered. One is that the important factor operating is not political sponsorship, but socio-economic status. This argument says that political appointments are conservative only because they are low status, and not because of their political involvement. The rank order correlation of socio-economic status with liberalism, shown in Figure XII.3, is lower than the correlation of political activity with liberalism, but it is still high enough to keep the situation ambiguous. It seems very likely that each of these factors operates to make the board members more conservative. Whatever the exact mechanism operating, the most conservative boards are those which have a "pure" pattern of political appointments, and the most liberal boards are those made up entirely of high status nonpolitical persons.

Cohesion and Board Recruitment Patterns

The other major factor which seems to determine the level of acquiescence is the cohesiveness of the school board. Not surprisingly, one factor which keeps a board from being cohesive is the heterogeneity of the backgrounds of its members. In particular, there is a good deal of tension between the political and nonpolitical members of the board.

⁶It is worth the time to point out that the political party allegiance of these boards is not relevant. Many board members chose to keep their political party identifications confidential; we can therefore only estimate the differences between boards and have divided the boards into four groups: Democratic, leaning Democratic, leaning Republicans, and Republican (one board was not rated on this variable due to lack of information). There is only a low correlation (.27) between these categories




Figure XII.3.--School Board Socio-economic Status and Race Liberalism

As Figure XII.4 indicates, the most cohesive boards tend to be those which are neither purely political nor purely nonpolitical in make-up. The closer the board is to being exactly 50 per cent political, the lower the level of cohesion. (If we ranked the cities by their distance from the 50 per cent point, the correlation with cohesion would be an impressive +.81.)

and the board's race liberalism. (Democratic boards are slightly more liberal.) However, we probably have not misclassified the cities badly since there is a good correlation (.78) between party affiliation and economic liberalism.




Figure XII.4.--Political Activity of Board Members and Cohesion of Board

On one of the mixed political-nonpolitical boards this is because of a sharp disagreement between politicians and reformers (Bay City). But this is only one of the ways in which a "mixed" board has difficulty. In Lawndale we argued that the injection of partisan politics into board activity led to conflict, but in addition there was conflict over a reform issue (whether to hire an "outsider" or a "local" as superintendent). In Lawndale, San Francisco, and Buffalo the selection procedure is a compromise between appointing "qualified" board members and paying political debts. But in every case the attempt at this compromise contains the seeds of

dissension. In San Francisco there is considerable internal conflict between high and low status board members. In Buffalo there is conflict in a board which is ethnically diverse without any overriding loyalties to a political party. And in Lawndale, there is some tension among even the members of the majority coalition, at least in comparison with the other cities in the sample. The mixed appointment process also leads to dissension by restricting the number of highly skilled persons who can assume leadership roles.

There are some interesting parallels between San Francisco and a city not in our sample, Chicago, which also has a mixed appointment process. In both cities there is sharp disagreement which tends to divide the higher status nonpolitical appointments from the politicians. In both cases the result has been that the board has difficulty developing a consistent style of action. No one member is universally respected and hence there is no clear leadership. With the boards both split near the middle, votes are often close, and therefore every action tends to be preceded by long discussion as the "swing votes" take their position. And in both cities the superintendent has gradually taken over many of the board's functions and consequently been accused of being autocratic. As we pointed out in the preceding chapter, superintendents do have difficulty working with school boards, possibly because of their social background and the experience they bring with them when they become superintendents in big city systems. However, the board can partly control the kind of relationship it has with the administration, and Pois (1964) has pointed out in his case study of the Chicago school board some of the reasons why Chicago has difficulty dealing with its superintendent. (Pois had served on the board before writing the monograph.) In both Chicago and San Francisco the presence of a "mixed" board results from the city's being in a state of political transition. Chicago is undergoing a gradual reform, and the presence of the high status appointments on the board is the result of reforms in the appointment process. However, the reforms were not completely successful, so that some

of the board members are political appointees. San Francisco, on the other hand, seems to be in a state of transition toward working class politics, which may result in more political appointments in the future.

Board Organization and Cohesion

The boards which are most cohesive are also the ones with the most pronounced hierarchical patterns. Pittsburgh has a clear "inner core" of influential board members. This core leads discussion in private session in such a way that nearly all votes are unanimous.

The hierarchy seems to develop "naturally" according to the interest or ability shown by the various board members. In contrast, the St. Louis board members are almost forced into an informal hierarchical structure because of the election campaigns. As long as the founder of the citizens committee which slated the members for election serves on the board (and serves as chief political adviser in the committee's electoral campaign) the board members are almost forced to pay attention to him. For the same reason the senior Negro member of the board must be respected, since he is instrumental in obtaining the support of Negro voters. The result is that despite considerable heterogeneity in background and in attitudes, the board functions as a tightly knit unit on many issues.

In Newark the hierarchy is also present, but here it is deference to the political party (and hence the mayor) which reduces tension.

Hierarchy does not explain the cohesiveness of the Baltimore board, but in this case it may be that the majority members of the board are quite homogeneous in attitudes and background (they are two university men, two prominent lawyers, and a prominent newspaperwoman--all quite liberal in racial matters).

At the other extreme, the two most egalitarian boards seem to be Buffalo and Bay City, and these are also the least cohesive. In both cities this egalitarianism is in part caused by the competition for the spotlight among politically ambitious members; no one is willing to take

a back seat. Each issue requires that an ad hoc leader put together a winning coalition, and it is conceivable that each coalition could be different. In Bay City every board member has publicly disagreed with each of the others on at least one issue.

The Effect of Size of Board

A rather surprising pattern appears if we look at the number of members on each board. The most cohesive (and the most acquiescent) board, Pittsburgh, is also the largest. The least cohesive (and the least acquiescent), Bay City, is the smallest. The full rank ordering of cities by cohesion is given below:

Ranking by Cohesion

		Number of Members
High:	Pittsburgh	15
	Newark	9
	St. Louis	12
	Baltimore	9
	Lawndale	7
	San Francisco	7
	Buffalo	7
Low:	Bay City	5

$r = +.93$

The correlation is of impressive magnitude. If the reader has the urge to dismiss the correlation as a statistical freak, we should add that in our parallel study of seven southern school boards, the two smallest boards had five members; these two were the least acquiescent boards and most torn by community controversy.

Regrettably, there is a trivial argument which might explain this finding. One way in which a school board is "reformed" is by adding new members. This has happened to three of the seven southern boards and to one of the northern boards (Buffalo) in the past decade; there may be other cases which we do not know of. Thus reform boards should be larger than "political" ones.

Nevertheless, there may well be a relationship between size and cohesion independent of this. The school board is in effect a nonpartisan legislative body. Suppose that an issue came up which would normally divide a school board very closely. Suppose that 55 per cent of all school board members voted yes and 45 per cent voted no on this issue. If we then constitute a five member board by selecting persons randomly from the population of school board members, we would find that 61 per cent of the time the board would split 3-2 on this issue, while a fifteen member board would split 8-7 only 36 per cent of the time. Or to put it another way--if one member were absent (again chosen randomly), the chance of a tie vote in the five member board would be .37, but only .19 in the larger board. (The absence of two members would reverse the outcome of the vote one-fifth of the time in the small board, and only one-tenth of the time in the larger board.) On issues which ordinarily do not divide the board this closely, the differences are even greater. For example, if we took an issue on which board members normally split 65-35 per cent, the chance of a single absence creating a tie in a fifteen member board is 11 per cent; in a five member board it is 31 per cent.

Under these conditions, it is much more difficult for the small board to develop a hierarchical structure. An uninterested board member cannot simply stay away from meetings. If he does, he will be pressured by the two board members who need his vote. This also forces everyone to vote cautiously. His vote is often crucial. With more intense concern attached to each vote, stable voting factions are liable to break down. This, coupled with the intimacy of the small board, makes an opportunity for bad feeling to emerge.

The other characteristic of a small board is that it has a smaller pool of leadership to draw upon. This means that it may be difficult to develop specialists in various fields and may make it difficult for the board to select a president who is respected by other members.

The Negro Board Member

So far, we have discussed several ways in which different appointment procedures can affect the way the board handles the integration issue. However, we have not yet considered the way in which different styles of selection affect the type of Negro members the board will have.

The Negro board members are recruited in several different ways. Some of them are political appointees. As political appointees they differ from the white board members in that they hold positions of considerable prominence compared with other Negro politicians; they are likely to be young men "on their way up." Alternatively, they may be drawn from the Negro civic elite--on the recommendations of the top Negro leadership. In a few cases they may be PTA leaders.

Judging from the experience of St. Louis, Pittsburgh,⁷ and Newark, the "right kind" of Negro board member can help his board avoid severe conflict over integration. In all three of these cities the Negro board member was respected by other board members but also held a position of influence within the Negro community. Thus he could serve as an intermediary who could convince other board members that the demands being made by the civil rights groups were supported by the Negro elite. By endorsing their demands, without himself being identified as a civil rights specialist, he could give the demands legitimacy. In addition, he could carry influence back to the Negro community. For example, the opposition of Hicks and Hurt was probably important in stopping the St. Louis school boycott. However, even under ideal conditions the Negro board member is in a position of considerable role conflict which makes it difficult to play this role as an intermediary. On the one hand, he must represent the Negro community and hence must strongly support civil rights demands. On the other, he is (in four of the cities) the first of his race to serve on the school board.⁷ Thus they must prove themselves to the white community by disassociating

⁷Hicks (St. Louis) and Clendon (Lawndale) were the first Negroes ever elected to a city-wide post in their cities.

themselves from their role as a Negro and playing instead the role of school board member with no regard to race. This role strain has had different effects on different school board members. It is, of course, most acute if the Negro board appointee is in one way or another dependent upon the person who arranged his appointment. Conversely, the Negro board member can resist the pressure to disassociate himself from the civil rights movement most easily if he holds high status in the Negro community and is independent of white influences. So we see the peculiar contradiction-- the seemingly safe move of appointing a Negro who "will not cause trouble" in the long run only leads to difficulty.

Election Versus Appointment of Board Members

There is an old saw that the best method of electing school board members is the one you don't have right now. Like many popular sayings, this one does not seem to hold true. The majority of the school board members interviewed preferred the method by which they were selected. Only two of fifteen elected board members think appointed boards do a better job and only seven of twenty-eight appointed board members prefer elected boards (six of the seven are in either Newark or Buffalo).

It seems obvious that there is no simple answer to this question. It is very likely that research will show that appointed boards do certain kinds of things, elected boards others, and the choice between the two will depend upon the values of the observer. In studying integration we have collected data on only one aspect of board behavior. We should first note that only one city, Bay City has a history of contested elections for school board. Lawndale and St. Louis have at one time or another seen board members nominated who ran without opposition. In particular, we must consider St. Louis as having an appointed board during the time period of our study since the last two elections were virtually uncontested. These leave us only two elected boards, unfortunately.⁸ However, the following

⁸Actually, our sample is unrepresentative in this respect; most northern big city boards are elected.

similarities between these two elected boards are striking: they are the two least acquiescent boards in the sample. In both, racial integration became an election issue. Both have low levels of consensus. And both have politically active members. These are all factors which are associated with low acquiescence and extended debate. In fact, a rereading of the stories will indicate that these two cities probably had the highest level of controversy.

There are several obvious reasons why this should be so. The elected board rewards the politically ambitious with exposure and inhibits the high status candidate for the same reason. Once in office, the elected board member must be willing to risk a segregationist candidate running against him, as happened in both Bay City and Lawndale. The election campaigns maintain a higher level of public interest in board activity and reduce the social distance which insulates boards like Pittsburgh and enables them to take "unpopular" steps. The Bay City and St. Louis system is particularly cruel; the board members run at large and those getting the largest vote are elected. This means that the incumbents are running against each other, although they must work together both before and (hopefully) after the election.

On the other hand, we can point out that some of the appointed boards are low in cohesion and acquiescence, so that an appointed board is no guarantee of racial peace.

Finally, what can we say about St. Louis? Here is an elected board which has high cohesion and was able to acquiesce in the civil rights movement. This may be evidence that an elected board can handle civil rights issues just as an appointed board can. However, it must be remembered that the St. Louis board would have been reformed earlier than it was if Mayor Tucker had had the power of appointment when he was first elected. Second, the reformed school board has only been in office less than five years. It is difficult to predict what will happen in the future when the spirit of reform had died and the voters get bored (if they do) with uncontested

elections. Finally, we should note that the St. Louis board operates as it does only because the civil elite of the city invested considerable amounts of money in winning the two crucial elections.

Methods of Board Appointment

The remaining five boards are all appointed--four of the five by the mayor and the fifth, Pittsburgh, by the judges of the Court of Common Pleas.

In Newark and Buffalo the mayor is able to recruit most of the board members from the ranks of his active supporters and friends. The school board positions are highly desirable, so that there is considerable competition for these appointments. In both cities a pattern of ethnic assignment of seats reduces the competition for each post somewhat, since only Jews need harangue the mayor when a Jewish seat comes up, etc. In three cases that we know of, the candidate in effect waged a campaign to get the appointment. In at least two other cases the appointment was made to a close personal friend or a relative of the mayor or another top leader in the party. The appointees tend to be young. Of the eight persons whose ages we know in these two cities, the median age at appointment was only forty-four. In contrast, Pittsburgh now has a median age of sixty. It is unlikely that any were younger than forty-three when first appointed.

In San Francisco and Baltimore the same formal procedure of appointments by the mayor results in quite different groups of board members. In Baltimore there is no uniform technique for recruitment. Three of the Baltimore board members must be representatives of the three universities; apparently two of these three board members were located by people who serve on the boards of trustees. (Board President Eli Frank serves on the Johns Hopkins University board. The chairman of the University of Maryland Board of Regents is a member of the Greater Baltimore Committee.) Otherwise the Baltimore board members tend to be recruited in a variety of ways. The two key members of the present board were recruited by other board members, so that there is a pattern of continuity, at least among the high status appointments.

Two of the key board members were recruited by a board president. Since the board presidents tend to be members of the Baltimore civic elite, we can conclude that the elite exert an important influence on board recruitment.

In San Francisco several board members stated they had helped to locate candidates for the board. Some of the appointments come from key members of the civic elite. Others come from close advisors of the mayor. The result is to produce the most heterogeneous board in our sample.

The Pittsburgh technique of having board members selected by a panel of judges should operate somewhat differently from the mayor-appointment system. Since judges serve for life, changes in the mayor's office will have no appreciable effect on the appointment process-the newly elected mayor cannot punish his enemies or reward his friends until he has control over the judges. In addition, the judges will be less sensitive to pressure than the mayor, since there are fewer people who can perform important favors for a tenured judge. This does not guarantee that the board will be nonpolitical, of course. If all the judges are members of the local political party and the party is well disciplined, then the judges might choose to appoint only candidates recommended by the party. Or the judges might engage in log rolling, with each faction of judges having the right to make a certain fraction of the appointments. However, this requires close communication and negotiation among the judges. In the event of disagreement, the judges might easily succumb to pressure from the civic elite to name high status persons.

In practice, the judges consult with incumbent board members for recommendations so that at least a part of the board can be considered to be self-perpetuating. Those appointees who have earned the respect of other board members are able to recommend other board appointments. The result is that Pittsburgh, like Baltimore, has a self-screening process which tends to select new board members by the same criterion which board members use to evaluate each other. Thus both boards should be quite stable in political style.

It is clear from this discussion that the formal appointment procedures in these five cities do not vary enough to explain the great difference in the informal recruitment process and the composition of the boards. Similarly, the three elected cities do not differ very much in the electoral apparatus. The explanation for the differences in the school boards must now be traced back one more step into the political, economic, and social structure of the city. This is the task we will attempt in the next chapter.

Summary

The behavior of the school board in handling the school integration issue is largely dependent upon the process of recruitment to the board. Among the eight cities studied, we have found that the procedure for selection of board members operates in two important ways to determine the degree of acquiescence to school integration demands. The recruitment processes vary considerably. One of the most important ways in which they vary is in their tendency to recruit either political professionals or higher status political amateurs, often loosely associated with the civic elite.

The political professionals have more conservative attitudes on race than the political amateurs. This may be because of their social backgrounds, but in addition, their disapproval of the civil rights movement seems to fit with a constellation of values which indicate that the professional politician on the school board is less willing to participate in decision making under conditions of conflict.

The proportion of politically appointed board members is a good predictor of the liberalism of the school board, as measured by attitude questionnaires administered to school board members. Liberalism, in turn, is correlated with the level of acquiescence of the school system.

The other factor which seems to be independently correlated with acquiescence is the degree of cohesion of the school board members as a

social group, cohesive boards being more acquiescent. Highly cohesive boards tend to be made up entirely of political professionals or entirely of nonpolitical members, to have a hierarchical internal structure, and to be large in size.

CHAPTER XIII

COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS OF SCHOOL BOARD RECRUITMENT

In the preceding chapter we isolated three factors which seem to explain the acquiescence of the school board to the civil rights movement's demands. These are the number of political professionals on the board, the socio-economic status of the school board members, and the cohesion of the board. All seem to be a function of the procedure used to recruit school board members. By this we do not mean the formal procedure, although electing rather than appointing the school board has an important effect. But mainly we will focus upon the informal influence exerted by different sectors of the community on the recruitment process.

Interest groups and others can influence board appointments by proposing candidates or by screening potential candidates before they are nominated (or appointed). But the process of influencing board selection is not, and need not be, even this formal. Rather, we think that the appointing or nominating body develops over the years a mental picture of what a school board appointment should be like. In one city it may be considered "only fair" that a prospective candidate should demonstrate political loyalty; in another any such appointment might be considered "tainted."

In some cities this image of the ideal board member is clear; in others it is fuzzy. In Newark, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Pittsburgh almost all the board members might fit a single set of criteria: "proper ethnic and political association" in Newark; "intellectualism" in Baltimore; "hard working and capable" in St. Louis and Pittsburgh. In the other four cities the picture is not so simple. The Lawndale board contains political leaders, civic leaders, persons active in voluntary organizations, and reformers. Certainly no single image will fit board members DeUrioste and Ladar in San Francisco, or Goodyear and Parlato in Buffalo. And the complex set of

reasons which motivate residents of Bay City to run for the board, or to vote for particular candidates, almost defy description. The result of these unclear or contradictory job descriptions is to produce boards which are heterogeneous; this in turn leads to lower cohesion and thus makes the board less acquiescent.

But let us ignore for the moment the clarity of the "recruitment image" and concentrate on how the image differs from city to city. There is a strong negative correlation between the number of high status appointments to the board and the number of political appointees (-.70). This suggests that the basic difference between cities is a single dimension; either the board is made up of politicians, or it is made up of persons representing the civic elite. The nominee to the school board must have some sort of qualifying credentials, and the most common are achievement in politics or achievement in civic affairs--service on citizens committees and in the fund-raising campaigns which Rossi has called "nondestructive potlatches." There are other kinds of credentials--personal wealth, special skills (in education, real estate, financing, architecture), achievement in grass-roots organizations like the PTA, or the ability to represent major interest groups, such as labor unions. But these types of appointments are in the minority. The main choice is between civic and political activity.

This suggests that the appropriate model for studying school board recruitment is one of conflict between the two most powerful groups in the city, the political party and the civic leadership. This is not usually a visible conflict, and we doubt that very many people in these cities recognize this; but in fact this is simply a continuation of the pressures which divided these two groups over fifty years ago, when the industrial cities of the North developed professional politicians who could use ethnic and class conflict as a resource to compete with Yankee money.

In Figure XIII.1 we have located cities on this dimension by comparing for each board the number of board members who are political appointees with the number who have high occupational status--businessmen from large


firms, corporation lawyers, or other professionals. Since even the most elitist board will reserve some seats for PTA or union representatives and the like, and the most political board may have members who hold these occupations, we cannot expect any board to be made up entirely of high status or entirely of low status persons. For this reason we have drawn a dashed line indicating the possible range, from 85 per cent high status down to only 20 per cent, as we move from completely nonpolitical boards to completely political ones.¹

Reading from upper left to lower right in Figure XIII.1, we have a ranking of cities according to the power of the civic elite over appointments, relative to the power held by the political organizations. In this ranking we have tied the first two cities (Baltimore and Pittsburgh). We shall call this new ranking simply "recruitment source."

It is our impression that this ranking of the power of the civic elite relative to the political leadership in school board nominations is very nearly the same ranking that one would produce considering all other areas of civic decision making as well. In the three top cities--Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and St. Louis--there are formal organizations in which the business

¹The exact shape of this line is hard to determine. We assume a slight negative curvature on the basis of two assumptions: (1) There is a floor of 20 per cent high status appointments which no board will fall below. (2) There is a "take-off" effect, in that once a board is completely controlled by nonpolitical persons, it will be easier to recruit persons of very high status. There is also a ceiling effect--no board can be 100 per cent high status because of the need to represent PTA or union officials.

We might also assume a simple double-saturation curve of this form:



Our ranking of cities would be the same, however.




Figure XIII. 1. --Percentage of Board Members of High Social Status and Percentage of Members Politically Active

elite are active, take stands on various issues, and do actual promotional work for various programs. All three organizations have been quite involved in urban renewal programs in the downtown areas of their cities. The organization in Baltimore has promoted the expansion of the local airport for use by jets, has given support to the art museum and the opera, has supported open occupancy legislation, and is in the process of organizing a broad program of compensatory education. (The reader will recall that the Greater Baltimore Association supports Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc., whose executive director was one of the plaintiffs in the school integration

issue.) The civic elite in this city participate as members of boards and commissions of the city government. An illuminating comment was made by a man who served as president of the school board during a crisis period, who was quickly shifted to the urban renewal commission when that became controversial, and who is a top executive of a large downtown department store. When asked, as all our respondents were, how often he talked to the mayor, he responded, "Very rarely more than once a day." There was not such a close relationship between the mayor and the business elite in any other city we studied. In Pittsburgh the formal organization was consciously committed to problems on at least a metropolitan scale and probably even larger, but the organization was also quite effective locally, especially in the urban renewal program.

In San Francisco and Lawndale (ranks 4 and 5 in Table XIII.1) the economic elite were quite active in civic affairs. In San Francisco there were a number of formal organizations such as those in Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and St. Louis, but not one of these organizations could claim to speak for the majority of the business elite. On some issues, these organizations took different sides and opposed one another. The business elite in these cities are also quite active as individuals apart from the organizations; in fact, individual participation may be more important than organized participation. As individuals they also become more directly involved in open support of candidates for political office and may themselves run for political office. These are the only cities in our sample where it is not at all unusual for a quite prosperous and prominent businessman to run for local office. In Lawndale, the business elite is active in three distinct ways. One group is quite conservative in ideology and works for the maintenance of conservative control over the local Republican party. (This is the group that was closest to the school board.) The interests represented by this group are those of a number of local industries with regional markets, including warehousing, small manufacturing, food processing, and the local newspaper. A second group is one which is identified with a major national corporation which has the executive offices of all its branches in

Lawndale. Besides the executives from this company, there are many younger professional people involved. Politically these people are involved in both the liberal wing of the Republican party and in the Democratic party. The third grouping is composed of the hotel, motel, bank, and financial interests and is mainly concerned with booster activities to promote the city. They become involved with projects such as bringing professional football and baseball teams to the city, promoting the airport, and developing local transportation. This group cuts across the other two. While the participation of the economic elite in these two cities is quite high, the conflict and competition within the economic elite itself often curtails their influence.

Newark, Buffalo, and Bay City all represent similar patterns. The economic elite are only slightly involved with civic affairs. In Newark there is minimal involvement which was forced by civil rights groups. A committee was informed to help to both overcome discriminatory hiring and to form an education program so that Negroes would be prepared for available jobs. Other than this program, there has been almost no involvement of the economic elite.² The other two cities show almost no signs of involvement of the business elite in civic affairs.

These different types of participation of the economic elites in these cities were quite clear. But it is of course harder to say how much "influence" they wielded. We must speak only of fairly open influence, not of secret contributions to campaigns and attached promises, not of particularistic intervention for special treatment, not of quiet threats to leave the community and disrupt the economy. This type of influence was not uncovered in any of the studies which we have reviewed, though, and there is room for broad doubt whether such conspiratorial activity is of major importance. Even if this type of influence is important, it would be difficult to say that it is more important than open influence. We do

²The Newark Urban Renewal Program operated in a virtual power vacuum for years before the businessmen became involved (see Kaplan, 1963).

know that open influence is important since we have a record of its effects. This, however, leads us to a more difficult and perhaps more central problem. The way we have devised the rankings of the cities on the influence of the economic elite contains a certain bias. We have started from specific issues (reported to be the most important issues in the city in the past few years), and we have gone from the issues to those who are influential in the decisions involved. In doing this we probably have encountered a bias toward new programs which have gotten underway and thus toward people who have been influential toward bringing about change or at least in directing the course which inevitable change would take, and the activists. We may be missing the business elite who are influential in maintaining the status quo. It is then possible that this ranking is not one which shows the economic elite who are most influential at the top but rather one which shows the least influential civic elite resistant to change at the top. Given the near total representation of the major business institutions in Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and St. Louis, this seems a highly improbable interpretation of these findings.

In summary, we would rank the cities in terms of general participation of the civic elite in community decision making in approximately the same order that they are ranked with regard to school board recruitment, except that we do not believe the leaders in San Francisco to be as active as those in Lawndale. It seems likely that our analysis can be generalized to other community decisions; school board recruitment is similar to other community decisions. Thus we think that two characteristics of the acquiescent board--having high status members and being "out of politics"--result from the presence of a powerful civic elite.

The third factor which correlates with the acquiescence of the school board is the level of cohesion of the board. In Figure XIII.2 we have plotted recruitment source against the cohesion of the board. (The plot is of course similar to the plot of cohesion against political activity in Chapter XII.) In Figure XIII.2 we seem to have developed a "map" which places similar boards near each other. The three boards in the upper




Figure XIII.2.--Recruitment Source and Cohesion

left are the three in which we found powerful civic elites, and which have the fewest political professionals--Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and St. Louis. The two West Coast boards--San Francisco and Lawndale--tend to fall in the upper right. It is hard to imagine a school board in the extreme upper right. This would require that it be made up of very high status persons who strongly disliked each other. In the lower right we have Bay City and Buffalo. It is hard to say whether these two cities should be considered similar or not. The Bay City board is elected, and it is hard to guess what sort of school board the city would have if it were appointed. However, the two cities do have similarly chaotic political systems, which suggests that under the same system of board selection their boards might not differ

too much. Finally, in the lower right we have Newark, resembling Buffalo in its politicalness, but similar to Pittsburgh in its cohesion.

One can find these same similarities in Figure XIII.1 (which correlates status and political activity), with San Francisco and Lawndale near each other and Buffalo lying between Newark and Bay City. As we shall see, there is reason to believe that this similarity is not accidental. In order to make the relationship between Figures XIII.1 and XIII.2, we will present the "map" shown in Figure XIII.2 as a four-cell typology in Figure XIII.3. The two dimensions of the figure are level of elite involvement and level of organization of the recruitment process. Cell A, the cities dominated by "civic elite" recruitment style and with high levels of cohesion, are the cities we refer to as "balance of power" cities. In this case, the balance of power is between the political parties, which are tightly structured and wield considerable influence in the day-to-day politics of the city, and the civic elite, who are organized and possess enough countervailing power to capture the school board, to play a major role in city decision making, and, on occasion, to elect a mayor. While we have chosen to look at this as a conflict situation, another observer might say that a division of labor has been agreed upon between the parties and the elites in these cities. In Figure XIII.1 we find all three of these cities at the upper left, with boards made up of high status nonpolitical persons. In Figure XIII.2 they again appear together as high status cohesive boards.

Reading down the first column, Cell C is the "machine" city. Newark clearly falls in this cell, and during certain periods Buffalo might fall here as well. In the machine city, the school board is controlled by the working class and ethnic-based political party. Here there is also a conflict, or division of labor, between the elites and the party, except that the elites are too weak to compete with the party; the elites have withdrawn from city decision making. In Figure XIII.1 the board is located at the lower right, being made up almost entirely of low status political appointees. The right hand column contains the cities where power is more diffuse. In Cell D the civic elite has withdrawn from municipal decision making; but in addition,

the political parties are very weak. The result is that politics is dominated by class and ethnic considerations, just as in the machine city, but politics are highly disorganized. Thus both cities have unclear images of the "proper" type of board member. With neither strong parties nor a strong elite dominating the selection of school board members, there is no clear criterion for board selection. The result is that these boards appear in Figure XIII.1 toward the lower center of the chart. Some of the board members are political, but some are not; and even the nonpolitical members tend to have low status. One does not need clearance from the elite or the party to serve on the board, and the result is that in principle almost any resident of the city would have a reasonable chance of selection. There are probably very few places in the country where important political offices are "up for grabs" in quite this way. It is hardly surprising that these boards should have low cohesion.

Degree of Organization of Local Politics

		Highly Organized	Disorganized
Power of Civic Elite	High	<p>A</p> <p>Balance of Power Cities</p> <p>Pittsburgh Baltimore St. Louis</p>	<p>B</p> <p>Middle Class Cities</p> <p>San Francisco Lawndale</p>
	Low	<p>C</p> <p>Machine Cities</p> <p>Newark</p>	<p>D</p> <p>Working Class Cities</p> <p>Bay City Buffalo</p>

Figure XIII.3.--A Typology of School Board Recruitment

Cell B in Figure XIII.3 remains--"middle class." Both are western cities, cities which are younger and which have larger Protestant populations. The result is that neither city has the sharp bifurcation between the civic and political spheres. In both cities we find high status Protestants campaigning for elective office. Both cities grew up in a reform era, so that nonpartisanship resulted in the weakening of political parties. Since individual members of the business elite are directly involved in politics, it is possible--indeed necessary--for them to take ideological positions which prevent the elites from pulling together to form a unified interest group. Liberal businessmen are active in this organization, conservatives in another. The result is that while high status persons tend to dominate city decision making and fill a number of positions on the school board, board members are recruited in different ways and the board remains heterogeneous and not a cohesive group. In Figure XIII.1 both these cities appear in the upper center of the graph; while one-half of the board members are political appointees, the board contains a large number of high status appointments. In Bay City the percentage of board members who are high status, plus the percentage who are political, should sum to less than 100 per cent of the board; in the middle class cities the high status appointments might themselves be political, and hence this sum would come to 100 per cent or more. These two cities are probably representative of a large number of American cities, particularly small cities and cities in the South, where there is no clear distinction between the politician and the civic leader.³

In summary, we see that the only way a school board can be cohesive is for appointments to be made with a consistent and clear image of the ideal board member in mind, and this can only occur if the school board is dominated by a strong political party or by a strong civic elite. If these groups are weak, the result will be that the board can be either high or

³In fact, these two cities resemble in some ways the two small southern cities described by Agger, Goldrich, and Svanson (1964).

low status, but it will be heterogeneous and will have high internal conflict. Buffalo is the most problematic city in the typology. It probably varies, from one time period to another, between being disorganized working class and being a machine city. The other board which comes close to crossing the line between two cells in Baltimore, which has a high status board but with some political appointments. The result is that it is near San Francisco in both Figure XIII.1 and Figure XIII.2 and is the least cohesive of the three "balance of power" boards.

There are several assumptions implicit in the fact that these two typologies work out this way. We shall discover some of these as we begin to investigate the factors which cause cities to fall into different cells.

Recruitment Source

What are the conditions which enable the civic elite to retain (or recover) their influence in city decision making? There are two general possibilities. One is that the city has a population which is sympathetic to "good government." The obvious test of this is to examine the socio-economic status of the population. Six indicators of socio-economic status--median income, percentage of families earning under \$5,000 per year, percentage making over \$10,000 per year, median education, percentage of adults with at least some college, and percentage in white collar employment--were used to rank the cities and the rankings averaged. The resulting correlation with the recruitment source of the board was -.11, indicating a very slight tendency for the low status cities to have "civic" boards. The correlation is in the wrong direction and of trivial magnitude.

Another possibility is that the cities with large manufacturing plants would develop a more powerful civic elite and thus be better able to control the school board appointments. The assumption is that the concentration of economic power into large units, as in large manufacturing plants, concentrates considerable resources in a small number of men, who can build an organization of civic elites and make demands on the political

system. On the other hand, if economic resources are diffusely headed by many owners of small plants, or service industries, such a concentration and organization of economic power will be less likely. Mills and Ulmer (1946) make essentially this assumption when they argue that cities with large manufacturing plants provide a low level of services to their residents. They assume that this concentration of power will be used for selfish purposes by the manufacturers. Their finding is disputed by Fowler (1958), who argues that this concentration of power will be used unselfishly and that cities with large industry in fact provide higher levels of services.

With these arguments in mind, we constructed a centralization index by combining the percentage of the labor force in manufacturing with the average size of manufacturing firm (this is essentially the procedures used by Mills and Ulmer, and Fowler). This index places the heavy industry cities of Buffalo, Newark, St. Louis, and Pittsburgh above the less industrial cities, Baltimore, Lawndale, San Francisco, and Bay City. However, this correlation with recruitment source is also in the wrong direction and of insignificant magnitude. Centralized (i.e., industrial) cities are slightly less likely to have "civic" boards ($r = -.26$).

Our respondents spoke a good deal about the problems created by the flight of the civic elite to the suburbs. This turns out to be a very good predictor of elite control. The index we have used to measure the suburbanization of the civic elite is taken from Census data: it is the percentage of the total population living in the city divided by the percentage of the metropolitan area's families earning over \$25,000 who live in the city. The index would be 0 if all income units of over \$25,000 were in the central city; it would be 1.00 if high income families were no more or less suburbanized than the total population; and it would go to infinity if none lived in the city. There are two reasons why this measure recommends itself. First, it is not affected by the total suburbanization of the city. Thus it isolates elite suburbanization from general suburbanization. (This also means that we can compare our two satellite cities to

the six central cities. Elite "suburbanization" will be high if high income families avoided these satellites.) Second, the index is independent of the size of the elite population, thus separating suburbanization from this factor. The suburbanization scores of the eight cities are given in Table XIII.1.

TABLE XIII.1

SUBURBANIZATION OF ECONOMIC ELITE

City	Per Cent of Population in City	Per Cent of Elites in City	Suburbanization of Elites
Newark	23	4	5.9
Bay City . . .	26	8	3.2
St. Louis . .	36	14	2.6
Lawndale . . .	14	10	1.4
Buffalo . . .	41	31	1.3
San Francisco.	26	21	1.2
Baltimore . .	54	49	1.1
Pittsburgh . .	24	29	0.83

As Figure XIII.4 indicates, there is a correlation of $-.75$ between suburbanization of the economic elite and recruitment source. The cities with the longest tradition of high status appointments to the school board are the ones where the economic elite are least suburbanized. There are two exceptions to the rank ordering--St. Louis, which has a more "civic" board than would be expected, and Buffalo, where the board is more political.

It could be argued that suburbanization is caused by loss of power, rather than the other way around. High income families stay in the city




Figure XIII.4.--Suburbanization of Economic Elites and Recruitment Source of Board

if they have a paternalistic attachment to it. They move out if they lose this power. The argument is not particularly plausible on its face. In addition, a glance at Table XIII.2 suggests that there are more reasonable explanations. The cities which have retained their economic elites tend to fall into two groups--those which are not heavily suburbanized in general (Baltimore and Buffalo compared to Bay City and St. Louis) and those where special problems of geography make living out of the central city more inconvenient (Pittsburgh and San Francisco). There is also a tendency for cities which have retained their elites to have the lowest population density in persons per square mile. (Although the young suburb of Lawndale is lowest on this scale, Pittsburgh and Baltimore are second and third, respectively.)

If suburbanization is the best predictor of the influence of the civic elite, we must reconceptualize this whole question of elite influence. The bulk of the literature, including Mills and Ulmer (1946), Forster (1958), and Hunter (1953) and his disciples, has been concerned with the existence of community power structure. A power structure implies a somewhat rigid set of relationships between persons, with some sort of hierarchical structure. Hunter's implication is that the top elites of Atlanta are the persons who hold the greatest economic resources, and that they in turn assign specific tasks to their underlings. There are some problems in reconciling this picture with our data. For example, how can we explain the apparently autonomous power wielded by Daniel Schlafly, who owns a relatively small business in St. Louis? And how can we explain the fact that we found no evidence in any city that key school decisions were checked out with economic higher-ups?

Even more disturbing from this point of view is the finding of Sternlieb (1965) that executives who live in the suburbs are much more likely to be active in the civic affairs of the suburb, rather than the central city. We cannot reconcile this with the structure model which implies that civic activity on the part of businessmen is designed to indirectly benefit their business.

We think the civic elite can be more accurately described, not as a structure of power, but as a collection of individuals, each of whom has some resources and some contacts with other elites, who participate as individuals, but who constitute a diffuse "class" (by Marx's definition) in that they have a common set of values.

Much has been written about the withdrawal of business elites from local parties, but little has been said about their reentry in decision making. Certainly the American city of the 1960's seems much more dependent upon the elite who are serving on school boards, urban renewal commissions, Urban League boards, and so forth, than it did three decades ago.

The original withdrawal of the civic elite from city decision making was probably a result of two factors: the growth of the ethnic vote, which

disqualified all but the most unusual Protestant from office in the northern cities, and the rapid urban growth of the late nineteenth century, which brought considerable disorder to the structure of the city.

By the turn of the century, the business elite were no longer able to elect one of their own to the mayoralty of either New Haven or Chicago (Bradley and Zald, 1965; Dahl, 1961). The disorder of the business community resulting from the tremendous urbanization and economic development of the 1880's and 1890's (Chicago's population was growing at an annual rate of 10 per cent at this time), and the frequent scandals resulting from the participation of individual businessmen in buying utility franchises and city contracts, had already made city politics disreputable. Businessmen never completely withdrew from politics, however, but remained on the fringes, organizing reform tickets and lobbying for state laws to prevent this and that bit of corruption.

Finally, as ethnic rivalries began to fade out and middle-class political values became more widely diffused, the "reformers" like Clark in Philadelphia and Tucker in St. Louis began to win elections. Dahl (1961) refers to Lee of New Haven as an example of a new breed of mayors who are not working class political bosses, but men who combine administrative skill with the ability to muster support from the growing bloc of middle class voters. Even in cities which have not moved this far from working class politics, the change is present. It is in this environment that the civic elite has become reactivated.

But this is not a return to the patterns of the nineteenth century. The business elite have accepted the notion of a bifurcation between themselves and the political professionals--holding high status in the business community is worth little in an election campaign. In addition, the growth of national corporations selling to national markets, the shutoff in population growth of the central city, and reform of city purchasing practices mean that few members of the business elite will reap any direct personal benefits from participation in politics. These two factors have led to

the development of a common ideology and an agreement among goals which permit the civic elite to behave as a "class." The key elements in this common set of goals are:

1. General economic development: any action which furthers economic development will benefit most of the elites.

2. Reform: while in a sense this is a carry-over from the original ideological wars which displaced the elite from power, it is a widely accepted value now.

3. Improvements in public welfare: charitable giving, and charitable action on the part of government.

4. Maintenance of social stability: "peacekeeping" is as honorable a mission in the city as it is in the United Nations.

These four goals--peace, prosperity, charity, and reform--constitute a common denominator around which the civic elite can agree. If the businessman moves beyond this framework, he may find that he has become "involved in controversy" but within this framework he can expect the other members of the elite to give their endorsement to his action.

Within this framework the businessman participates, not so much on behalf of his company, but as an individual. The direct financial return to his company for the time he invests is minimal, and while the corporation may earn some prestige from his participation, most of his motivation stems from personal reasons.⁴ The participation differs in degree, but not in kind, from the participation of his wife (or anyone else's wife) in PTA work or the League of Women Voters. He participates because the work is entertaining and because it brings him prestige. But beyond that, his participation furthers his class interests; he is helping to change the city into the kind of community which the members of his class--the civic elite--want.

⁴Of course, certain firms (downtown department stores) reap more benefits from this participation.

We now see that if this argument is correct we do not need to postulate the existence of a power structure. Rather, the civic elite can remain merely a loose association of men who meet in the downtown clubs. If one of their members is invited to serve on the board of the Urban League, he knows that his luncheon companions will generally approve. If he uses this position to begin some program of action, he will have the tacit support of the other members of the elite (unless, of course, he commits some blunder or wanders outside the "common denominator" of goals). In fact, his participation may quickly brand him as the specialist in this area, the man to see for advice.

By participating, the businessman receives status in the eyes of his colleagues. In addition, the participation of the elites makes for a common bond between men who otherwise would have little cause for interaction.

All this makes the negative correlation of suburbanization with elite control of the school board more plausible. If in fact the civic elite is only a loose association of men who meet at lunch and on committees, then a sort of compositional effect can occur. If most of the men around the luncheon table are city residents, city problems are more likely to be the topic of conversation, and each man more likely to become active. Conversely, if most of them are suburbanites, the conversation will stray to other subjects, and even the city residents will feel little incentive to be active. In addition, many activities originate from one's place of residence, not from the place of work. Contributions to political parties, and to school activities, residential conservation programs, voting, contributions to charities, are all examples of activities which might result from having one's doorbell rung at night.

Another implication of this model is that the resource which a member of the civic elite has which makes him valuable in civic affairs is probably not the control over economic resources in his business. Rather, his personal skill, personal wealth, and willingness to work, coupled with the status he holds as a businessman, make his participation desirable.

At the same time we cannot overlook the fact that his participation depends upon his ability to earn the respect of other members of the elite. Thus he participates primarily in issues on which other elites agree and in many cases can be said to be consciously furthering class interests. Thus the effect is not so different from what it would be if the civic elite were a tightly organized interest group, but the conditions under which they are effective are different.

Deviant Cases

Although suburbanization is a reasonably good predictor of elite influence, there are no doubt other factors which remain undiscovered. Our two most deviant cases are St. Louis and Buffalo. As we saw in our case study of St. Louis, Banfield (1965) also noted that it does not seem to have the necessary population composition to maintain a reform government. One idea which we advance rather tentatively is that the "reform" vote in St. Louis does not come from the usual "silk stocking wards," but also includes the bloc of Germans in the city. These voters remained in the Republican party, and the Republicans remained competitive with the Democrats until after World War II. Today these voters appear as Tucker supporters in the Democratic primaries. This brings us to the possibility that the civic elite have more influence in cities which have a stable, competitive two-party system, where they constitute an important "swing vote." Alternatively, it may be a consequence of the presence of German voters, who have demonstrated a sophistication in local elections in Milwaukee and Cincinnati; both those cities have strong reform traditions.

One possible explanation for the weakness of the civic elite in Buffalo is that the bulk of local industry seems to be absentee owned. This is often discussed, but as far as we know its effect has not been measured. In addition, the civic elite's access to municipal decision making may be hampered by the presence of unstable and factional political parties, whose leaders must conduct repeated mass campaigns to obtain a

majority in each election.⁵ Somewhat the same theory is advanced to explain why mayors in nonpartisan or weak party systems are less likely to support fluoridation (see Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, 1965). It may seem surprising that the strength or level of organization of political parties should play a role in the behavior of the civic elite, and hence in the school board, for both these groups are very far removed from everyday partisan politics in the reformed cities. But when we turn to our other major variable, cohesion, we will see that political parties do seem to play a role in determining the structure of even nonpolitical decision making groups.

The Causes of Board Cohesion

We have seen that the eight school boards include boards which are high and low on cohesion, regardless of whether the recruitment source is the civic elite or the political professional. We have argued that the root of this cohesion lies in the clarity and stability of the criteria used to select board members--or the image of the ideal board member. In Table XIII.2 we have tried to state what these images are and at the same time to rank the cities by consistency and clarity of the image. This ranking cannot be very precise, of course, and we have only divided the boards into four categories.

In general, the most cohesive cities are at the top of this list. If Bay City and Buffalo had fallen into the "very mixed category," the four groups would be ordered perfectly by cohesion. Of course, the ranking is based on impressionist data, so that the correlation is probably exaggerated. We will not try to be more specific than to say that the main component of cohesion seems to be the clarity and stability of the criteria used. There may be other factors of less importance.

The ranking of clarity of image shows a perfect correlation with the socio-economic status of the community. San Francisco, with the

⁵In Buffalo Mayor Kowal needed every bit of patronage he could find to be a viable candidate for reelection, and hence went farther than most mayors would in replacing school board members with his supporters.

least clear criterion, is highest in status, whether measured by educational attainment, income, or white collar employment. Lawndale and Bay City, in the next group, are second and third, and so forth. The higher the socio-economic status, the less clear and stable the recruitment procedures seem to be. The result is that, as Figure XIII.5 indicates, socio-economic status is a good correlate of the cohesion of the board.

TABLE XIII.2
CRITERIA USED TO SELECT BOARD MEMBERS

Clarity Ranking	City	Criterion
1. Most clear . .	Pittsburgh	High status, and/or demonstrated leadership ability
1. Most clear . .	Newark	Loyal to party; ethnic representation
1. Most clear . .	St. Louis	High status if possible; commitment to reform
2. Moderately clear	Baltimore	Most seats to high status persons, but must represent schools, ethnic groups
2. Moderately clear	Buffalo	Loyal to mayor, ethnically diverse, but also represent special groups and "good government"
3. Mixed	Lawndale	Drawn from business leadership, or those interested in education, but represent interest groups and give preference to politicians
3. Mixed	Bay City	Must generally be Irish, but reformers are acceptable; selection based on either personal attractiveness, on campaign promises to improve schools, or on anti-integration appeals
4. Very mixed	San Francisco	Either high status, with demonstrated leadership ability, or politically loyal; must be ethnically representative




Figure XIII.5.--Socio-economic Status of the Population and Cohesion of School Board^a

^aAverage of six measures of population status: median income, per cent under 5,000, per cent over 10,000, per cent white collar, median years schooling, and per cent with some college education.

The finding is not exactly unexpected. For example, a study of fluoridation decisions (Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, 1965) which found that cities with higher levels of education had more difficulty with fluoridation, even though well-educated people are more favorable to it, concluded that high status cities have two characteristics which make the decision making process more unstable; these factors presumably would produce an unclear or unstable recruitment pattern for school boards.

1. High status communities are less apathetic. This means that in general more people will participate in the making of any decision.

Newspapers will play a more important role; it will be easier to mobilize sectors of the population. This means that the mayor or the appointing or nominating body is more often under pressure to change the recruitment system. More important, having a clear recruitment criterion means that the majority of the candidates will be excluded and hence there will always be objection. Of course, it is obvious that with a higher level of public participation in Newark, there would be a great deal of pressure to put "reform" candidates on the board, but it is probably also true that a higher status population would exert pressure on the court of common pleas to represent some of the ethnic groups in Pittsburgh. After the board is appointed, the presence of a high status population continues to lower consensus, since it tends to keep a public spotlight on the board and gives each board member more opportunity to mobilize public support for his position.

2. High status cities have weak political parties. Figure XIII.6 indicates that among our eight cities, the higher the status, the weaker the political parties. The ranking is again subjective; while it is not too difficult to distinguish among the weaker parties, we did not have sufficient data to distinguish among the three cities with the strongest parties and have tied them in rank.⁶

The four low status cities all have stronger parties than the four higher status cities. This is a well-known relationship and is hardly surprising, given the independence, issue orientation, and reform orientation of higher status voters. What may be more surprising is the very strong relationship between strength of parties and cohesion of the board, shown in Figure XIII.7. While a more objective and more precise measure

⁶The ranking is as follows: Pittsburgh, Newark, and St. Louis are judged to have the strongest parties. Baltimore is ranked fourth, primarily because it was able to elect a Republican mayor in an overwhelmingly Democratic city. Fifth is San Francisco, which has parties, but only within the general context of California nonpartisanship. Lawndale, sixth, is nonpartisan but has stable factions. Buffalo, seventh, is partisan, but has a highly unstable pattern of factional conflict. Bay City, eighth, has neither parties nor stable factions.




Figure XIII.6.--Socio-economic Status of the Population and Strength of the Political Parties

of party strength might lower the correlation somewhat from its present value of .90, it is obvious that we have a close relationship.

This relationship is to be expected among the three "political" boards. The high cohesion of Newark seems to be a direct result of the power of the political party, and the chaotic election procedure of Bay City seems to be a function of nonpartisanship as it is practiced in that city. However, the same pattern holds among the five "civic" boards as well. Partly this is because the mayor (who is the appointing officer in two of these cities, and who made certain key appointments in St. Louis as well) will be restricted in his range of appointments if they must be




Figure XIII.7.--Strength of Political Parties and Board Cohesion

"cleared" by the political party (that is, he cannot appoint a personal friend if the party refuses to go along with it). More important, the presence of clear party or factional alignments insulates the appointing official from public opinion. At the same time, the race conservatism of the political party rank and file does not seem to have much effect on the appointment process. Eldersveld's (1964, p. 9) research on the parties of Detroit leads him to talk about the party as a "stratarchy" in which power is diffused through several strata, each with considerable autonomy. He also argues that the party must be viewed as a coalition of conflicting groups who are kept together by downgrading the importance of ideological differences. "As a power-aspiring group, 'greedy' for new followers, the party does not settle conflict; it defers the resolution of conflict"

(Eldersveld, 1964, p. 7). It is possible for the party to tolerate ideological differences because the party members serve for nonideological reasons--even in Detroit, where there is relatively little patronage (Eldersveld, 1964, p. 7).⁷

As a result, there is little ideological communication either up or down the party hierarchy. This has two implications for our study. First, it means that the party does not serve to articulate mass opinion up to the party leadership, but instead as a barrier to prevent the leadership from being heavily influenced by public opinion. Since party workers are loyal in large part for nonideological reasons, the mayor knows that whether they work or not will not depend much upon his position on issues. On the other hand, this absence of ideological communication means that party workers will not be "socialized" by party activity into taking a particular view.

This means that the mayor is free to appoint people to the school board who are more liberal than the voters as a whole. But if he recruits board members from within the party, he will get appointees who are not more liberal. The result is that the four cities with strong parties tend to have school boards who are extreme, either liberal or conservative, while the four cities with weak parties tend to fall toward the center of the distribution on race liberalism.

There is another way in which the presence of strong political parties might affect the appointment process. In the three cities which have civic boards and strong political parties, the civic elite are organized formally and seem to exert effective influence as a result of this organization. We have already mentioned two reasons why this should be the case. First, the nearly complete separation of the civic elite from the everyday workings of the political parties prevents party differences or ideological issues from dividing the elite. Second, the presence of strong parties tends to make reform an issue which unites the elites. In addition, the presence of a working class political organization restricts

⁷Eldersveld (1964, p. 200) finds the ideological differences between party workers actually greater than the differences between the districts they "work."

direct communication between individual party leaders and individual elites. This condition, which earlier led to the withdrawal of civic elite from policy making, now tends to organize the communication through a limited number of channels. If the only public official who will listen is the mayor, the elite are under more pressure to organize themselves so as to speak with a single voice. These factors, plus the fact that if the mayor or appointing officer does choose to appoint a "civic" board, he will be under less pressure from public opinion, could explain the higher cohesion of these boards.

As far as school board behavior on school integration, we have now isolated the community variables which seem to provide the explanation. In the process we have developed a tentative typology of northern cities which might be useful for other issues. The typology is presented in the four-cell table in Figure XIII.8.

There are a number of hypotheses implicit in the typology. Of these possibly the most interesting one is this: The civic elite will only participate in political decision making in northern large cities in a highly organized fashion if they have been prevented by ethnic or class factors from direct participation in political parties.

The hypothesis cannot be considered proven by this analysis of only eight cities. Furthermore, the hypothesis will need to be more specific, in order to account for the possibility of an amateur such as Tucker being elected mayor.

In Figure XIII.9 we present a three dimensional plot linking the two major community variables, elite suburbanization and socio-economic status, directly to school board acquiescence. In this table the most acquiescent cities appear at the lower left, while the least acquiescent are at the upper right. The dotted lines indicate the combined ranking of suburbanization and status; the rank order correlation of this with acquiescence is .89. Two cities are out of order in the listing: Buffalo, which is not sufficiently acquiescent, and San Francisco, which is

	A Balance of Power	B Middle Class	C Machine	D Working Class
Socio-economic status Elite suburbanization Parties	Low Low Strong	Medium-High Low Weak	Low High Strong	Low-Medium High Weak
"Political style"	Civic elites organized and active in policy-making, but not in party politics:	Civic elites active in small groups and as individuals in policy-making and politics. Elections are contests between individuals, with weak parties or factions.	Civil elite inactive. Elections are contests between strong and stable parties or factions	Civic elite inactive; politics highly personalized; strong ethnic voting patterns
School board recruitment criteria	High status, demonstrated interest in civic affairs. Non-political.	Varies: high-status or politically active persons or both. Some ethnic or interest-group representation.	Political activists: Party workers, some ethnic and interest-group representation.	Varies: Persons loyal to mayor, or who have personal contacts or support; or persons active in organizations or with ties to civic elite.
Board socio-economic status Per cent political appointments Cohesion Liberalism Acquiescence	High Low High High High	Medium-High Medium Medium Varies Medium-Low	Low High High Low Medium	Low-Medium Medium-High Low-Medium Low-Medium Low

Figure XIII.8. --Typology of Cities and School Boards

more acquiescent than its ranking indicates. This our final figure in this line of analysis, could be summarized by saying that the least acquiescent cities are those which have no "upper class"; the most acquiescent, those which have an upper class and a working class but no middle class.




Figure XIII.9.--Suburbanization of Elites, Socio-economic Status, and Acquiescence

Summary

The findings of this chapter are summarized in the flow chart shown in Figure XIII.10. The arrows indicate the location and presumed direction of correlations. The chart is indefinite in that we cannot determine the intervening variables that link high socio-economic status to heterogeneity of school board appointments. Our best hunch is that strength of political party is most important, but factors such as the




Figure XIII.10.-- Rank Order Correlations between Variables Linked to Acquiescence

^aPerfect correlation among appointed or elected boards only.

presence of heavy industry in low status cities and the general impact of political apathy are also relevant. Of course, the flow chart does not reveal all the complexities of the typology shown in Figure XIII.8.

With many more cities, we would be able to separate out the effect of more specific variables, such as size of board, appointment versus election of board members, or the size of the Negro population. Each of these factors probably plays a role, but it is difficult to say how important each is.

The presence of elites in the city, the presence of strong political parties, and the presence of a low status population are all relevant to the way the school board is recruited and the way the school integration issue is handled. This means that for the purposes of this one issue, large northern cities with ethnic groups can be divided into four groups: (1) the blue collar city with active civic elites; (2) the blue collar city with inactive civic elites; (3) the unbifurcated, or middle class city; and (4) the blue collar city with inactive civic elites and weak political parties. Presumably, for other issues other factors would appear and this typology would have to be expanded to include more categories.

The typology cannot itself be considered final. With limited data from only eight cities, we have pushed to what seems to be the most plausible pattern of correlations. However, several of our rank order correlations are high; although part of this is no doubt due to our own bias, it nevertheless seems to us that our data are "overexplained"--we can produce a rank order correlation of .89 with acquiescence using only two variables. The result is that we have removed all the variance, but have some independent variables left over. This is no doubt more satisfying than exhausting all variables and having variance left, but it is an unpleasant problem, nevertheless. The only answer is to replicate the study using the largest possible population of cities.

CHAPTER XIV

THE COMMUNITY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

In the preceding three chapters we have traced acquiescence back to its roots in the school board, the school board nominating process, and finally to the community political and social structure. In doing so, we have fortunately been able to ignore the difference between the civil rights movements in these cities, since the civil rights groups have little direct effect upon the school board's acquiescence. The civil rights movement does have some other effects upon the school integration decision. Most important, they determine how much civil rights activity there will be and thus help to determine how much controversy there will be. In addition, we have commented that one reason school boards have difficulty with school integration decision making is that they are confronted with an ambiguous issue, with few guidelines available, and thus are heavily dependent upon their personal racial attitudes. The civil rights movement has some influence in this respect, because it can choose to present the issue in concrete or very abstract terms.

The Extent of Civil Rights Activity

Let us first consider what types of cities had the greatest amount of civil rights activity. We have already observed (in Chapter X) that a resistant school board provokes civil rights activity; but we also saw that a good deal of the variation in civil rights activity was not accounted for by the behavior of the school board. Civil rights movements vary in that some were more anxious to demonstrate (Bay City is the best example of this) and were able to mobilize the community for demonstrations, while others were reluctant to demonstrate and less successful in doing so. Our first task is to develop a ranking of the cities on their willingness or ability to take direct action.

Civil rights activity falls into four general categories, which can be conveniently summarized in a 2x2 table (Table XIV.1). First action can be taken either through formal and "regular" channels for protest, or it can be taken in the form of extralegal or even illegal demonstrations; second, the action can be merely expressive, designed to call the school system's attention to the demands or develop public support for them, or it can involve sanctions brought against the board, either by the use of legal authority or by embarrassing or inconveniencing the school system. There are some fine lines here, of course; a public march through the central business district can be merely expressive if it is held on Sunday afternoon; it can involve the use of sanctions if it winds up snarling rush-hour traffic or discouraging shoppers. Table XIV.1 indicates the four types of action with examples of each.

TABLE XIV.1

A TYPOLOGY OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVITY

Channels of Protest

	Formal	Extralegal
Expressive	Action designed to publicize grievances: reports, speeches, testimony at board hearings	Action designed to publicize grievances using direct-action techniques: marches, "demonstrations" rallies, vigils
Sanctioning	Action designed to compel schools to act: suits, petitions to state or federal authority	Action designed to inconvenience or embarrass system: "inconvenient" street demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins

In Table XIV.2 we have listed the eight cities, commented on the amount of action taken under each of these headings, and assigned a numerical value to the amount of action; the sum of these four numerical scores is a rough indicator of the total amount of civil rights activity. However, this does not give us a good measure of propensity to take action, since much depends upon whether the school system has provoked action by refusing to acquiesce. Ideally, one should use regression procedures to "control" for this, but as usual the quality of our data and the number of cities involved makes sophisticated techniques rather inappropriate. What we have done is list in the next to last column the rank of the city on the acquiescence scale, beginning with 0 for the most acquiescent city and ending with 7, and subtract this rank from the action score; the result gives us a measure which is primarily dependent upon the amount of civil rights activity, but which "controls" for school system acquiescence. We shall call this "action propensity." (Since the action score ranged from 0 to 15, while the acquiescence score ranges only from 0 to 7, the control for acquiescence does not affect the final scores very much. The rank order correlation of "action" [without the control] with "action propensity" [with the control] is a high .88.)

Approximately four civil rights leaders who had been involved in the school issue were interviewed in each city. In large measure it was up to these men to decide when the movement would take action, and therefore we should expect to find that the patterns of action in each city are mirrored in the attitudes of this leadership. This proves to be the case.

The most commonly discussed attribute of civil rights leaders is militancy. Militancy generally refers to willingness to engage in direct action, but it sometimes is used to describe leaders who hold extreme or utopian goals--men who set their sights high. An agree-disagree attitude questionnaire was administered to civil rights leaders, similar to the one used for school board members. The one question which seems to capture the meaning of militancy best is "Too many times Negroes have compromised when

TABLE XIV.2

CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVITY RANKING

City	Activity (Score in Parentheses)				Total Score	Acquiescence Rank	Net Score ("Propensity to Act")
	Formal Expressive (Testimony, Etc.)	Formal Sanctioning (Suits, Etc.)	Extralegal Expressive (Demonstrations)	Extralegal Sanctioning (Boycotts, Etc.)			
Bay City	Noisy (3)	Suit filed (2)	Sit-ins, marches, vigils (4)	Two boycotts (6)	15	7.0	8.0
Buffalo	Somewhat noisy (2)	Petition to state (2)	Small demonstration (1)	One boycott, one unsuccessful boycott (4)	9	5.0	4.0
San Francisco	Somewhat noisy (2)	Two suits filed, one settled (3)	Sit-ins, picketing (3)	-- (0)	8	3.0	5.0
St. Louis	Somewhat noisy (2)	Out of court; one suit filed (2)	Large demonstration (2)	One small boycott, one threatened (2)	8	2.0	6.0
Newark	Some noisy, but some quiet (1)	One suit settled out of court (3)	Demonstration at one school (1)	One small strike (2)	7	4.0	3.0
Lawndale	Somewhat noisy (2)	Suit threatened (1)	-- (0)	-- (0)	7	6.0	1.0
Baltimore	Quiet (1)	One threatened (1)	-- (0)	-- (0)	2	0.5	1.5
Pittsburgh	Quiet (1)	-- (0)	-- (0)	-- (0)	1	0.5	0.5

Note: formal expressive scores range from 0 to 3; "noisy" refers to testimony which is provocative and backed with delegations, etc. "Formal sanctioning" ranges from 0 to 4; a score of 4 would be given to a suit which is carried all the way through court. Buffalo receives only a score of 2, since a petition to the state requires less local effort. "Extralegal expressive" ranges from 0 to 4 and is based upon the extensiveness of activity. "Extralegal sanctioning" refers only to school boycotts in these data; a score of 3 is given for each city-wide boycott, and a score of 1 for each localized boycott. Newark receives a score of 2 for its "strike," where the students did not return to school until the issue was settled.

they could have made more progress if they had held out a little longer." There are three other questions which are correlated with this one, and these four together make up what we will call a militancy scale (Table XIV.3). The first three items are not surprising, since they all reflect a willingness to take action and a belief that demonstrations are the most effective way to get results. The last item--disagreeing that "the average white man really wants the Negro to have his rights"--is more interesting. Taken together, they suggest that the militant believes there is little to be gained from appealing to the better nature of whites and therefore the only hope is to make discrimination unpleasant or costly, so that whites will give in out of self-interest.

TABLE XIV.3

MILITANCY SCALE

Opinion Items	Militant Response
1. Too many times Negroes have compromised when they could have made more progress if they had held out a little longer.	(Agree)
2. Unless you dramatize an issue through mass protests and demonstrations it seems that there is scarcely any progress made.	(Agree)
3. It is sometimes better to have white resistance to Negro requests, because then you have a basis for bringing the overall problem to the public's attention.	(Agree)
4. The average white man really wants the Negro to have his rights.	(Disagree)

Measures of Association (Q) between the Items

	2	3	4
1.	.45	.73	.89
2.	--	.62	.69
3.		--	.54

It is clear, despite the limitations of our data, that the most active movements have the most militant leaders. In Figure XIV.1 we see

that the average militancy score correlates very highly with the activity scores generated in Table XIV.1.¹ In fact, the correlation is perfect, but we can assume that this is partly a statistical fluke. Our wisest conclusion is the correlation between militancy and propensity to act is high but by no means perfect.




Figure XIV.1.--Militancy and Propensity for Civil Rights Activity

Note: (X) has only an estimated militancy score.

Having established a connection between activity and the attitudes of civil rights leaders, we are now ready to take the next step and try to determine what kinds of movements recruit militant leaders. We shall assume that militancy is an attitude which the leader brings with him to office, rather than a response which he has developed from his experience

¹The average militancy scores are given below. Although it is difficult to decide what statistical model to use, it is clear that the data do not yield statistically significant differences among the three groups. No responses were obtained in Lawndale, and the Lawndale movement was rated by the interviewers in comparison with the others. (See table on next page.)

as a leader. (Although in extreme cases the behavior of the white leadership will certainly influence his attitudes, but if it were simply a learned response, the civil rights leaders would be most militant in the least acquiescent cities, and this is not the case.) So some movements recruit more militant leaders than others. Why?

In Table XIV.4 we have reported some of the correlations between militancy and some background characteristics. The table indicates that in this group of leaders the militants are young and slightly better educated, but have lower incomes and are long term residents of the city (rather than being migrants from the South). This fits with the stereotype of the militant, who is often thought of as a young native northerner who is of marginal social status despite his educational attainment. The conventional explanation for this is that the young high status Negro leader experiences the greatest "status discrepancy"; the more obvious his ability to "get ahead," the more glaring is the fact that as a Negro his social status will also be low regardless of his occupational attainment. Two of these factors, income and age, suggest that the city with militant leaders must have a recruitment process which permits people who have low social status to enter and

Ranking of Eight Cities on Militancy Scale

City	Militancy Score	Militancy Rank	Number of Respondents
1. St. Louis	2.52	1	5
2. Bay City	2.40	1	5
3. Buffalo	1.76	2	3
4. San Francisco	1.72	2	2
5. Newark	1.60	2	4
6. Lawndale	--a	3	-
7. Baltimore	1.32	4	4
8. Pittsburgh	1.32	4	3

The score is average number of militant responses on the four questions. ($r =$ approximately .60.)

^aNo actual score is listed for Lawndale because interviewers' perceptions were the basis for ranking it, not opinion items.

rise to a position of power on the basis of their ability. This also fits the everyday image of the movement--the militant civil rights movement has an open, achievement-oriented leadership structure. This suggests that if a city has internal competition, a large number of organizations, and competition for leadership, there will be more opportunity for the young, low status, but skilled person; hence the movement will become more militant.

TABLE XIV.4

MILITANCY AND BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

Characteristics	Percentage Militant	N
<u>Age:</u>		
Under 35	73	(11)
35 or over	40	(15)
<u>Education:</u>		
Advanced degree	57	(14)
B.A. or less	45	(11)
<u>Occupation:</u>		
Political	80	(5)
Law	50	(6)
Other professional	43	(14)
<u>Residence:</u>		
In city over 15 years	78	(9)
Less than 15 years	31	(8)
<u>Income:</u>		
Under \$10,000 per year	75	(12)
Over 10,000 per year	45	(11)

Note: Only years of residence yield a correlation significant of the .05 level (two-tailed) test; age is significant at 10 per cent, and income at only the 20 per cent level.

But it also seems reasonable (indeed, it is part of the conventional wisdom) that competition among civil rights groups leads to increased

militancy as the groups bid against each other for followings. Thus we have two reasons to hypothesize the next step in our chain of causation: The more internal competition in the civil rights movement, the greater its militancy. Since competition will itself inspire more civil rights activity, it could be that competition would itself lead to higher activity in school desegregation, regardless of militancy; but it is also possible that competition would lead to diffuse activity, as each group tried to find its own issue; thus instead of intensifying the civil rights battle in the schools, the movement might spread simultaneously into housing, employment, political activity, etc. For this reason, we think that militancy is a necessary connecting link between competition and intense civil rights activity on the school integration front.

None of this is original or surprising, of course, but it serves as a preamble to asking what types of communities will develop high levels of civil rights activity. We can now modify the question to ask what types of cities will have internal competition in their civil rights movements. One general hypothesis comes to mind; there will necessarily be competition between groups if there are alternative bases for power. If, for example, one civil rights group has access to financial support, and another access to "troops," there will be a natural bias toward conflict between the two groups. In the North, of course, all civil rights groups are underfinanced, so this is not a real conflict; but in the South one can easily imagine one group with access to local support (the NAACP) competing with another with access to northern money and participants (such as SNCC). In two cities in our northern sample there is this kind of competition between the political machine and the civil rights movement. St. Louis and Newark both have strong Negro political organizations which are patronage based. These machines have control over access to political office and hence are able to hold the loyalty of a large number of persons who might otherwise be active in civil rights movements. More important, since their power base lies in patronage and control over political rewards, they can tolerate a disagreement

with the civil rights movement. Finally, they are able to exercise considerable influence over the local NAACP branches. Under these conditions, avenues for access to nonpolitical civil rights groups become much more open, the pressure to organize groups to compete with the NAACP increases, and leadership passes into "deviant" hands--young persons and white liberals being the most common types of deviants. In both Newark and St. Louis the NAACP was rather conservative on the schools issue and wound up splitting with other civil rights leaders. In contrast, in the other cities the battle between moderates and militants occurred within the NAACP, or else the NAACP cooperated with the other groups. even when there was disagreement.

A review of the case studies suggests that the highest level of conflict was in the two "machine" cities and that conflict was also high in San Francisco and Bay City. The obvious common factor in these latter two cities is that they both have high status Negro populations.

This brings us to our second hypothesis, that competition in the Negro community, like competition in the white community, stems from high levels of political participation and hence from high social status. This is of course the argument which we advanced in the preceding chapter to explain the low cohesiveness of school boards in high status cities, and it is consistent with explanations of other community characteristics (see, for example, Hawley, 1963; Pinard, 1963).

However, the hypothesis must be modified in the case of the Negro population, since it must be treated as a subcommunity which is heavily dependent upon the white community surrounding it. If the Negro community is small relative to the white population, then the "boundary" connecting the two communities will be larger and the degree of integration--in housing, schools, employment, and leadership roles--will be greater. The effect will be to bleed off the potential leadership from the ghetto and leave more opportunity for mobility into civil rights roles. For example, in both Bay City and Buffalo Negro political leaders have disassociated themselves from local civil rights activity and identified the total community as their

constituency. Or to note another example of this, in southern communities, where there is very little contact across the boundaries, the civil rights leadership roles are often filled by persons of high general prestige. Thus when the Negro community is of high status and relatively small, there will be the greatest opportunity for organizational pluralism and for leadership mobility. In Table XIV.5 we list the socio-economic status rankings of each city and the percentage Negro of the population, and assign arbitrary weights to combine these two variables into a single rank ordering. Since high status communities tend to be small (the rank order correlation between the two variables is $-.75$), the particular weights used will have little effect; we have chosen weights so that the status will be of more importance than size in the final rank ordering. The ranking based on status only and the ranking based on both status and size are highly correlated ($r = .92$).

TABLE XIV.5


RANKINGS OF SOCIAL STATUS AND SIZE OF NEGRO POPULATION

City	Socio-economic Status			Size		Combined Score	Ranking
	Per Cent White Collar	Per Cent High School Graduates	Combined Ranking, SES	Per Cent Negro	Ranking		
San Francisco	27	40	1.0	9.0	1	61	1.0
Bay City . .	17	37	2.0	9.8	2	47	2.0
Lawndale . .	18	32	3.0	26.4	5	32	3.0
Pittsburgh .	14	25	4.5	16.7	4	28	4.0
Buffalo . .	11	22	7.0	13.8	3	24	5.0
St. Louis .	15	24	4.5	28.8	6	20	6.0
Newark . . .	11	22	7.0	34.4	7	10	7.5
Baltimore .	15	19	7.0	35.0	8	11	7.5

Note: Combined score = (per cent white collar) + (per cent high school graduates) - $2/3$ (per cent Negro in city).

Combined ranking for socio-economic status ranking is based upon (per cent white collar) + (per cent high school graduates).

The correlation of the status-size variable with militancy is negligible (.21). However, the only two cities in the upper left corner of the chart are the two "machine" cities. The other six tend to fall along the diagonal. If the two machine cities are deleted, the correlation rises to .61 among the remaining six cases. Although the correlation is still not high enough to be persuasive, it is consistent with our expectations.



Combined Ranks, Negro SES
and Per Cent of Population Negro

Figure XIV.2.--Size and Status of Negro Population
and Militancy

Note: Initials indicate name of city

The Goals of the Civil Rights Movement

We observed in Chapter X that the school board is accustomed to receiving demands from groups asking the school system to solve, within its present policy framework, a specific problem in a specific school, and that this is one of the reasons why school integration causes difficulty. In the North the civil rights movement tends to ask for the establishment of new policy--opposition to de facto segregation. Furthermore,

the demand is not only novel, it is vague, in the sense that it was unclear precisely why segregation is bad, how and when it should be eliminated, and when it could be said that the task was finished. The civil rights group does not usually specify any particular school, but rather speaks on behalf of the entire Negro community. Thus the demands are abstract, diffuse, and city wide in base. This is the "ideal type" of civil rights movement, and actually this description of the goals of the movement fits only Bay City in our sample. The other cities fall on a continuum, at the other end of which we would find a city where the civil rights movement demanded, on behalf of the parents of one school, that the board stop gerrymandering and redraw a particular boundary in a certain way. Obviously, this sort of demand is much easier for the board to understand and hence to deal with. (No city fits this description very well, but this might apply to the initial activity in Newark, the opposition to the building of Vailsburg High School.) In Table XIV.6 we have ranked seven cities on these three criteria. (Baltimore was excluded from the ranking because the civil rights groups played almost no role in determining the goals of the movement.)

As Table XIV.6 indicates, the three criteria go hand in hand. Together, they come close to reflecting what is meant by the symbolic-welfare distinction. At one extreme, groups are asking for a commitment on the part of the board to the symbols of racial equality; at the other extreme, the movement asks for a specific action to affect a particular group.

In the last column of Table XIV.6 we have listed the Negro socioeconomic status ranking of the city. The rank order correlation is virtually perfect. This is not especially surprising. A large middle class population means that the city has many eyes turned to the mass media, to the national civil rights values. It also means that the population has a large group of Negroes whose real deprivations are not so serious and who can concern themselves with symbolic wounds. (Of course, even a high status population is only high in comparison to other Negro communities--the median family income for Negroes in the high status cities is only slightly over \$4,000.)

TABLE XIV.6

COMPARISON OF CIVIL RIGHTS GOALS IN SEVEN CITIES

City	Initial Demand	Did it stress general <u>de facto</u> segregation?	Was it diffuse?	Was it oriented to entire Negro community?	SES Rank
San Francisco	<u>De facto</u> segregation statement and establishing school board study committee	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Bay City	<u>De facto</u> segregation statement	Yes	Yes	Yes	2
Lawndale	Integrate Woodside High	Partly	Partly	Yes	3
Pittsburgh	Relieve overcrowding at one school, integration plan	Partly	Partly	Partly	4
St. Louis	Preserve West End integration, desegregated busing	No	Partly	No	5
Newark	Integrate Vailsburg High	Only slightly	No	No	6.5
Buffalo	Integrate Woodlawn Junior High	Only slightly	No	No	6.5

Taken together, we now see three different ways in which a high status population produces intense conflict. The Negro community's more

diffuse leadership and more middle class values produce a movement which is diffuse, competitive, militant, and symbol oriented; meanwhile the general presence of high status persons in the community tends to produce weak political parties and a less cohesive school board. This description seems to fit all three of the high status cities in our sample--Bay City, San Francisco, and Lawndale. But like nearly every other finding in this study, this one must be considered tentative until the other large American cities are studied.

Summary

We have isolated only two community characteristics which seem to influence the civil rights movement. First, we have argued that cities with entrenched political machines should tend to produce highly militant civil rights movements, and that high status Negro communities should have more militant movements--and we have also seen that the amount of civil rights activity depends very strongly upon the militancy of the movement. Finally, we have also documented the rather unsurprising hypothesis that high status Negro populations will produce civil rights movements which are more symbol oriented, in that they will make diffuse demands on the school board, involving the whole city and place heavy emphasis upon de facto segregation.

CHAPTER XV

WHY CONFLICT?

Possibly the commonest judgment held about northern school integration is that intense conflict is unavoidable because, as is true of most racial issues, Negroes want a good deal and whites are too prejudiced to give it to them. It seems to us that this statement contains four factual errors. First, intense conflict is avoidable. Our own data indicate, for example, that some of the cities experienced only a brief flurry of picketing. Second, the statement makes the assumption that conflict is to be expected when a racial issue is raised. In fact, many racial issues have been raised and resolved in northern cities without a battle. As we said in the Introduction, war is news and peace is not. Hence national publicity was given to Governor Wallace's 1964 "northern campaign," to the Cadillac and Bank of America employment demonstrations in San Francisco, to such "nonevents" as the World's Fair stall-in (New York), and to such demonstrations of white prejudice as the repeal of open occupancy by referendum in California. But this is hardly a fair picture, for the Gallup poll has indicated that white voters support President Johnson's civil rights legislation. Fair employment and fair housing legislation have been passed in a number of states (and an attempt to prevent Illinois fair housing legislation failed to get the question onto the ballot). In addition, many employers have increased hiring of Negroes, and civil rights groups have refrained from demonstrations in many cases. Finally, it seems to us our data indicate that the civil rights leaders are not in general asking for anything that whites will object strongly to. We have observed that civil rights leaders must often be content with little more than token integration plans, and if they have not been content, they have at least been quiet about it. And we have seen that bussing Negroes into white schools is now common practice in most of our cities with at most a short-lived "white backlash."

Thus we do not see any "natural" reason why school integration issues should be riddled with conflict--the Negro demands are not "unreasonable," whites have shown a willingness to accept school integration, other racial issues have been handled peacefully, and some cities have avoided serious controversy over schools. Yet northern cities have experienced more controversy around the school integration over schools than they have in any other area of racial change. Why is the school issue the difficult one?

We think the reason for this is that compared to other racial issues in northern cities, the parties to the school integration controversy have chosen to keep their dialogue on a highly ideological level. We have seen that conflict has more often broken out over ideological issues than over the actual details of the integration plan. Once the board and the movement have agreed in principle, both sides have demonstrated more flexibility and willingness to compromise. In turn, we see two reasons why the school integration issue should be more ideological. One is the high autonomy of school boards; the other is the symbolic orientation of the civil rights movement.

First, the autonomous school board, which participates in a narrow range of decisions, has less to lose from social conflict than does a mayor, who must make decisions in a whole range of issues. The mayor must decide what combination of decisions over the several issues which he must handle will maximize his chances for reelection and further the goals he holds for the city. He is very likely to decide that all-out war over a racial issue, and the subsequent permanent loss of the Negro vote, is dangerous. On the other hand, the school board is likely to have only one issue--school integration--which is of public importance. If it loses the white vote, it cannot regain it by making a decision in some other area which will please this group. Further, if the school board member is politically ambitious, he must make the school integration into an attention-getting device; thus social conflict is not necessarily to the disadvantage

of the school board member. In the eight cities studied here, mayors interceded in support of the civil rights movement twice; no mayor took a public position in opposition to integration.

Second, the autonomous school board is only indirectly responsible for the day-to-day operation of the schools. The school system is the one department of government which has gone farthest in separating policy making from administration. Thus the school board is not under much pressure to make pragmatic decisions, especially in areas of policy innovation. The pragmatic decision in this case would be to acquiesce to the civil rights demands in order to avoid disrupting the normal operation of the schools. But the school board cannot balance these two values against each other because the normal operation of the schools is not its direct responsibility, but the superintendent's. The school board's task is only to make policy. Thus the whole structure of the school decision-making apparatus tends to make the board focus upon the school integration issue as a matter of policy, and hence as a largely ideological question.

We have presented in this study a statement of the goals of the civil rights movement which is highly symbolic in orientation. We have presented a rationale for this set of goals which makes them appear quite reasonable, but the fact remains that a more "welfare-oriented" approach would also seem reasonable. There are probably a number of reasons why the civil rights groups have made this choice. First, a welfare orientation would plunge the movement into the difficult task of trying to evaluate the quality of education, and would make it very difficult for the NAACP to fall back on its area of greatest experience, legal redress. In addition, the precedent of the southern school cases is handy, and many civil rights leaders are committed to demonstrating that racial discrimination is as real in the North as in the South.

In addition, a welfare-oriented concern for Negro school achievement falls into the trap of raising the issue of innate racial inferiority. If the school system chooses to grant that Negroes do not on the average

learn as well as whites and then cites "cultural deprivation" as the reason, the implication of innate inferiority is clear. This is a very frightening issue, simply because many Negroes, very likely including civil rights leaders, are unconsciously afraid that there is truth here.¹ Thus we think there is some pressure on the civil rights leader to stay with the issue of segregation, rather than open this Pandora's box, where he may find evidence that his worst fears are true.

However, the school integration issue can be transferred from North to South easily only if there is evidence that the schools are in fact intentionally segregated. What happens when there is little or no evidence of de jure segregation? There is still one more test the school system can be put to; they can be asked to demonstrate not merely that they have no segregated schools, but that they personally approve of integration--this leads to the development of the de facto segregation issue. By continuing to focus on schools despite the change in the type of demand made, the civil rights movement has chosen to fight a battle on unique terrain. The de facto school segregation issue is possibly the only case where the movement intentionally sacrifices its strongest weapon, the ability to reveal publicly that the enemy is intentionally discriminating against Negroes. On the other hand, they have the opportunity to win a major moral victory by forcing a public body to commit itself, not merely to nondiscrimination, but to intentional integration and to the principle that public bodies should go out of their way to help Negroes achieve equality.

The school board must face this new demand with very little help available to it. The board cannot depend upon the superintendent, whose narrow orientation is an invitation to extensive controversy. The

¹No research with adult Negroes has established this point, but the work of Goodman (1952) and K. B. Clark and M. P. Clark (1947) with children in doll play point toward this finding. These two studies found that if young Negro children (aged three to six) were offered a choice of brown- or white-colored dolls, they would choose the white doll to play with--in some cases with a transparent comment that the brown one was "bad all over" or that the brown doll was a "nigger."

educational profession has not taken a position which could guide an individual school. The federal courts have not made decisions which give guidance to the school boards, and the federal government has taken no action. The only help the school board has received in the form of a guideline for policy has been from state governments. A number of states have passed legislation committing school boards to a policy of furthering integration, and in particular, New York's State Commissioner of Education has played a very active role in helping local boards to bring their practices into line with this policy. We saw in the case of Buffalo that Commissioner Allen's intervention had an important effect on the behavior of the board. Although we have no data, it seems likely that the same sort of thing is happening in other states as well. The effect of the state's intervention is to resolve the ideological issue and leave the contesting parties with the simpler problems of negotiating the details of the settlement.

The school integration conflict has some parallels with labor-management negotiations--not the present highly structured and rather tame contract negotiations, but the recognition battles during the first part of this century. At that time there was no common acceptance of the principle of collective bargaining. The factory owner was faced with an unprecedented demand, and it was largely up to him to decide whether it should be considered legitimate. If he chose to deny the legitimacy of the workers' demand, the result was sometimes a long and blood-drenched strike. The issue was redefined with the passage of the Wagner Act and the establishment of the National Labor Relations Board. We shall see when we turn to the desegregation of southern schools (Report No. 110B) that the federal government is now playing a strong role which has apparently redefined the issue and prevented overt social conflict. The federal government may eventually play some sort of lesser role in the North, possibly serving as a mediator of disputes. One can imagine the NAACP and the school board agreeing to bring in a federal mediator just as they presently agree to the appointment of a biracial citizens committee or to calling on the state commissioner of education.

Thus we see a distinct possibility that a national climate of opinion will develop which will narrow the range of alternatives open to school boards and hence dampen considerably the conflict they are now facing.

If we continue to look to the future, we also see the possibility that the civil rights movement will become more welfare oriented in its approach. The federal government has here set one guideline by redefining a part of the civil rights revolution as a war on poverty. In addition, the continued emphasis of the schools on compensatory education is an invitation to the movement to engage in a dialogue in these terms. Finally, the new civil rights groups have stressed grass-roots organization. Since the people "in the neighborhoods" seem to be more welfare oriented, this will also have an impact on their orientation. Whether this will lead to more or less conflict with the schools is hard to say. On the one hand, it will prevent the present "hang-up" on ideology; on the other hand, as we pointed out earlier, the welfare oriented civil rights movement may demand much more in the way of results. One possibility is that there will be great pressure for the publication of achievement test scores, just as there was pressure for publication of racial censuses of schools.

If these changes occur, how much of our analysis of the differences between cities will remain valid? It is a truism that the conditions which lead to successful resolution of one issue will not necessarily lead to resolution of another issue, and a more welfare oriented issue, or an issue which requires coordination with the demand of the state or federal government, would in many ways be different from what northern schools have faced until now. We shall see when we look at southern school desegregation that the factors which lead to acquiescence in the North are not as important in the South. In particular, because of the ideological and legal clarity of the issue, southern board members do not have to be race liberals in order to acquiesce. However, this does not mean that the issue will change completely; certainly, it is hard to imagine a condition

under which the race liberalism of the school board would be of no importance in determining the outcome.

It also seems plausible that the typology of school boards based upon the presence or absence of (to put it simply) the "upper class" and "middle class" in the city will remain of interest. How cities will change in these respects is hard to predict, of course. It seems to us that the increased participation of the civic elite in local decision making has been due to an increased interest in economic development and improvements in civic welfare, and not because of any rising interest in "reform." This suggests that there will be little charter reform, weakening of political parties, or elimination of patronage, and that consequently, if the interest of the civic elite continues to grow, more cities will fall into the "balance of power" cell in our typology, where an active civic elite coexists with strong political parties. Granted, continued increases in leisure time and in levels of education will encourage more independence on the part of the voters, but if the structure of government is not changed, political parties will not be appreciably weakened, especially in the "balance of power" cities. Up to now, reform has been a double-edged sword which has destroyed the policy-making ability of government at the same time that it has eliminated corruption. However, there is some evidence that opinion leaders in this field have become more conscious of the need for governmental centralization and for strong political parties.

The other main goal of this study was to develop some ideas of the differences in the political "styles" of cities. In our attempt to do so, we have been forced to paint in broad strokes--to take a few variables and try to extract the maximum in explanatory power from them. In the process we have left a great many questions unanswered. And certainly, other factors must be introduced. However, we do think that the two factors--the role of the civic elite and the openness of the system to public participation (which seems to be what is reflected in the socio-economic status of the city and in its correlate, the strength of political parties)--which

are the basis for our typology will reappear in analyses of other issues. The pervasive influence of the political party in structuring even the one governmental institution which is most often out of politics, the school board, is surprising, if we are correct in this conclusion. We suggested that the presence of strong political parties tended to result in the organization of the civic elite; and that the two factors together then led to a highly structured process of school board recruitment and produced a cohesive school board. If this is correct, then it follows that there will be very few areas of community action where the tightness of the party structure will not play a role.

At several points in this report we have advanced hypotheses, fully realizing that our own data constituted little or no evidence for them. One of these points is in our conceptualization of the "civic elite." We have taken a position somewhere between the power structure theorists and their critics. Like the students of community power structures, we have accepted the notion that economic and civic leaders play a major role in local politics, but we have rejected the notion that there is a structure of power. Rather we have advanced the idea that the civic elite is a very loosely related group of persons who participate in local politics as individuals and who frequently act with little intention of furthering their own direct economic interests, although they may well be furthering the goals of the business class. For cities in the 400,000 to 1,000,000 size range, the main factor which seems to explain their ability to organize and influence local government is the extent to which this group still lives in the city. Obviously, we can expect that when we study smaller cities, we will find that here also some elites will be powerful while others are weak. Yet in smaller cities we will probably find that the elite is not suburbanized, and we will have to turn to some other factor as an explanation. This is one of the many questions left open by this research.

Counts (1927) demonstrates clearly that at the time of his writing school boards drew very few of their members from the laboring class which

made up the bulk of the population. Counts makes it clear that his research is motivated by the assumption that the businessmen who are so heavily overrepresented on school boards would not represent the interests of the workers in the way that workers would if they were able to serve on school boards. Today the radical voices of the civil rights movement pick up a related theme and discuss the "white power structure." However, our data indicate clearly that the members of the white power structure and the business class are the ones most willing to break with traditions and to innovate in order to meet the demands of the most oppressed group in our society. The finding is really not so surprising. Furthermore, we see no reason to accept Counts' assumption--that putting working-class men on school boards will eliminate the school system's middle class bias. When we examine a school board made up of professional politicians with close ties to the working class, we do not see a different educational philosophy in operation. It may well be that all school systems operate with a heavy bias in favor of the middle class. But if this is true, more will need to be done than simply appointing a "proletarian" school board to change this.

The continued increase in research into educational decision making has tended to emphasize the role of the school administrator and by comparison has tended to ignore the school board. In the case of school integration, however, it seems clear that the school board has more influence on the outcome than does the superintendent. In designing this research much attention was paid to the channels of direct communication and influence which operated on the school board to determine their decisions--influence not only from the superintendent but also from the civic elite and political leaders. With few exceptions, we found the school board to be a highly autonomous body. Thus we are tempted to reject one view of the city, that of a tightly structured political body in which behind-the-scene influence tends to place control of major decisions in a few hands.

The decision about school integration is one of the most important to be made in any city, and we find that the powerful men of the city either

do not choose to influence this decision, or attempt to and are unable. Yet at the same time, we find that cities which have influential civic elites have school boards that act as if they were being influenced by the elite. The reason for this consistency is that the influentials exert their influence indirectly by acting to set a "style" of politics for the city. It is this political style which overrides the actual formal governmental structure to produce a school board which then takes actions appropriate to the style.

APPENDIX I

THE SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE OF CITIES

The universe from which the sample of northern cities was selected is all cities between 250,000 and 1,000,000 in population having 10 per cent or more of its population Negro and located outside of those states in the Confederacy in the Civil War. The universe was limited to cities with 10 per cent or more of the population Negro, so that there would be some assurance that the issue of school desegregation had been salient in the community. Cities over 250,000 were chosen by the definition of the study as being "large" cities. Cities over 1,000,000 in population were eliminated--partly because the issue in these cities would probably be too complicated to fit into a comparative framework, but primarily because we felt that those five cities had been studied already by others. The twenty cities in the universe include six border cities (in Oklahoma, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland), five northeastern cities, seven midwestern cities, and two in the West.

With this universe established, the sample was selected on the basis of three variables--geographical location, size, and proportion of the population Negro. Location was considered relevant because of possible cultural factors, i.e., in the contrast between border states and the rest of the North, or between West and East. The politics, economics, and social structure of cities is thought to vary by size, and thus this variable was introduced. The relative proportion of the population Negro is thought to affect the system of politics and leadership within the Negro community and the relationship between the Negro and white segments of the community.

Further, it was decided to select the sample of cities in matched pairs in order to increase the range of comparative variables which could be analyzed. The size of the sample is eight cities.

The first step was to divide the cities into border cities and northern cities. There are six border cities and fourteen northern cities.

The decision was then made to select one matched pair of border cities and three matched pairs of northern cities. Thus two graphs of population size by percentage Negro were constructed, one with border cities on it (Figure A-I.1) and one with northern cities on it (Figure A-I.2).

In Figure A-I.1, with the use of the principle of least distance between cities in a pair, the cities are easily divided into three pairs as indicated on the graph--St. Louis and Baltimore, Louisville and Kansas City, Oklahoma City and Tulsa. The three pairs were put on three pieces of paper, dropped into a hat, and one was drawn. The pair selected was St. Louis with Baltimore.

The selection of the three pairs of northern cities was begun in the same manner. Since we had already drawn a pair of large cities with large Negro populations, it was decided to draw three more pairs which would include small cities with large Negro populations and both large and small cities with small Negro populations. The fourteen cities were divided into the four quadrants shown in Figure A-I.2, and the cities were paired within each quadrant as much as possible. City A in the upper right hand corner could not be paired with any other city and was in the same quadrant as St. Louis and Baltimore, so it was eliminated; we then found that if we eliminated City F, the remaining twelve cities could be paired as shown. In every case a port city was paired with another, and inland cities were paired with each other. Since it was necessary to conceal the names of two of these cities in the report, they will not be identified here.

In the initial drawing the pairs D-E, G-H, and K-L were selected. However, we decided that the pairs drawn had several problems; first, our preliminary contact with informants in cities G and H left us uncertain whether racial issues had ever come up in the schools; second, we felt that we were overrepresenting one region of the country, since G, H, K, and L are all in the western New York-Pennsylvania-Ohio area. Finally, it was decided that an additional western city would be useful. For these reasons, cities G and H were dropped and cities M and N added.




Figure A-I.1. --Border Cities Graphed (City Size by Per Cent Negro)




Figure A-I.2. --Northern Cities Graphed (City Size by Per Cent Negro)

APPENDIX II

COMPARING THE EXTENT OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN THE EIGHT CITIES

In all eight cities a racial census of the pupils by school has been made. From this it is possible to derive several different indices of the extent of school integration. The index we have chosen to use is the percentage of the Negro elementary school population in schools that are over 10 per cent white in enrollment. This percentage varies from 8 per cent in St. Louis (before the increase in bussing of Negro students) to 70 per cent in San Francisco, as shown in Table A-II.1.

We noted in Chapter X that there is little or no relationship between the number of Negro students in integrated schools and the attitude of the civil rights movement toward the school system. This is to be expected, since the extent of segregation in the school is largely outside the control of the school system. The most ambitious program of school integration in this sample is probably St. Louis'; and it has increased the percentage of Negroes in school with whites by only 6 per cent.

Figures A-II.1 and A-II.2 indicate the roots of school segregation. In the first figure we have plotted the index of school integration against the Taueber coefficient of residential segregation (K. Taueber and A. Taueber, 1965). The Taueber coefficients are indices of dissimilarity between the location of the Negro and white population, and they approximately indicate the percentage of the population which would have to move in order to disperse Negroes equally throughout the city. We have used the complement, $100-T$, in Figure A-II.1. In Figure A-II.2 we have added a second factor, the size of the Negro school population. In general, the number of Negroes in integrated schools will be related to the number who live on the periphery of the ghetto, and the length of the periphery increases proportionately to the square root of the population, so we have used the square root. The correlation is not very high in Figure A-II.2, and we are tempted to try to determine how much of the deviation might be attributed to school policy; but most of the deviation results from the fact that

the more irregular the shape of the ghetto, the greater will be its periphery in relation to its area. For example, three of the four cities which fall above the regression line have more than one Negro ghetto; the four cities below the line have the bulk of their Negroes concentrated in a single residential area.

TABLE A-II.1

PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PUPILS IN SCHOOLS WHICH ARE OVER 10 PER CENT WHITE, FOR EACH CITY

<u>City</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
San Francisco	70
Bay City	57
Pittsburgh	48
Lawndale	37
Newark	28
Buffalo	20
Baltimore	17
St. Louis	8

Per Cent of
Negro Elementary
School Students
In Integrated
Schools




Figure A-II.1.--Extent of School Integration and Index of Residential Segregation

Per Cent of
Negro Elementary
School Students
In Integrated
Schools




Figure A-II.2.--Extent of School Integration, and Index Combining Size of Negro School Population and Degree of Residential Segregation

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